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Abstract
The three essays in this dissertation examine questions related to the R&D boundaries of
the firm and the governance of R&D alliances. The first essay draws on institutional theory to
examine the history of corporate R&D in the U.S. since the mid-19th century. Formal and
informal institutional rules and constraints are shown to play a role in the initial rise of markets
for technology in the 19th century, their decline during the early-20th century, and their eventual
return at the end of the 20th century. The influence of formal and informal institutions on the
adoption of in-house R&D labs in the U.S. during the mid-20th century is also examined.
In the second essay, the focus shifts to an investigation of the discrete project-level R&D
outsourcing decision. A framework for understanding the direct and indirect influence of
strategic considerations and environmental factors is developed. The impact of project- and
transaction-level characteristics on the R&D outsourcing decisions are also considered,
highlighting the importance of integrating information possessed by managers from different
levels of the firms. Finally, the second essay proposes that cross-level interactions may exist
within the framework, which may help to explain why the decisions observed in some cases run
counter to the predictions traditionally derived from theory.
The third essay includes two empirical studies that examine different aspects of the
contracts designed to govern R&D alliances. Using a unique set of contracts from the medical
device industry, the studies in the final essay investigate the factors that influence the structure of
R&D alliance contracts and the assignment of key decision and control rights in such contracts.
In addition, the final essay investigates the impact of previous alliance experience on the
relationship between the key factors identified and the structure of R&D alliance contracts.
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1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Research Topic: The R&D Boundaries of the Firm and R&D Alliances
Technological creativity is often credited as an important driver of economic progress. In
addition, technological creativity has enhanced living standards by improving clothing,
healthcare, housing and nutrition. As Mokyr states, in the absence of technological creativity,
‘we would all still live nasty and short lives of toil, drudgery, and discomfort’ (1990: vii).
However, for most of human history, technological change could hardly be considered the result
of an orderly research and development (R&D) process. Particularly in the U.S., technological
creativity originated from sources other than corporate R&D laboratories until sometime
between 1875 and 1900 (Hounshell, 1996).
Today, corporate R&D occupies a central role in the advancement of technology and the
development of new products. According to a recent study, companies spent $282 billion on
R&D in the U.S. during 2009 (National Science Foundation, 2012). Approximately $225 billion
of this funding originated from the companies’ own sources, while the federal government
contributed approximately $40 billion of the $57 billion of R&D paid for by other sources. It is
important to note, however, that these funds are not just allocated to R&D conducted internally
(i.e., carried out solely by the companies’ own labs), but also to R&D conducted in collaboration
with other entities. Among the 104 R&D managers surveyed by the Industrial Research Institute,
external R&D collaboration continues to be an area of increased emphasis (Antcliff, 2012).
Specifically, between 2007 and 2012, participation in R&D alliances and joint ventures
consistently ranked at the top of the list of tools for external R&D collaboration in terms of
investment. Survey respondents expect that such relationships will continue to be an important
element of their firm’s technology/product development strategy in the future.
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The R&D boundaries of the firm and R&D alliances have received a considerable
amount of attention in the literature. Researchers have investigated a variety of topics, ranging
from the choice between in-house and external sources of R&D in the face of technological
change (e.g., Pisano, 1990) to how the value created by the members of an R&D alliance is
divided (e.g., Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). The concept of ‘open innovation’, which suggests
‘that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external
paths to market, as the firms look to advance their technology’ (Chesbrough, 2003: xxiv), has
particularly garnered interest in both academic and practitioner circles. Despite the wealth of
research that has been conducted, there are several fruitful areas of inquiry and many questions
yet to be answered about the R&D boundaries of the firm and R&D alliances. The three essays in
this dissertation attempt to address a number of these opportunities.
1.2. An Institutional Theory Investigation of U.S. Technology Development Trends since
the Mid-19th Century
The first essay examines technology development trends in the U.S. since the mid-19th
century. During the 19th and early-20th centuries, a market for technology flourished wherein
firms obtained patents from individual inventors, independent labs and universities (Lamoreaux
and Sokoloff, 1997, 1999). This market steadily declined during the 1920s to the point where the
in-house R&D lab became the dominant mode of technology development for most firms for
much of the 20th century. However, a new market for technology emerged in the late-20th century
(Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001), along with the appearance of new forms of
collaborative R&D such as joint ventures, alliances and research consortia. Just as importantly,
firms did not simply replace internal R&D with external sources. Rather, many firms adopted a
balanced approach to technology development that considers external sources of technology as
complementary to, rather than a substitute for, the in-house lab (Arora and Gambardella, 1990).
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These shifts bring to light several important questions. What factors gave rise to the
initial market for technology in the 19th century? Why did this market decline in the early-20th
century, only to re-emerge at the close of the century? Why did the in-house R&D model
become so dominant during the middle of the 20th century? What gave rise to the relatively new
collaborative organizational forms dedicated to technology development in the late-20th century?
Whereas previous research has drawn on firm-level theories (i.e., transaction cost
economics, the capabilities perspective, the trust-based view) to help enhance our understanding
of the choice between internal and contractual modes of technology development at the project
level for discrete transactions, such theories have been less instructive when trying to explain the
two distinct shifts in the history of technology development in the U.S. Institutional theory offers
an alternative explanation that may account for the aggregate trends observed. Institutions
include both informal relations and norms and formal laws and organizations that establish ‘the
rules of the game’ and ‘how the game is played’ (North, 1990: 3). Institutions are considered to
be highly persistent, thus a change in an institution often requires some catalyzing event (Sine
and David, 2003; Geels, 2004) or the coalescence of individuals/organizations around the
recognition that current institutions no longer address critical problems (Schön, 1971).
Based on an inductive analysis of the history of technology development and corporate
R&D in the U.S., the first essay shows that both formal and informal institutional rules and
constraints played a role in the initial rise of markets for technology, their decline during the
early-20th century, and their eventual return at the end of the 20th century. The influence of
formal and informal institutions on the widespread adoption of in-house R&D labs in the U.S.
during the mid-20th century is also discussed. This essay draws on and integrates insights from
institutional economics with those from the various branches of institutional theory rooted in
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sociology. The adoption of a pan-disciplinary approach is particularly useful when analyzing
historical phenomenon and shifts in trends across long time periods, such as those observed in
the first essay.
1.3. The R&D Outsourcing Decision: Environmental Factors and Strategic Considerations
In the second essay, a framework for understanding the direct and indirect influence of
various strategic considerations and environmental factors on the project-level R&D outsourcing
decision is developed. Again, transaction cost economics has factored prominently into research
that has examined this decision (e.g., Pisano, 1990; Ulset, 1996). Despite general support for the
predictions based on transaction cost economics, individual project-level decisions often run
counter to theory, suggesting that other factors may play a role. The second essay argues that
environmental factors act as shift parameters that increase or decrease the costs of outsourcing.
Seven prominent environmental factors that indirectly influence the project-level R&D
outsourcing decision are discussed. Previous research by Prahalad (1998), Chesbrough (2003),
and Gassmann (2006) that has investigated the erosion of the so-called ‘closed innovation’
paradigm shaped the list of factors examined in this essay. Importantly, these factors have not
impacted all industries equally. However, in contexts where these environmental factors are
prevalent, ‘open innovation’ models of technology development are more likely to be
appropriate and feasible (Gassmann, 2006), making it more likely that R&D outsourcing is
occurring.
The second essay also suggests that it is important to consider firm-specific strategic
considerations in addition to the project- and transaction-level characteristics that are typically
the focus of an R&D outsourcing decision. This suggestion highlights the importance of
integrating the information possessed by managers from different levels of the firm. For
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example, the decisions made by an R&D manager are likely to be framed by their firm’s overall
technology strategy, which is likely to be set by top management. One important dimension of a
firm’s technology strategy is its technological aggressiveness. Previous research indicates that
technologically aggressive firms (i.e., those that are considered technology pioneers) are usually
less likely to acquire external technology (Brockhoff and Pearson, 1992). Rather, such firms
focus on investing in the development of their internal R&D capabilities.
The second essay suggests that a firm’s technological and relational capabilities are also
important firm-specific characteristics that factor prominently into the project-level R&D
outsourcing decision. Specifically, it is the strength of these capabilities at a given point in time
that is likely to influence whether managers even consider the option to outsource viable. In
addition, the conceptual model developed in the second essay examines several project-level
characteristics that have not received as much attention in the literature previously. The second
essay concludes with a discussion of the potential for cross-level interactions. An examination of
such interactions underscores the importance of considering the context within which individual
outsourcing decisions are made. Recognition of these interactions may help to explain why the
decisions observed in some cases run counter to the predictions of transaction cost economics.
1.4. An Empirical Examination of the Design of R&D Alliance Contracts in the Medical
Device Industry
Whereas the first two essays focus on questions related to the R&D boundaries of the
firm, the third essay examines the actual contracts developed to govern R&D alliances after the
decision to form a partnership has been made. A substantial body of research has examined the
R&D boundaries of the firm, notably Pisano (1990), Ulset (1996), Robertson and Gatignon
(1998) and Odagiri (2003). In contrast, the formal contracts that establish the terms and structure
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of alliances have only recently gained much attention in the strategic management literature
(Weber, Mayer, and Wu, 2009).
Economic theories of contracting assert that more complex/complete contracts are
necessary to deal with the hazards that plague transactions. Williamson (1985) suggests,
however, that terms should only be included if they contend with a specific hazard that is present
or likely to arise. As a result, while some terms may be widely applicable, others are likely to be
context-specific. The first study in the third essay focuses on the hazards that are prominent in
R&D alliances, and how partners deal with such hazards contractually. Specifically,
communication and appropriation challenges, and the contractual solutions devised to contend
with them, are examined.
Economic theories of contracting also assume that managers and lawyers have the
foresight to perceive hazards, or at least learn quickly from their experience, enabling them to
develop contracts that appropriately deal with the hazards present. Evidence indicates, however,
that managers and lawyers are not as farsighted as theory suggests (e.g., Mayer and Argyres,
2004; Lumineau, Fréchet, and Puthod, 2011). Thus, this assumption is relaxed in order to
investigate if and how previous contract design experience impacts the development of R&D
alliance contracts. The study also delves into whether all contracting experience contributes
equally to the knowledge that managers and lawyers gain about designing alliance contracts.
Specifically, the study examines whether experience with alliances that involve other value chain
activities (i.e., marketing, manufacturing) helps managers and lawyers to draft R&D alliance
contracts that contain the appropriate provisions.
The second study in the third essay also examines issues revolving around contract
design in R&D alliances, namely the allocation of decision and control rights. Such rights refer
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to provisions in alliance contracts that provide, for instance, one partner with ownership over key
alliance assets and the right to decide how they should be used. Research in this stream has
primarily drawn on property rights theory (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore,
1990; Hart, 1995). Following in this tradition, this study examines the assignment of two specific
rights: the ownership of foreground intellectual property and severe termination rights (i.e., those
that can be invoked unilaterally and unconditionally). Recent research suggests that different
rights matter to different partners (Ariño and Ring, 2010; Kloyer, 2011), and play different
functions (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). Thus, this study deviates from previous research by
suggesting that different factors influence the assignment of rights that play different functions.
The research questions posed in each study of third essay are investigated in the context
of the medical device industry. Several factors make the medical device industry an ideal setting
for examining questions related to the design of R&D alliance contracts: (1) it is highly R&D
intensive, (2) the emergence of convergence products (i.e., those that bring together discrete
areas of science/technology) presents a capabilities challenge to industry incumbents, and (3)
most of the R&D alliances between large firms and their smaller, entrepreneurial partners are
organized contractually. A unique data set comprised on 66 actual alliance contracts, drawn from
Windhover’s Strategic Transactions database, was employed to test the hypotheses developed in
each study.
1.5. Conclusion
In summary, organized R&D is a relatively recent phenomenon when the scope of human
history is considered. However, in the U.S., the R&D boundaries of the firms shifted twice since
the mid-19th century. As a result, scholars have sought to explain why these boundaries have
shifted at both the economy-wide and project level. The essays in this dissertation follow in this
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tradition. Using the model of the economics of institutions developed by North (1990), and
formalized by Williamson (1998, 2000), these essays can be organized as shown in Figure 1-1.

An Institutional Theory
Investigation of U.S.
Technology
Development Trends
since the Mid-19th
Century
The R&D Outsourcing
Decision:
Environmental and
Strategic
Considerations

Level 1:
Informal
Institutions

Level 2:
Formal
Institutions

Level 3:
Governance

An Empirical
Examination of the
Design of R&D
Alliance Contracts in
the Medical Device
Industry

Level 4:
Resource
Allocation
Figure 1-1. The three essays in relation to the model of the economics of institutions

The focus of the first essay is on explaining aggregate trends related to the shifting R&D
boundaries of the firm in the U.S. over a period of roughly one and half centuries through the
lens of institutional theory. Thus, the first essay straddles the top three levels of the model, as the
study conducted discusses how informal and formal norms established the rules by which
governance decisions related to R&D evolved. The second essay is also shown to straddle the top
three levels of the model. The distinct focus of this essay, however, is on explaining the projectlevel R&D outsourcing decision. Again, informal and formal norms, as represented by several of
the environmental factors discussed in this essay, are shown to play an important role as shift
parameters in the governance decision represented by Level 3 of the model. Finally, the studies
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conducted in third essay are shown to be linked to Level 3 of the model directly in recognition
that decisions regarding contract structure represent choices made by managers that determine
how an R&D alliance will be governed.
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CHAPTER 2
AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY INVESTIGATION OF
U.S. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TRENDS SINCE THE MID-19th CENTURY
2.1. Introduction
The reliance on contractual modes of technology acquisition and development grew
rapidly in the U.S. in the late-20th century. Howells (1999) and Chesbrough (2001) suggest that
this is something of a return to the norm for technology development that existed throughout the
late-19th and early-20th centuries, before the advent of the in-house R&D lab. During much of
that period, a market for technology flourished wherein firms obtained patents from individual
inventors, independent labs and universities (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1997, 1999). However,
the market declined in the 1920s, and in-house R&D became the dominant mode of technology
development for much of the 20th century.
A new market for technology emerged in the late-20th century (Arora, Fosfuri, and
Gambardella, 2001). Licensing revenue in the U.S. increased from $3 billion in 1980 to $110
billion in 2000 (Rigby and Zook, 2002). Firms also began to experiment with collaborative forms
of organization dedicated to technology development. The number of new technology
development partnerships formed annually surged from fewer than ten per year in the 1960s to
approximately 500 in 1989 (Hagedoorn, 2002). While there were several fluctuations over the
ensuing decades, the trend continued, reaching a peak of 750 new partnerships in 2004
(Schilling, 2009).
Despite the rapid growth in the reliance on contractual modes of technology development
and acquisition, in-house R&D continues to play an important role for many firms. Funding of
internal R&D has continued to grow in the early 21st century (Grueber and Studt, 2009).
However, it does appear that a more balanced approach to technology development has emerged,
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wherein external sources of technology are complementary to, rather than a substitute for, the inhouse lab (Arora and Gambardella, 1990).
These shifts bring to light several questions. What factors gave rise to the initial market
for technology in the 19th century? Why did the market for technology decline in the early-20th
century, only to re-emerge at the end of the century? Why did the in-house R&D model become
so dominant during the middle of the 20th century? Was it merely ‘a temporary episode within a
larger Smithian process of the division of labor,’ as Langlois (2003: 251) suggests? What gave
rise to the relatively new collaborative organizational forms dedicated to technology
development in the late-20th century? Why has the licensing of technology grown so rapidly
since the 1980s?
To examine these questions, this essay adopts a pan-disciplinary view of institutional
theory that draws on economics and sociology. Given the longitudinal nature of the questions
examined in this essay, it is suggested that this approach is appropriate. As North (1990) notes,
institutional theory is a particularly powerful lens for examining economic phenomenon both at a
moment in time and over time. This feature is particularly valuable, as technology development
practices in the U.S. have changed twice over the period examined in this study. It is important to
recognize that the current period is not likely to be the determinative end-point in the evolution
of these trends either; they are apt to change again at some time in the future. Thus, any theory
employed needs to be able to account for the possibility of change and how change comes about.
Recent work by scholars of institutionalism has focused on further developing the theory of
change (e.g., Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006).
Institutional scholars have long acknowledged that the institutional setting can influence
the organizational options available to decision makers (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985, 1998;
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Nee, 1992). While institutional theory concepts have been relied on to explain societal and
national trends, Ingram and Clay (2000) suggest that such concepts can be extended to
investigate industry and firm-level trends as well. Thus, the institutional framework developed
by North (1990) and formalized by Williamson (1998, 2000), which asserts that actors pursue
their interests by making choices within constraints, serves as the starting point for the analysis
conducted in this essay. This framework is extended by integrating North’s theory of informal
norms with research on the role of science in industry and on managerial beliefs regarding
internal control of innovation. The objective of this essay is not to test institutional theory per se,
but rather to use institutional theory to further understanding of the major shifts that were
observed.
This essay is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief discussion of the
literature that examines technology development and acquisition. In particular, firm-level
theories that have been drawn upon to analyze project- and firm-level decisions are reviewed.
The difficulties of relying on such theories alone to answer the questions that are posed in this
essay are then discussed. Institutional theory is then introduced as an alternative lens that can
help to further understanding of the aggregate trends observed. The history of technology
development in the U.S. since the mid-19th century is then examined through the lens of
institutional theory. This historical examination is divided into three eras in which several formal
institutions and informal norms and beliefs are identified. Finally, the implications of and
conclusions from this analysis are discussed.
2.2. The Technology Development Mode Decision
As noted, the acquisition and development of technology via contractual arrangements
dramatically increased in the late-20th century. Initially, scholars were puzzled by this trend,
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particularly the formation of technology development joint ventures. Conventional wisdom held
that due to the inherent risk of spillovers and the sensitive nature of technology development,
firms would simply exclude it from joint ventures (Hladik, 1985). Despite this concern, a variety
of managerial motives for relying on the market for technology and contractual arrangements
were uncovered including the shortening of innovation cycle times, the sharing of risk, and
increased access to new markets (Powell, 1987; Hagedoorn, 1993).1
As the trade of technology and the reliance on contractual modes of technology
acquisition and development continued to grow, a large body of scholarly research studying this
phenomenon emerged. Much of this research draws on transaction cost economics (TCE). In
general, TCE suggests that conducting activities internally is preferred over spot market
contracts and partnerships when transaction-specific investments are required or when demand
or technological uncertainty is high (Williamson, 1975). Building on these central tenets, Teece
(1988) was among the first to examine the reluctance of firms to rely on the market for
technology through the lens of TCE. Noting that transferring information and technical
specifications between firms is costly, time-consuming and fraught with hazards, Teece (1988)
suggests that firms are likely to conduct technology development internally when it is difficult to
write a complete contract with a prospective partner and enforce the agreed upon clauses.
Empirical work generally provides support for TCE logic. For example, Pisano (1990)
found that firms are less likely to rely on the market for technology when few suppliers are
available, and when intellectual property rights are relatively weak and difficult to enforce.
Robertson and Gatignon (1998) also found that firms are more likely to conduct technology

1

It is interesting to note that many of the same rationales for choosing between in-house R&D and obtaining the
services of an external partner were expressed much earlier by Nelles (1958).
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development in-house when demand is relatively unpredictable, supplier performance is difficult
to verify, and transaction-specific assets are required.
Another stream in the firm-based literature suggests that technological capabilities impact
the choice between internal and contractual modes of technology development (e.g., Kogut and
Zander, 1992; Argyres, 1996; Foss, 1996). In general, capabilities are inherently complex,
casually ambiguous and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Connor and
Prahalad, 1996). Firms are largely heterogeneous in terms of their technological capabilities as a
result of past choices regarding which technologies to develop. Thus, a firm’s technological
capabilities are likely to be inferior to those of potential suppliers who have invested to a greater
degree in a specific technology. According to the logic of the capabilities perspective, it is often
more efficient for a firm to obtain the capabilities that it lacks from an external source rather than
to build them internally due to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989).
Conversely, when a firm has invested in certain technological capabilities, it should prefer to
leverage them, especially if they are superior relative to those of potential suppliers.
A parallel stream of the capabilities literature suggests that a firm’s skills related to
selecting attractive partners, negotiating and enforcing contracts, and managing inter-firm
relationships may also impact the choice between internal and contractual modes of technology
development. Firms that frequently interact with other firms gain experience learning how to
structure and manage inter-firm partnerships (Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002; Sampson, 2005).
Thus, as firms develop ‘relational capabilities’, the probability of entering future contractual
relationships is likely to increase (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
A final perspective that has been relied on is the trust-based view. According to this
perspective, a firm is likely to enter into new contractual relationships with firms that it has
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previously interacted with (Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000). The rationale for this preference is
that search and selection can be time-consuming and costly, making previous interactions with a
particular firm valuable. Familiarity can help to establish trust (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992),
increasing the likelihood that a firm will form a new relationship with a trustworthy former
partner rather than search more broadly for a new partner.
Overall, firm-level perspectives have enhanced understanding of the choice between
internal and contractual modes of technology development at the project level for discrete
transactions. Yet, it is difficult to explain the two distinct shifts observed in the history of
technology development in the U.S. using only firm-level theories. For example, according to
TCE-logic, considerable variation in the mode of technology development during any time
period should be expected owing to the unique characteristics of each transaction. However,
during the middle of the 20th century, internal technology development was the dominant mode.
Thus, the explanatory power of firm-level theories alone appears to be limited in this particular
case.
What other factors may account for the aggregate trends observed? Williamson (1985,
1998) contends that transactions are embedded in a larger social context that needs to be
accounted for in governance decisions, such as the choice of technology development mode.
Hagedoorn (2006) suggests that the decision to enter a technology partnership is likely to be
impacted by country- and industry-specific characteristics, as well as changes in these
characteristics over time. Thus, the choice of technology development mode may at least
partially depend on exogenous factors that lay outside of the specific transaction.
A potential solution to this problem may be to better understand the role of contextual
factors on the observed trends. While there are several theories that can be called upon to explain
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the impact of context, this essay adopts a pan-disciplinary approach that integrates ideas from the
economics and sociological branches of institutional theory. Some of the underlying assumptions
regarding the decision-making process differ between institutional scholars in economics and
sociology. Whereas economists emphasize rationality and profit maximizations motives as the
key drivers behind decisions, sociologists stress the role of behavioral and cognitive
explanations. Despite these differences, both streams agree that formal rules and informal norms
constrain the decision-making process (North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Hodgson, 1998; Ingram and
Clay, 2000). Simply put, institutions define ‘the rules of the game’ (North, 1990: 3; Williamson,
2000: 598), and these rules are viewed as highly persistent.
2.3. Methodology
Due to their persistence, Barley and Tolbert (1997) suggest that changes to institutions
can only be observed through historical longitudinal studies. Consistent with this suggestion, an
inductive historical investigation of technology development by U.S. firms from the mid-19th
century to the present is conducted in this essay. Adopting an approach similar to Hargadon and
Douglas (2001), a well-documented history, where the facts are reasonably settled in order to
offer an explanation for the shifts that were observed, was examined. Consequently, the
contribution of this essay is not the discovery of previously unknown historical facts but an
interpretation of technology development trends through the lens of institutional theory.
The historical account in this essay starts in the mid-19th century, as at that time a great
wave of administrative innovations (e.g., the development of the line-and-staff organization,
selective forward integration by manufacturers into distribution) triggered the evolution of
business in the U.S. that gave rise to the modern corporation (Chandler, 1977). Particularly in the
U.S., the latter half of the 19th century witnessed the rapid and widespread adoption of these
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organizational innovations (Chandler, 1962). In addition, the business practices and
organizational forms in the U.S. before the mid-19th century would be scarcely recognizable to a
modern manager (Williamson, 1981). Thus, the mid-19th century appears to be an appropriate
starting point for this analysis.
Many possible explanations could be offered for the shifts in technology development
trends observed since the mid-19th century in the U.S. Thus, care was taken to determine whether
a potential cause coincided with the timing of a shift in the trend. For example, in looking for an
explanation for why firms began to establish internal R&D labs in the early 20th century, the
obvious answer is the vigorous enforcement of antitrust regulation sanctioned by the Supreme
Court in the Northern Securities ruling of 1904. This ruling clamped down on mergers and
acquisitions, pressuring firms to diversify organically through product development driven by
internal R&D. However, U.S. firms had already established internal R&D labs before the ruling.
Consequently, the Northern Securities decision by itself appears as though it is not the sole
driver of the internalization of R&D in the early-20th century. As is suggested later in this essay,
the Northern Securities ruling was just one of many events with an influence on this
phenomenon.
Several accounts of the trends in technology development by U.S. firms exist, making it
possible to draw on considerable information from a wide range of sources. The works consulted
include those of historians of science, technology, and management who compiled data on the
R&D laboratories of specific firms including Alcoa, AT&T, DuPont, and GE (e.g., Reich, 1985;
Hounshell and Smith, 1988; Graham and Pruitt, 1990). Histories of the evolution of technology
development in the U.S. across a wide range of industries were also drawn upon (e.g.,
Rosenberg, 1969; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989; Mowery, 1992; Hounshell, 1996), as well as
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the work of legal scholars that documents U.S. antitrust and intellectual property rights (IPRs)
policy over the period of interest (e.g., Fisk, 1998, 2001; Hart, 2001). As a result, the analysis
conducted in this essay relies on a rich history that is fragmented across various areas of the
literature. Therefore, one contribution of this essay is to weave these individual accounts together
in order to understand why distinct shifts in the trend are observed. In addition, by taking into
consideration changes in the institutional environment over an extended period, generalizations
based on a single snapshot in time are avoided (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001).
2.4. Institutional Rules, Informal Norms and Technology Development Mode
The fundamental premise of this essay is that, in addition to the characteristics of any
particular transaction, the institutional setting strongly influences the choice of technology
development mode. Specifically, it is suggested that institutional theory can help to explain the
larger, aggregate trends that have been observed from period to period, while firm-level theories
explain some of the variance within a particular period.
There are several advantages to adopting a pan-disciplinary approach to institutional
theory in this essay. The economics branch (e.g., North, 1990; Williamson, 2000) does not offer
a strong explanation for the origins of institutions and how they change. As noted, institutions
are considered extremely persistent, potentially leading an institutional economist to conclude
that the rules are fixed (Geels, 2004). In contrast, cognitive institutionalists (Meyer and Rowan,
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and network theorists (Granovetter, 1985) contend that
institutions are socially constructed and can change during the game due to the interaction of the
actors playing the game. In addition, adopting a pan-disciplinary approach can help explain how
lower-level institutions can catalyze change in higher-level institutions. While Williamson (1998,
2000) acknowledges this possibility, institutional economists mainly neglect how these feedback
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loops work. In contrast, scholars in the sociological branch suggest that in response to a
triggering event that calls into question the logic behind the prevailing norms, actors and
decision makers often exert an upward influence on the constraints that impact them in an
attempt to restructure higher-level institutions (Ingram and Clay, 2000; Sine and David, 2003;
Geels, 2004).
A final advantage of integrating perspectives from economics and sociology is that a
more comprehensive picture of how new practices become institutionalized can be obtained. The
economics branch emphasizes that decision makers take into account the relative effectiveness of
a practice, leading to its widespread adoption. However, the effectiveness of a practice is often
unobservable by outsiders. Thus, the sociological branches of institutional theory suggest that
due to bounded rationality, decision makers may simply adopt the practices implemented by
powerful actors within their network (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Consequently, combining
perspectives provides a more complete picture of how institutions work.
Similar to Chacar and Hesterly (2008), this essay adapts the hierarchical model of
institutions developed by Williamson (1998, 2000). Figure 2-1 identifies the specific institutions
applicable to the context of this essay at each of the four levels in Williamson’s model. Level 1
consists primarily of the informal relations and norms of the scientific and manufacturing
communities in the U.S. Level 2 involves the formal rules such as IPRs, antitrust regulations and
technology policy. Level 3 addresses governance structures and transactions, particularly the
choice of technology development mode. Finally, Level 4 is concerned with the distribution of
resources. As the primary focus of this essay is on the impact of formal rules and informal norms
on the evolution of the market for technology and the choice of technology development mode,
the analysis is limited to an examination of the influence of Levels 1 and 2 on Level 3.
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Figure 2-1. Williamson’s four institutional levels and corresponding model for R&D partnerships
Applying this framework to the history of technology development by U.S. firms
suggests that there have been three distinct eras since the mid-19th century. Over this time period,
the formal and informal institutions changed twice. As shown in Figure 2-2, the first stage was a
transitional period marked by the evolution of beliefs regarding the nature of invention. These
informal norms (Level 1) combined with formal legal and financial institutions (Level 2) to
begin the shift away from a reliance on the market for technology.
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Figure 2-2. Institutional settings and impact on R&D partnerships in U.S.
Dramatically different institutions are observed for the second or Internally Focused era.
In this period, the U.S. government, through antitrust enforcement and the direct funding of
research and technology development, was the major Level 2 institution shaping the formal
rules. Informal norms (Level 1) regarding the value of science and systematic research and the
optimal degree of internal control over innovation further reinforced the formal rules. These
beliefs, which were adopted by leading policy-makers and industrialists alike, were greatly
influenced by the events of World War II.
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A different institutional setting is again observed in the current or Dual Path era. After the
Level 1 norms started to change in reaction to the perception that the U.S. was facing an
international competitiveness gap, the government instituted an unprecedented wave of new
federal policies that directly and indirectly addressed technology development and diffusion.
Concurrent to the implementation of these formal initiatives, new industries began to emerge,
driven by radical technological breakthroughs. Collectively, the changes in both the Level 1 and
Level 2 institutions, along with the emergence of new industries, not only encouraged firms to
engage in collaborative research and technology development, but also provided incentives to do
so. However, it is important to note that firms did not abandon their in-house efforts, opting
instead to adopt a more balanced ‘dual path’ approach to technology development.
In general, technology development trends differ considerably from period to period
depending on the institutional setting. Informal norms shaping managerial beliefs regarding the
nature of invention and the optimal degree of internal control over innovation play a particularly
important role along with formal rules and regulations governing antitrust and IPRs. The
following sections discuss each of the eras in greater detail and present the evidence supporting
the findings. While previous researchers have divided their accounts into multiple eras based on
major events (e.g., Mowery, 1992; Hounshell, 1996), the eras in this analysis are representative
of different institutional settings.
2.4.1. The Transition Era: The Mid-19th Century-1915
U.S. industry in the 19th century was considered a ‘system of manufactures’ in reference
to American leadership in the development of production technology and mechanical devices
(Rosenberg, 1969). Yet during most of the transition era, firms did not engage in systematic inhouse R&D, instead relying on the market for technology in order to acquire new products and
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processes. This practice was strongly supported by the formal institutions and informal norms in
place, as few (if any) constraints restricted the trade of technology. Indeed, even in science-based
industries such as pharmaceuticals, this practice was the norm until after World War I (Liebenau,
1984; Swann, 1989). Not unlike today, individual inventors, independent labs and universities
were all important developers and sources of new technology (Howells, 1999; Chesbrough,
2001). However, as the formal institutions and informal norms began to change in the late-19th
century, firms started to shift away from the ‘inventive marketplace’ to ‘administered
innovation’ through in-house R&D (Usselman, 1999).
2.4.1.1. Informal Norms and Beliefs in the Transition Era. A commonly held belief
during much of the transition era was that invention was the domain of the solitary inventor who
did not possess much formal technical training (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). According to
Bartlett (1941), industrial research was for the most part an unorganized effort by individuals
without scientific training. In many cases, inventors lacked the capabilities to commercialize
their inventions, leading them to sell or license their patents to firms and other individuals who
could (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1996). In other instances, inventors were hired to conduct work
specifically related to a firm’s major processes and products (Mowery, 1983). Further
propagating the notion that invention was the domain of untrained craftsman, prominent leaders
in the scientific community expressed an interest in keeping pure science research independent
of industrial research.2 As a consequence, individuals with formal scientific training were
discouraged from seeking industrial employment.
In the late 19th century, the view of the solitary inventor tinkering away in his workshop
came to be seen as anachronistic, as technologically complex, capital intensive, systems-based
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See for example Henry A. Rowland’s address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in
1883 (Rowland, 1902: 609)
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industries began to emerge. Invention came to be viewed as a collective, employer-sponsored
enterprise, particularly in these new industries. In addition, the process of invention shifted from
a reliance on traditional craft knowledge and simple science, to the application of advanced
scientific and technical knowledge. Whereas older industries such as textiles, primary metals and
construction relied on trial-and-error techniques, newer industries including chemical processing
and electronics heavily utilized the experimental method in product and process development
(Birr, 1957). The relatively young photographic, telecommunications and railroad industries also
relied on formal problem-solving methods in product and process development (Hounshell and
Smith, 1988).
Another informal belief held during most of the 19th century was that science education
in the U.S. lagged behind that of Europe (Guralnick, 1979). However, this view evolved as top
colleges and universities including Johns Hopkins, Cornell, Harvard, and MIT vastly upgraded
their natural science curriculum (Reich, 1985), establishing doctoral programs in the physical
and biological sciences modeled on the German system (Hannaway, 1976; Walker, 1981).
Several U.S. universities and colleges also launched leading programs in the relatively young
disciplines of chemical, civil, electrical and mechanical engineering. With the emergence of new
systems-based industries, employment opportunities outside of academia opened up for the
graduates of these programs. Thus, as the state of science and engineering education improved
and beliefs regarding the nature of invention evolved, pursuing a career in industry gained
legitimacy in the scientific community.
2.4.1.2. Formal Rules and Institutions in the Transition Era. For much of the
transition era, few formal rules and regulations applied to business in general, let alone
technology development. A prominent exception was the U.S. patent system, which provided the
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institutional framework within which the 19th century market for technology evolved
(Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2002). In accordance with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,3
the patent system was designed to encourage inventive activity while also promoting the
diffusion of new technology. In exchange for public discloser of inventions, the patent system
grants exclusive property rights to inventors that protect them from the possibility that someone
else can exploit their ideas without compensation.
Patent law initially required patentees to be individuals, not firms. In addition, firms were
not automatically entitled to own or use inventions developed by employees. Rather, during most
of the transition era, the federal courts consistently ruled that regardless of the inventor’s status, a
firm could only obtain the rights to an employee’s invention if that employee had acquiesced to
its use (Fisk, 1998). Thus, the decision regarding how to exploit a patent was left to the inventor
even if they were employed by someone else. In many cases, due to their lack of manufacturing
and distribution capabilities, inventors sold or licensed their patents to firms or other individuals
in order to financially benefit from their inventions.
Robust trade of technology did not truly occur until the passage of the Patent Act of
1836, which replaced the registration system with the more rigorous examination system that is
still in use today (Khan and Sokoloff, 2001). Under the requirements of the examination system,
each patent application is scrutinized by technically trained examiners to ensure that the
invention is truly new, useful and non-obvious. Passage of the Act helped make patents rights
more secure by increasing the likelihood that the validity of a patent would survive a court
challenge, in turn making it easier for the inventor to sell or license the patented technology to an
individual or firm with the complementary capabilities necessary to exploit it. In addition, the
3

U.S. Constitution, Article 1, section 8, clause 8, ‘The Congress shall have Power… To promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.’
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Act led to an increase in the number of patent attorneys and patent agents, many of whom
became specialized intermediaries and brokers that matched inventors with would-be buyers
(Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2002).
While substantial trade of technology occurred during the transition era, in some cases,
patents were acquired for defensive rather than offensive purposes. Some firms assembled strong
patent portfolios to block competitors from commercializing a similar product, even when there
was no intention of bringing the patented invention to market (Hart, 2001). A strong patent
portfolio could also be used as leverage when acquiring subsequent patented inventions from
independent inventors (Hounshell, 1996). The federal courts reinforced the legitimacy of
defensive patent portfolios in the 1890s (Mowery, 1992). Thus, for much of the transition era,
firms had little incentive to conduct in-house technology development as long as patent law and
the courts supported the trade and accumulation of technology.
In the 1880s, a subtle change in the treatment of the employment relationship by the
federal courts began to constrain the market for technology. As Fisk (1998) documents, the
courts began to recognize that certain employees had been expressly hired to invent. In these
very specific instances, the courts concluded that the employer was entitled to a shop right (i.e., a
royalty-free license) to the employee’s invention because the employee was paid for his or her
inventive efforts. While an important shift, the market for technology did not entirely disappear
however. The courts applied a fairly narrow interpretation of who had been hired to invent. In
addition, the fundamental requirement that the patentee be an individual did not change.
Employees retained ownership of their patents even if they were found to have been hired to
invent, and could thus still sell or license them to other firms and individuals.
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According to Fisk (1998), a more dramatic shift in the treatment of the employment
relationship occurred around 1910. The courts broadened their interpretation of who had been
hired to invent, while also enforcing the validity of employment contracts including provisions
explicitly assigning ownership of any inventions developed by employees to the firm. In
addition, the courts expanded an employee’s obligation to guard trade secrets. Whereas
protecting trade secrets had been viewed as an express duty only for employees doing inventive
work for most of the 19th century, it became implied for all employees by the early 20th century.
The courts also embraced the use of restrictive covenants, prohibiting an employee from
revealing confidential, proprietary information after the termination of employment (Fisk, 2001).
Thus, these shifts in the formal institutions governing intellectual property rights collectively
contributed to the decline in the market for technology.
Another formal institution that played a role in the shift from the ‘inventive marketplace’
to ‘administered innovation’ was antitrust policy. A belief held by some during the late 19th
century was that expanding, diversifying firms posed a threat to basic American social and
economic values (Thorelli, 1955; Page, 1991). The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890 to
contend with this concern. Seeing opportunities for profits through ‘trusts’ limited by the
Sherman Act, a wave of horizontal mergers took place from 1895 to 1904 (Mowery, 1992).4 As a
result, ‘holding companies’ and ‘consolidated enterprises’ were formed that legally substituted
for tacit price and output control agreements (Hart, 2001). Firms also used mergers as a means to
acquire patents and diversify into new product markets. However, this merger wave created
price-fixing concerns that were subsequently addressed by the Northern Securities decision in
1904. The decision signified that consolidated firms would be considered monopolies and
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Horizontal mergers are those where activities at the same stage in the value chain are consolidated (e.g., the
purchase of a manufacturer of bicycle gears by a rival manufacturer of bicycle gears).
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dissolved (Mowery, 1992). Consequently, antitrust enforcement brought product diversification
via merger under heavy scrutiny, creating the need to innovate internally.
Outside of the government, another influential formal institution was the U.S. banking
system. In the post-Civil War era, banks functioned as the financial arms of the extended kinship
networks that dominated the economy, accumulating sizeable capital reserves by selling stock to
individuals in surrounding communities (Lamoreaux, 1986). Many banks mobilized this capital
during the merger wave occurring between 1895 and 1904, pursuing their own acquisition
objectives. For example, J.P. Morgan took over ownership and operation of AT&T in 1907
(Reich, 1980). As a major stakeholder, the banks pressured firms to rationalize their structure in
order to achieve higher levels of efficiency and profit. As a result, many large U.S.
manufacturing firms vertically integrated in the early 20th century in order to achieve economies
of scale and scope (Chandler, 1962; Fligstein, 1990).
Innovation did not escape this rationalization, as companies began to realize that
internalizing technology development, rather than relying on the market, could provide a supply
of products, processes, patents and expertise to protect established markets, and a launching pad
for diversification into new markets. In addition, as technology development became more
complex and capital intensive, it became increasingly difficult for specialist inventors not
associated with firms to acquire needed financing (Langlois, 2003). However, the large
enterprises of the early 20th century, through their connections to the banks, were well-positioned
to raise the capital required to fund technology development.
2.4.1.3. Summary of the Transition Era. In summary, the transition era marked the
beginning of the shift from the ‘inventive marketplace’ to ‘administered innovation’, as several
corporate labs were established. The appearance of internal R&D labs was largely influenced by
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changes in the institutional setting during this period. When firms could acquire new technology
and patents from external sources, they did, but when the formal rules and informal norms
challenged this practice, firms began to internalize technology development.
It is important to note that firms did not completely abandon the market for technology as
the formal institutions and informal norms evolved. In particular, links to universities continued
to play a central role in a firm’s ability to stay abreast of scientific advances. For example,
AT&T maintained close ties with Boston-area universities through research director Hammond
V. Hayes, a doctorate in physics from Harvard (Reich, 1980). Likewise, GE cultivated ties to
MIT through research director Willis Whitney, a former faculty member prior to joining GE
(Reich, 1985). In addition, Alcoa fostered relationships with the Columbia College of Mines,
Cornell University, MIT and Lehigh University in the 1890s and 1900s (Graham and Pruitt,
1990).
2.4.2. The Internally Focused Era: 1915 – 1980
With the decline of the ‘inventive marketplace’ and the founding of pioneering labs by
prominent firms during the later years of the transition era, the stage was set for the widespread
adoption of in-house R&D. Further contributing to the shift, the U.S. government created several
agencies charged with providing direction and funding for industrial research during the interwar
period. The government also instituted changes in antitrust and science policy, bringing the
formal rules into alignment with the informal norms that had started to transform during the
previous era. In addition, the founding of the Directors of Industrial Research (DIR) in 1923
played an important role in shaping informal beliefs about the value of scientific research to
competitive advantage. The DIR also provided a critical forum for research managers to share
information about their practices, spreading informal norms regarding educational standards and
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scientific publication (Hounshell and Smith, 1988). Overall, as the institutional structure
continued to evolve during this era, firms began to rely more on ‘administered innovation’.
2.4.2.1. Informal Norms and Beliefs in the Internally Focused Era. Breakthroughs
such as nylon in 1939 (Hounshell and Smith, 1988) and the transistor in the late 1940s (Nelson,
1962) led many firms to embrace the belief that basic scientific research could bring about an
endless supply of new products. While this belief had started to transform during the transition
era, it did not gain widespread acceptance until after the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
created the National Research Council (NRC) in 1916 to collect information about the early
industrial labs. The reports distributed by the NRC highlighted the achievements and shared the
management practices of the pioneering labs in various industries (Hounshell, 1996). In addition,
prominent scientists within the ranks of the NAS played an instrumental role in promoting ‘best
science’ as a solution to the emergence of global competition to U.S. industry following World
War I (Kevles, 1978).
Further propagating the view that scientific research was a key source of competitive
advantage was the success of the GE Research Lab, which had come to be known as the ‘House
of Magic’ (Wise, 1985). In addition, the DIR hosted one- and two-day tours of the facilities
established by AT&T, DuPont, GE, and Kodak to promote the value of scientific research to
industry. The tours were designed to provide research managers with evidence they could use to
convince their firms to expand their R&D programs (Hounshell and Smith, 1988). During the
1920s and 1930s, the NRC also sponsored a campaign to sell in-house R&D as a ‘royal road to
riches,’ extolling the benefits of scientific research to industry (Kevles, 1978).
The scientific and technological developments brought about by DuPont, GE, Union
Carbide and Westinghouse during World War II served to confirm and further spread the belief
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that basic scientific research was a key to competitive advantage. This informal belief was also
reinforced by accounts portraying scientists as the main protagonists of the war effort (e.g.,
Baxter, 1946), which the scientific elite saw as an opportunity to achieve permanent support for
scientific research from both industry and government (Hounshell, 1996). The champions of this
effort within the NAS and the DIR found a strong advocate in Vannevar Bush, an electrical
engineer known for his pioneering contributions to computing.
During World War II, Bush served as head of the National Defense Research Council
(later the Office of Scientific Research and Development or OSRD). Based on his experiences at
OSRD during the war, Bush strongly believed that peace and prosperity could be brought about
by basic scientific research (Zachary, 1997). Bush issued a report to the president characterizing
basic scientific research as the source of the new knowledge used by applied science to develop
new technologies (Bush, 1945). This linear or assembly line, science-based, technology
development model was firmly embraced by U.S. industry and came to dominate R&D
management in the years following World War II (Ruttan, 2001).
2.4.2.2. Formal Rules and Institutions in the Internally Focused Era.5 The U.S.
government took a direct role in setting an agenda for science in industry during this era,
influencing the formal institutions and rules governing industrial R&D. Several organizations
were created to oversee the direction and growth of industrial R&D in the U.S. including the
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (1915), which had a major influence on the
development of the fledgling aviation industry (Hounshell, 1996). Similarly, several agencies
were created after WWII to support fundamental research in industry including the Atomic
Energy Commission (1946), the National Science Foundation (1950), the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (1958), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (1958).
5

Founding dates cited in this paragraph are from Ruttan (2001).
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Beyond creating formal institutions to provide leadership and guidance, the U.S.
government also assumed a central role in the funding of both public and private research during
this era. The government’s share of total national R&D expenditures grew from less than 20%
before WWII to over 80% in the 1960s (National Science Foundation, 1989). On the public side,
several federally funded research labs were established, including Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore, and Brookhaven, to conduct research directed towards military applications (Seidel,
1983, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1994). On the private side, federal research contracts were awarded to
EG&G, GE, DuPont and Raytheon for the development of new materials vital to nuclear energy
and weapons technology (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962; Hewlett and Duncan, 1972; Hewlett and
Holl, 1989; Furman, 1990). Overall, government funding of and involvement in both public and
private sector R&D was pervasive during this era.
The further evolution of antitrust policy also played a role in the shift to ‘administered
innovation’. Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the deconcentrationist view had a major
influence on policy (Hart, 2001). According to Joe Bain’s research, high market entry barriers
posed by large corporations might deter innovation in some industries (Bain, 1992). Thurman
Arnold, head of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, subscribed to this view. Under Arnold,
antitrust policy was crafted to prevent innovation from being inhibited. To ensure this outcome,
several new tools were employed including compulsory patent licensing and consent decrees
banning firms from commercial activities outside of their primary markets (Hart, 2001). For
example, AT&T was barred from competing outside of telecommunications in 1956 despite
developing many of the pioneering advances in semiconductors (Mowery, 1992). Innovation
concerns continued to figure prominently into antitrust cases for many years after Arnold’s
departure from the DOJ in 1943 when he was appointed to the Court of Appeals (Waller, 2005).
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2.4.2.3. Summary of the Internally Focused Era. The formal rules and regulations and
informal norms and beliefs were brought into alignment during this era, particularly by the
antitrust policy agenda set by Thurman Arnold during his tenure at the DOJ. In response to the
changes in antitrust policy, many firms expanded in-house R&D efforts as they provided a
legally defensible way to grow and to develop proprietary new products (Mowery, 1992). For
example, after being charged with several antitrust violations by the DOJ in 1944, DuPont
adopted an internally-focused innovation strategy. In the wake of these charges, DuPont
executives decided that it would be prudent to turn away from acquiring technology from the
‘inventive marketplace’ in favor of increasing in-house R&D efforts in order to develop
breakthrough new products (Hounshell and Smith, 1988).
It is important to note that the disappearance of markets for technology and the
establishment of in-house R&D labs did not occur merely due to changes in the formal rules by
the federal government. Many firms that established labs did so to conform to the informal
norms established by the model of technology development advocated by Vannevar Bush. The
dominant technology strategy adopted by many firms during this era exemplifies the classic push
approach, where research efforts are undertaken without much upfront consideration for market
need (Dosi, 1982). As the formal institutions and informal norms of the era became entrenched,
managers had difficulty envisioning an alternative to ‘administered innovation’. Externally
developed technology came to be viewed as inferior and treated with suspicion (Katz and Allen,
1982), leading innovation efforts to become increasingly internally focused.
2.4.3. The Dual Path Era: 1980 – Present
With the economic downturn in the 1970s creating concerns that the U.S. was losing its
industrial pre-eminence, the institutional context was primed for a change in the early 1980s. A

34
critical catalyst for change, which challenged the informal belief that externally-developed
technology was inferior, was the emergence of industries based on new knowledge and
technologies that disrupted the advantages held by incumbent firms. The formal rules and
institutions from the previous era were also called into question, leading the U.S. government to
experiment with initiatives consciously designed to encourage innovation and the trade of
technology. In addition, a clarification to the policy governing pension fund investments played
an important role in the rise of venture capital and the re-emergence of the market for
technology. As a result, many firms in this era adopted a more balanced ‘dual path’ approach to
technology development that utilizes both ‘administered innovation’ and the ‘inventive
marketplace’.
2.4.3.1. Informal Norms and Beliefs in the Dual Path Era. By the end of the internally
focused era, many research managers had adopted the belief that ‘successful innovation requires
control’ owing to the difficulty of judging the ‘quality, availability, and capabilities’ of external
technology suppliers (Chesbrough, 2003: xx). As a result, externally developed technology came
to be viewed as inferior. Katz and Allen (1982: 7) called this the Not-Invented-Here (NIH)
syndrome, reflecting the belief held by long-standing R&D teams that they possessed ‘a
monopoly of knowledge,’ leading them to reject new ideas developed by outsiders. However, as
new industries based on technological discontinuities and radical breakthroughs began to
emerge, managers were forced to re-examine their beliefs about the quality of technology
developed outside of their own labs.
Biotechnology is a prime example of a field that emerged that called into question the
NIH mentality. Whereas pharmaceutical firms traditionally relied on their knowledge of organic
chemistry for drug discovery and development, biotechnology introduced new methods based on
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biochemistry, immunology, microbiology and molecular biology. For incumbents, this shift in
the knowledge base was potentially competence-destroying. To quickly build a presence in
biotechnology, many firms recruited star academic researchers to head their nascent programs.
However, the academics shunned the major corporations in several cases, instead joining startups (Hounshell, 1996). Thus, in order to obtain access to top academic talent and to keep pace
with the radical breakthroughs coming from biotechnology, many managers recognized that they
would have to relinquish some control over their technology development efforts and form
collaborative relationships with universities and start-ups.
2.4.3.2. Formal Rules and Institutions in the Dual Path Era. New policies governing
technology development also played an important role in encouraging firms to once again
explore the market for technology. Largely prompted by the perception that the U.S. was losing
its industrial pre-eminence to foreign competition (Florida and Kenney, 1990), the U.S.
government implemented an unprecedented wave of policy initiatives during the 1980s (Ham
and Mowery, 1995). It is likely that the perceived success of the policies implemented by the
Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) following World War II served as a model for
these initiatives, particularly those related to technology transfer and commercialization. In
addition, the policies implemented contributed to the growth of specialized technology suppliers,
particularly in the new industries that emerged during the 1980s (Arora, Fosfuri, and
Gambardella, 1999).
Despite record levels of R&D funding by the U.S. government during the 1950s and
1960s, there were fears that technology developed with federal support was not being effectively
transferred to and commercialized by the private sector (Ruttan, 2001). Consequently, several
formal institutional innovations were implemented with the aim of enhancing technology transfer
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from the public to the private sector (Lee, 1997). Legislation enacted with this goal in mind
includes the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allowing universities to patent technologies that were
developed using federal funds (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedons, 2001; Nelson, 2001), the
1980 Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act allowing federal agencies to grant exclusive
licenses for federally-owned patents, and the 1986 Federal Technology Transfer Act that created
rules for federal-private cooperative research and technology development agreements (Ruttan,
2001).
In 1983, the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness was convened to
determine if other formal initiatives could be implemented to further increase the transfer and
commercialization of viable technologies created with federal funds (Keyworth, 1986). One
recommendation was the establishment of interdisciplinary university-based engineering
research centers (Suh, 1986). Consequently, the Engineering Research Center (ERC) program
was launched in 1984 under the guidance of National Science Foundation director Erich Bloch.
The ERC program was designed to explicitly link technology development and manufacturing in
order to increase the chances of successful commercialization (Bozeman and Boardman, 2004).
Antitrust policy also continued to evolve during this era. By the 1970s, concerns emerged
that the deconcentrationist view of antitrust had constrained corporate strategy and day-to-day
decision-making for industrial research and technology development (Peck, 1961; Markham,
1974; Scherer, 1977). As the economic downturn continued, leading economists from the
University of Chicago and elsewhere revisited Schumpeter’s criticisms of antitrust policy in
search of ways to stimulate innovation (Hart, 2001). Several of Schumpeter’s ideas resonated
with economists and policymakers alike, particularly that markets are contestable through
product and process innovation (Schumpeter, 1950). Consequently, legislation was enacted to
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encourage private firms to enter into pre-competitive R&D partnerships (Lee, 1997). An example
of such legislation is the 1984 National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA), which paved the
way for the MCC and SEMATECH consortiums (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). While these
consortiums would have been considered anti-competitive under the previous antitrust regime,
the NCRA allowed firms to enter cooperative R&D arrangements without the fear of violating
antitrust.
A final change in the formal rules is one that is perhaps lesser known, but arguably just as
important in regards to its impact on the re-emergence of the market for technology. Unlike the
initiatives discussed above, the 1979 clarification by the US Department of Labor (DOL) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 was not consciously designed with
the goal of fueling innovation and transferring technology in mind. Initially, ERISA’s prudent
man rule restricted retirement fund managers from investing in high-risk assets, including
venture capital. However, the DOL ruled in 1979 that investing a small fraction of a portfolio in
a venture capital fund was not imprudent. As a result, venture capital funds sharply increased
compared to previous levels. Whereas venture capital had never exceeded more than a few
hundred million dollars annually, it rapidly grew into the billions (Kortum and Lerner, 2000). In
many cases, the funds raised were invested into young firms to finance risky early-stage projects
that lacked tangible assets.
The rise of venture capital also helped to spur the growth of technology clusters such as
Silicon Valley and the Route 128 Corridor. The origin of the Boston-based cluster, however, can
be traced back to the 1920s and the efforts of Vannevar Bush, who was an MIT associate
professor before taking the OSRD post in WWII. Bush played an important role in the founding
of the predecessor of Raytheon, one of the leading firms of the Route 128 Corridor (Roberts,
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1991). According to Castells and Hall (1994), concerns about the declining industrial
competitiveness of the U.S. have accelerated attempts to replicate the technology cluster model
since the 1980s. With their proximity to major universities, firms involved in the clusters are
often offshoots founded by faculty that retain their ties, establishing possibilities for universityindustry collaboration, particularly in technology development, that take advantage of the
policies introduced in the 1980s.
2.4.3.3. Summary of the Dual Path Era. The last 30 years have been marked by the reemergence of the market for technology, spurred on by the appearance of new industries based
on technological discontinuities. With the rise in venture capital to unprecedented levels and
advances in information and communications technology (ICT), specialized technology suppliers
surfaced to take advantage of these opportunities (Langlois, 2003). In addition, new policies
were enacted by the U.S. government to encourage the formation of technology development
partnerships. Concurrently, the informal norms and beliefs that were prevalent during the
internally focused era began to break down, making the acquisition of technology from an
external source a viable option once again.
It is important to note that firms have far from abandoned internal R&D, as corporate
R&D expenditures in the U.S. were expected to grow to $260.3 billion in 2010 (Grueber and
Studt, 2009). However, it does appear that firms are opting for a more balanced, ‘dual path’
approach to innovation as they continue their internal efforts while simultaneously engaging in
technology development alliances and licensing agreements. It would also appear that advances
in ICT have played a role in this phenomenon. As technology improves and communication
costs decrease, information asymmetry is likely to be reduced, making it easier for firms to
evaluate the skills of potential partners and to monitor their progress.
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2.5. Discussion and Conclusion
Early in this essay it was noted that firm-level theories can help explain technology
development mode choices made by individual firms for specific projects, but they appear to
have less power to explain the aggregate trends observed from era to era. Thus, this essay sought
to examine technology development through a lens that could explain the origins of trends, how
they become stable over long periods of time, and how changes to trends arise. To accomplish
this objective, a pan-disciplinary version of institutional theory that incorporates ideas from both
economics and sociology was adopted.
As discussed in the previous section, the formal rules and regulations and informal norms
and beliefs changed twice over the period examined, leading to three distinct eras characterized
by fairly stable practices within each. It is important to note, however, that the practices in some
industries within an era run counter to the overall trends. For example, whereas most industries
were still relying on the market for technology, the trade and professional associations affiliated
with the railroads saw the value of internalizing technology development and pushed for the
adoption of this practice in the mid- to late-19th century (Usselman, 1999). Similarly, innovation
in industries such as nuclear reactors and aircraft engines has remained internally focused in the
current era despite the shift to a more balanced approach in other industries (Chesbrough, 2003).
From the examination conducted in this essay, it appears that the major shifts from era to
era depend on the specific institutional environment encountered. As Williamson (1998) notes,
institutions act as shift parameters that can raise or lower transaction costs. Thus, as institutions
change, the range of options available may become wider or narrower depending on how the new
rules impact the costs of engaging in transactions. For example, the passage of the Patent Act of
1836 appears to have led to an increase in the number of patent attorneys and patent agents who
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matched inventors with would-be buyers (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2002). In this role, these
intermediaries helped reduce the information asymmetry between inventors and prospective
purchasers. As a consequence, the implementation of a new formal institution helped to lower
the transaction costs associated with exchanging intellectual property, making the sale and
assignment of patents viable and secure.
In addition to acting as shift parameters, it also appears that institutions can have a more
direct impact on shaping the choices and options available to actors. In many cases, firms simply
imitate the practices of other firms in their industry or reference group. The literature suggests
that firms engage in mimetic isomorphism to gain legitimacy among peers (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983), to maintain relative competitive position, and to prevent a rival from gaining an
unassailable competitive advantage (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006), regardless of the economic
rationality of such mimicry (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1982; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).
This seems to be the case during the early years of the internally-focused era, as firm established
labs in order to emulate the practices of research pioneers such as AT&T, DuPont, GE and
Kodak. It also appears that companies such as Ford, General Motors, IBM and U.S. Steel
established in-house labs later in the internally-focused era because it had become fashionable,
not because doing so guaranteed improved performance.
The findings of this essay also demonstrate that new institutions often arise because they
are supported by powerful actors. For example, the NRC and the DIR played an important role in
extolling the value of establishing an in-house R&D lab. It is important to note that the NRC’s
initial agenda was to build a permanent support system for scientific research in the U.S. rather
than to shape technology development practices. However, with the creation of the Advisory
Committee on Industrial Research, the NRC began to play a direct role in the promotion of
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industrial R&D (Hounshell, 1996). Eventually, many of the members of the committee went on
to found the DIR, taking on an even stronger advocacy role. With these powerful actors deeply
invested, the institutional setting demonstrated a great deal of inertia during the internallyfocused era.
The evidence in this essay also supports the notion that it often takes a triggering event or
a change in leadership for actors to initiate and experiment with new practices. Despite the
recognition that the flow of blockbuster new products from the major corporate labs had slowed,
many firms continued to rely solely on in-house R&D during the waning years of the internallyfocused era. Coupled with the perception that the U.S. was losing industrial pre-eminence, a
series of economic crises in the 1970s provided the shock necessary to prompt managers,
researchers and policy makers to question whether the internally-focused approach was indeed
working. It appears that overcoming this inertia required enacting formal legislation to spur on a
change in the informal beliefs (i.e., the NIH mindset, successful innovation requires control) that
had become institutionalized during the previous era.
As this case demonstrates, entrenched institutional actors often have difficulty
envisioning alternatives to their current beliefs (North, 1990; Beckert, 1999). In order to enact
change, actors need to at least recognize that the institutional setting is no longer addressing
critical problems or presenting valuable opportunities (Schön, 1971). Transforming the
institutional setting may then require actors to force change, as formal and informal rules have a
tendency to reinforce each other (North, 1990). Unless both sets of rules are altered with the
same goal in mind, it is unlikely that the institutional setting will change, or that the desired
outcomes will be achieved. In this instance, the implementation of new formal rules preceded the
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change in the informal norms and beliefs. Thus, this is an example of the type of feedback loop
discussed in the theory section.
This essay raises the question of whether current technology development trends actually
represent ‘a reversion towards the ‘norm’ for industrial R&D that existed at the turn of the 20th
century’ (Howells, 1999: 19). It appears that this is not exactly the case. While the market for
technology has re-emerged, firms are not eliminating their internal R&D labs. Rather, it seems
that firms in the current era have adopted a more balanced approach to technology development,
where the ‘inventive marketplace’ and ‘administered innovation’ are viewed as complements
rather than substitutes. Along these lines, several scholars have suggested that substantial inhouse technological capabilities are necessary to rely on the market for technology (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990; Rosenberg, 1990). Thus, effectively acquiring and efficiently using technology
from external sources may require that firms invest heavily in R&D.
Finally, this essay is subject to the limitations and trade-offs typically encountered in
historical analyses. Given that only the history of technology development in the U.S. was
studied, the findings from this essay may not generalize to other countries. Casual observation
suggests that a number of other countries have also witnessed trends similar to those observed in
the U.S. over the same period we examined. However, different transaction environments are
likely to arise depending on the combination of formal and informal constraints. Consequently,
care must be taken when generalizing about the impact of one rule without considering the entire
institutional setting that the rule is embedded in. Implementing one country’s innovation policies
in another country without taking the unique structural and institutional characteristics of each
country into account may actually be counterproductive.

43
In conclusion, this essay developed a model based on institutional theory to explain
technology development trends in the U.S. since the mid-19th century. Both informal and formal
rules and constraints influenced these trends, suggesting that the institutional setting can help to
explain the choices made by managers that cannot be accounted for by firm-level theories alone.
While there is little doubt that much has been learned from cross-sectional studies that draw on
firm-level theories, such studies can only tell part of the story when examining a trend or series
of trends over a much longer period of time.
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CHAPTER 3
THE R&D OUTSOURCING DECISION:
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
3.1. Introduction
There is a recent debate about whether the research and development (R&D) conducted
by firms is yielding fewer valuable or ‘game-changing’ new products and processes than it once
did (Howells, 2008). As a result, managers are beginning to question (1) whether current levels
of R&D investment are justified given the apparent lack of innovative output from in-house
research efforts and (2) if their firms possess the R&D capabilities to remain competitive in
markets that are rapidly becoming global. Consider the following statements from managers of
firms noted for innovation:



Dick Conrad, Senior Vice President for Global Operations at HewlettPackard, says, ‘Our strategy is now to work with global networks to leverage
the best technologies on the planet.’ (Engardio and Einhorn, 2005)
Robert W. Armstrong, Vice President for Global External Research at Eli
Lilly, commenting on Lilly’s research programs in India, ‘It’s a
transformation of the R&D enterprise. We have to think in a totally different
mode.’ (Engardio and Weintraub, 2008)

These statements reflect the recognition that innovation capabilities are now widely
distributed over a global network, and that external sources have become increasingly relevant to
corporate innovation (Porter and Stern, 2001). In response to this reality, firms are looking
beyond their own R&D labs and linking with other firms and organizations in order to discover
ideas that can lead to breakthrough new products and technologies. Overall, this search for ideas
originating outside of the firm is part of the ‘open innovation’ phenomenon that has received
considerable attention in the innovation management literature (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003;
Gassmann, 2006).6

6

Interestingly, a number of scholars observed the gradual ‘opening up’ of innovation in the 1980s. For earlier
discussions of this trend, see Graham (1985), Teece (1988), Mowery (1995) and Quinn (2000).
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In contrast to closed innovation strategies that rely primarily on internal R&D efforts,
open innovation processes capitalize on both internal and external knowledge acquisition and
internal and external pathways to exploit knowledge (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, and West,
2006). It is important to note that an open innovation strategy does not equate to disintegrating
the entire internal R&D function (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). Rather, adopting the
principles of open innovation indicates a willingness to acquire knowledge by developing it
internally or by accessing the R&D capabilities of external sources. Similarly, open innovation
does not rely solely on internal commercialization channels to exploit knowledge. External
pathways such as the out-licensing of technology developed in-house can also be utilized.
Clearly, the availability of multiple acquisition and exploitation pathways presents managers
with potential opportunities to increase the return from R&D investment, but also poses new
management challenges (Leiponen and Helfat, 2010).
The main focus of this essay is R&D outsourcing, which is one of the external knowledge
acquisition pathways that firms can follow. This topic has received interest from both academics
and practitioners (e.g., Prahalad, 2005; Engardio and Weintraub, 2008; Howells, 2008). Many of
the studies that have examined project-level R&D outsourcing decisions in the academic
literature have drawn on transaction cost economics (e.g., Pisano, 1990; Ulset, 1996). Despite the
general support for the predictions derived from transaction cost economics, individual projectlevel decisions often run counter to theory. This observation suggests that other factors may
influence such decisions. Thus, a multi-level decision framework is developed in this essay that
incorporates environmental factors with firm-specific considerations and project-level
characteristics in addition to the traditional transaction hazards. The model highlights the
importance of integrating information possessed by managers from different levels of the firm,
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which should result in a more thoughtful analysis of the outsourcing decision and potentially a
more successful outcome.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section provides
background about R&D outsourcing, followed by an assessment of the importance of this
phenomenon in the academic and practitioner literatures. The third section then briefly reviews
the TCE literature as it pertains to the R&D outsourcing decision. This review suggests that a
more holistic view of the factors that influence the outsourcing decision is needed, wherein
managers from multiple levels of the organization are involved. A decision framework composed
of environmental factors, firm-level considerations and project-level characteristics that
indirectly and directly influence R&D outsourcing decisions in addition to the traditional
transaction characteristics discussed elsewhere is then introduced. Finally, future research
directions are identified and conclusions are offered.
3.2. Background: The R&D Outsourcing Phenomenon
Firms first began to outsource component manufacture in the 1950s and 1960s. Costreduction motivations played a primary role in early component outsourcing decisions; firms
looked to focus scarce resources on high value-added activities such as design and assembly
while reducing labor costs and eliminating non-core activities (Welch and Nayak, 1992). In the
1990s, IT outsourcing heralded the shift towards the corporate disaggregation of knowledgebased activities (Mahnke, Overby, and Vang, 2005), as U.S. firms looked off-shore for highly
educated workers in countries with lower cost and wage structures as in India (Kapur and
Ramamurti, 2001).
With the IT outsourcing market rapidly growing, a number of observers concluded that
R&D was the next logical activity to outsource (e.g., Quinn, 2000; Piachaud, 2005). Recent
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statistics support this conclusion; despite a slight downturn in 2005, R&D outsourcing has
steadily increased by U.S. firms since the early 1990s.1 From 1993 to 2005, the amount spent on
research contracted to other domestic firms increased from $3.5 billion to $11.7 billion. Over the
same period, the overall ratio of contracted-out R&D to company-funded, company-performed
R&D increased from 3.7% to 5.7%. This trend is even more pronounced in manufacturing
industries, as the rate increased from 3.3% to 6.3%. Industries with particularly high funding
ratios for contract versus in-house R&D include pharmaceuticals (13.2%), scientific R&D
services (11.4%), navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments (7.9%) and
motor vehicles, trailers and parts (7.2%).
While sharing the cost-cutting rationale of component outsourcing, remaining
competitive in the future and having the ability to continually innovate are additional motivations
fueling the growth of R&D outsourcing (Howells, 2008). Accessing external R&D provides an
opportunity to tap into world-class research capabilities unavailable internally. The underlying
logic is that internal and external R&D are complements; maintaining in-house R&D builds the
absorptive capacity required to evaluate, acquire and assimilate the output from an external
project back into the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Laamanen and Autio, 1996; Chen, 2010).
3.2.1. An Assessment of the Rising Significance of R&D Outsourcing
In order to assess the importance and magnitude of the trends noted above, an in depth
search of academic journals, the popular press, and business books was conducted. The
methodology employed by David and Han (2004), particularly in regards to quantifying the
number of studies published in peer-reviewed journals, was followed. The period examined was
the decade between 2000 and 2009. Covering this period provides a reasonably comprehensive

1

All statistics cited in this paragraph are from the Science and Engineering Indicators 2008 report (National Science
Foundation, 2008).
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picture of the peer-reviewed work covering this topic following the publication of Quinn (2000)
who suggested that the time was ripe to outsource back at the turn of the 21st century.
The ABI Inform database was used to conduct a search of peer-reviewed journals. This
database was mainly selected due to its multidisciplinary nature: in addition to its extensive
coverage of innovation management journals, it covers other disciplines likely to publish work
on R&D and technology development such as law, management, marketing, and strategy. ABI
Inform is thus a comprehensive, appropriate and efficient database for this purpose because it
searches multiple disciplines at once. Limiting the search to published work also serves as a filter
for quality.
Predetermined keywords were used in order to obtain a count of the relevant articles. To
ensure that the search returned studies focused on the phenomenon of interest, the keywords
were carefully selected to filter out articles lacking relevance. For example, keywords such as
R&D, innovation, outsourcing, and sourcing, and combinations of these terms, were used as an
initial screen. Non-relevant articles were further eliminated by scanning the abstracts of the
papers identified in the first step. The results from this search provide a strong indication that
R&D outsourcing is an important topic in the academic literature. The search of ABI Inform
returned 143 articles covering this phenomenon in top academic journals spanning multiple
disciplines including R&D Management, Research Policy, the International Journal of
Technology Management, Technovation, Research-Technology Management, Organization
Science, the Academy of Management Journal, and Management Science.
A similar search of the popular business press using LexisNexis returned approximately
3500 articles containing various combinations of the keywords. It proved overwhelming to
screen these articles further using the same procedure employed to eliminate non-relevant peer-
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reviewed articles. However, a quick scan of the results revealed several noteworthy articles
including ‘Outsourcing Innovation,’ which was published in BusinessWeek Online (March 21,
2005), and a special extended section in Fortune (November 24, 2003) focusing on technology
outsourcing and foreign direct investment. Several other relevant articles were also found in a
variety of sources including The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. In addition,
several announcements of R&D partnerships in high-technology industries including
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and telecommunications were observed in
BusinessWire and FinancialWire.
Several prominent business books that investigate the broader idea of opening up the
innovation process were also published during this period (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003; Hargadon,
2003; von Hippel, 2005; Chesbrough et al., 2006). These books provide excellent theoretical
foundations along with in depth case studies of how companies use external knowledge to not
only substitute for internal knowledge but also as a complement. Prominent themes explored in
these books include the importance of user-driven innovation and how firms tap into user
communities, the reappearance of markets for and the trade of technology, and the role that
knowledge brokers play in bringing innovators and buyers together.
In sum, a search of the literature was conducted to assess the importance and magnitude
of R&D outsourcing. A systematic process similar to David and Han (2004) was employed that
relied on keyword searches and manual screening of article abstracts to uncover a relatively large
body of academic research that investigates this phenomenon. In addition, several noteworthy
articles and business books published between 2000 and 2009 were identified that examine the
R&D outsourcing phenomenon and the more general ‘open innovation’ trend. As noted, this
assessment of the literature demonstrates the importance of these topics in both academic and
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practitioner circles and establishes the need for a careful examination of the R&D outsourcing
decision.
3.3. A Brief Review of the R&D Outsourcing Decision through the Lens of Transaction
Cost Economics
Management scholars have typically drawn on transaction cost economics (TCE) in order
to shed light on the project-level R&D outsourcing decision. In general, the focus of TCE is on
the individual transaction as the unit of analysis and how the attributes of such a transaction
influence the choice between alternative governance forms. According to TCE, this choice rests
on the level of contractual hazards in a transaction (Williamson, 1975). The extent of such
hazards is shaped by factors including the degree of asset specificity, the availability of suppliers,
and the degree of uncertainty.
Asset specificity refers to the transferability of assets to alternative uses (Williamson,
1985). When assets are specific to a transaction, they have little or no value outside of that
transactional context. In such a situation, suppliers may act opportunistically and try to extract
excessive rents from customers (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978). This hazard is further
exacerbated when the number of suppliers is limited. In this so-called small-numbers bargaining
situation (Williamson, 1975), it is difficult and costly to switch between suppliers when
transaction-specific assets are required, leaving the customer open to opportunistic contract
renegotiation by the current supplier if there are few credible alternate suppliers to choose from.
Uncertainty may also lead to opportunistic behavior, as the inability to predict future demand and
changes in technology makes it difficult to write a complete contract to govern the transaction
(Williamson, 1975). Overall, TCE suggests that if these hazards are extreme, firms are likely to
internalize the transaction and perform the activity in-house.
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Empirical research has generally provided support for the tenets of TCE in the context of
project-level R&D outsourcing. In an early study, Pisano (1990) found that firms tend to
outsource R&D projects when ample suppliers are available, and when intellectual property
rights are relatively easy to assign and enforce. In a later study, Ulset (1996) found support for
the contention that firms are more likely to outsource R&D projects when the sunk costs related
to transaction-specific assets are limited. Finally, Robertson and Gatignon (1998) found that the
likelihood of outsourcing an R&D project increases when transaction-specific assets are not
required, demand is relatively predictable, and supplier performance is reasonably verifiable.
While providing important insight regarding the choice between alternative governance
forms, TCE relies on a restrictive set of assumptions that ignores the influence other factors
potentially have on the outsourcing decision. ‘The resulting implication is that, in equilibrium, all
firms facing a given set of transactional attributes will reach similar conclusions regarding which
activities to execute internally and which activities to outsource’ (Leiblein and Miller, 2003:
841). However, a simple comparison of firms competing in the same industry demonstrates that
this is not always the case. For example, whereas Lucent Technologies largely relied on internal
R&D in the late-1990s, Cisco Systems acquired technology from external sources (Chesbrough,
2003). Thus, it would appear that the predictive power of TCE is limited on its own.
What other factors may account for the deviations from the predictions of TCE?
Hagedoorn (2006) suggests that technology sourcing decisions are likely to be impacted by
country- and industry-specific characteristics. Scholars have also suggested that the firm’s
technology orientation plays a role in such decisions (e.g., Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2009). Lastly,
the firm’s own capabilities (or lack thereof) and specific characteristics of the project itself may
have an influence. Thus, a more holistic view of the R&D outsourcing decision is needed. A
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decision framework based on prior literature is developed in the following section that accounts
for these various explanations in addition to the traditional hazards from TCE.
3.4. An R&D Outsourcing Decision Framework
The more comprehensive project-level R&D outsourcing decision framework that is
developed in this paper is shown in Figure 3-1. In the sub-sections that follow, each level of this
framework is discussed and tied to the pertinent literature, starting with the key environmental
factors (i.e., country- and industry-specific characteristics) that have played a role in opening up
the innovation process and that indirectly impact the decision to outsource R&D. Firm-specific
strategic considerations that influence such decisions are then discussed followed by an
examination of project- and transaction-level characteristics. Akin to the distinction made by
Howells et al. (2008), firm-specific strategic considerations play a role in initiating the decision
to outsource, while project- and transaction-level characteristics have a more direct impact on the
outsourcing decision itself.
3.4.1. Environmental Factors
Figure 3-1 presents seven prominent environmental factors that indirectly influence the
project-level R&D outsourcing decision. These key factors were identified through a review of
the literature.2 Included among these factors are country- and industry-specific characteristics
that have played a role in the erosion of the ‘closed innovation’ paradigm, creating a new
landscape for firms that desire to remain competitive through innovation. The discussion that
follows expands upon the previous research by exploring the link between factors that have been
examined elsewhere (e.g., the rise of venture capital, the mobility of knowledge workers).
Factors that have received less attention previously in the context of the R&D outsourcing

2

Previous work that helped to shape our list of environmental factors includes Prahalad (1998), Chesbrough (2003),
and Gassmann (2006).
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Figure 3-1. A project-level R&D sourcing decision framework
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decision and the open innovation phenomenon (e.g., the growth of knowledge bases, the impact
of government policies) are also discussed.
The environmental factors have been placed outside of the pyramid in Figure 3-1 in
recognition that these trends are primarily external to and outside of the control of individual
firms. Consequently, it is suggested that these factors can be viewed as shift parameters in the
sense that while they do not directly determine the outsourcing decision, they can shift the costs
of outsourcing within the context of a particular country or industry. Phrased differently, the
barriers to outsourcing are typically lower in contexts where these factors have taken hold, while
the barriers remain high in contexts where they have not. For example, nuclear reactors, military
applications and aircraft engines are industries that have remained primarily closed due to
governmental regulation, while biotechnology and health care are in transition as university
research and venture capital push to open the innovation process (Chesbrough, 2003). Overall,
the more that the trends in a particular context conform to the environmental factors, the more
appropriate the open innovation model appears to be (Gassmann, 2006), making it more likely
that R&D outsourcing is occurring.
3.4.1.1. The Increasing Supply and Mobility of Knowledge Workers. The first
environmental factor influencing the opening up of the innovation process is the increasing
number and mobility of knowledge workers. In the 1980s, the perceived competitiveness gap
with Japan, and the declining number of U.S.-born science and engineering (S&E) graduates was
a cause for concern for both business and the U.S. government. Efforts were taken by the
government to rectify this perceived crisis, including the establishment of academic research
centers focused on near-term technology transfer and the education of new scientists and
engineers (Bozeman and Boardman, 2004). As a result, there has been a steady increase in total
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S&E bachelor’s degrees awarded by U.S. and Asian universities, and in S&E doctorates awarded
by U.S. institutions, since the 1970s (National Science Foundation, 2006).
The make-up of the recent S&E graduates is diverse; the percentage of recent foreignborn doctoral candidates attending U.S. institutions is higher than that of any previous era
(National Science Foundation, 2006). Consequently, the overall pool of S&E graduates has
increased in the U.S. In the past, the corporate lab would have been viewed as the employment
option of choice for many of these graduates. However, the mobility of foreign-born S&E
graduates has dramatically increased in the last decade, as some are being attracted home by
incentives and career opportunities that did not previously exist (Kim, 1999; National Science
Foundation, 2006). In addition, new employment opportunities with universities, startups and
other small firms abound for S&E graduates, regardless of their country of origin. These
opportunities are frequently tied to the second environmental factor, the venture capital market.
3.4.1.2. The Venture Capital Market. While not entirely unique in regards to this
environmental driver, access to and the availability of venture capital (VC) is certainly more
widespread in the U.S. than in the rest of the world. Prior to 1980, the formal VC market was
small even in the U.S. However, after the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
was revised by the Department of Labor in 1979, VC rates sharply increased. Whereas VC had
never exceeded more than few hundred million dollars annually, investments steadily climbed
into the tens of billions by the late-1990s (Kortum and Lerner, 2000). After the technology
bubble burst in the early 2000s, the VC market dramatically declined. However, the amount of
VC invested rebounded to $29.4 billion in 2007, the highest total since 2001 (Marketwire, 2008).
Until VC became readily available, promising ideas and technologies frequently
languished within large corporate R&D labs if they did not fit with current customers, supply
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channels or business practices. As a result, a considerable amount of useful technology that could
potentially be commercialized lay dormant on laboratory shelves. However, as access to VC
increased, ideas that were formerly trapped within large corporate labs could be liberated.
Projects that showed promise, but were shelved due to their lack of fit, could be spun out into an
organization with the proper structure to handle new technologies and new markets.
Alternatively, technologies could be exploited by out-licensing them to new, VC-backed firms.
3.4.1.3. The Increasing Supply and Capabilities of Contractors. A third
environmental factor shaping the opening up of the innovation process is the increasing supply of
contractors possessing high-quality R&D capabilities. Examples include startups and spin-offs,
university and government labs, and contract research organizations (CROs). Elaborating on this
last source, high-quality CROs have been established worldwide. In the U.S., three prominent
CROs are ADL, Battelle, and Carnegie. One of the most notable CROs is WIPRO in India,
which provides services in product design, information technology, and technology consulting.
As a consequence of the improved level of research quality provided by these various external
sources, firms are more willing to search externally for needed technological solutions than they
were in the past.
3.4.1.4. The Growth of Knowledge Bases. In conjunction with the increased supply of
highly mobile scientists and technologists, is the rapid growth of knowledge bases, and access to
them. A knowledge base refers to both tangible databases and the more amorphous depositories
of knowledge like regional and national innovation clusters that specialize in a specific field of
science or technology. Both types of knowledge bases are fueled by the discoveries of
universities, startups, and other small research and design firms as well as by multinational firms.
Tangible databases like those maintained by the U.S. and European Patent and Trademark
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Offices can be searched manually, or automatic searches can be performed and results delivered
by firms offering patent-mining services like Nerac. Regional and national innovation clusters
have also become rich sources of new knowledge in industries such as biotechnology,
information technology and pharmaceuticals (Gambardella, 1995; Kenney, 2000; Cooke, 2001).
Due to the abundance of information contained within these various knowledge bases,
many firms realize that they cannot possibly possess all of the knowledge in any one field of
science or technology. A stunning example of this realization is seen in Merck’s 2000 annual
report, which notes that:
‘Merck accounts for about 1 percent of the biomedical research in the world. To
tap into the remaining 99 percent, we must actively reach out to universities,
research institutions and companies worldwide to bring the best technologies and
potential products into Merck. The cascade of knowledge flowing from
biotechnology and the unraveling of the human genome – to name only two
recent developments – is far too complex for any one company to handle alone’
(Chesbrough, 2003: 53).
While this vast supply of knowledge exists, accessing and making sense of what is
available is another issue. Information and communication technology (ICT) and innovation
technology (IvT), which are discussed next, have played an important role in creating access to
these knowledge bases.
3.4.1.5. ICT and IvT. The proliferation of ICT has also influenced the opening up of the
innovation process by providing access to knowledge and enabling greater coordination and
collaboration between firms. As a consequence of employing ICT, access to information half a
globe away is less of a barrier to technological and scientific progress. Co-location pressures for
project team members are also reduced due to the ability to share information in real-time via
ICT. Solutions can be as simple as arranging for employees in remote locations to communicate
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via voice and/or video calls over the Internet, or as intricate as establishing proprietary networks
only accessible by team members.
In addition, Dodgson, Gann, and Salter (2006) suggest that new IvT has also played a
role in the shift towards open innovation. IvT includes a wide range of tools such as simulations,
modeling, virtual reality, data mining, and rapid prototyping that can be used to assist in the
generation of new ideas. When brought together, ICT and IvT can play a critical role in
promoting the flow of knowledge among parties to collaborate at all stages of the innovation
process.
3.4.1.6. Complexity and Interaction of Disparate Technology. Another major factor
influencing the drive to open up the innovation process is the increasing complexity of new
products and processes. Kodama (1992) noted this trend in the late 1980s-early 1990s while
studying high-technology firms in Japan. He observed that many innovations were actually the
result of combining previously separate fields of technology in new and unique ways. This
process, which he called ‘technology fusion,’ involves the integration of knowledge from diverse
scientific and technical disciplines.
Take for example fuel cell R&D in the automobile industry. This research entails
combining knowledge from fields such as materials science, chemical engineering, and physics
to develop a solution. Integrating these disparate scientific and technical fields is likely to result
in projects fraught with complexity. Thus, industries characterized by a high degree of
technology fusion and rapid technological change are more likely to exhibit the extensive use of
external sources to support product development (Howells, 1999; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003).
3.4.1.7. Government Policies, Incentives and Regulations. A final group of factors
contributing to the opening up of the innovation process are government policies, incentives and
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regulations. Policies and incentives may include tax credits for R&D-related expenses, increased
access and lower interest rates on capital to encourage entrepreneurial activities, and reductions
of domestic and international trade barriers to encourage international technology transfer. While
many incentives encourage a firm to collaborate with partners in their country of origin, some
regulations may encourage firms to search outside of that country for a research base (Boutellier,
Gassmann, and von Zedwitz, 1999). For example, with stricter regulation of stem cell research,
U.S. biotechnology firms have looked to countries like Singapore that have less stringent
regulations in order to conduct exploratory studies (The Economist, 2002). In addition,
government-funded technology clusters like India’s Genome Valley near Hyderabad and Dubai’s
DuBiotech Research Park are likely to attract foreign interest, especially if federal funding for
stem cell research remains restricted in the U.S.
A fundamental shift in government R&D funding in the U.S. is also part of this overall
trend. University labs are now conducting much of the basic research that was formerly
performed by corporate laboratories (Chesbrough, 2003). Pressures to deliver advanced product
solutions with shorter cycle times and short-term earnings expectations are driving this trend in
corporate R&D. Consequently, near-term product development programs are emphasized over
long-term fundamental scientific research in company labs. As a result, much of the government
funding that used to be awarded to private firms to conduct basic research has been shifted to
universities and CROs.
3.4.2. Firm-Specific Strategic Considerations
While the environmental factors set the context within which a project-level R&D
outsourcing decision is made, firm-specific strategic considerations play a role in initiating the
decision to outsource. The considerations outlined in this section are those emphasized in the

60
technology strategy and organizational capabilities literature. As illustrated in Figure 3-1,
technology strategy is typically the domain of senior management, while the capabilities
considerations on the second level are typically the concern of middle and functional (i.e., R&D)
managers.
3.4.2.1. Technology Strategy. A firm’s technology strategy defines how the use and
development of technology supports the firm’s overall goals and corporate strategy (Brockhoff
and Pearson, 1992; Ernst, 1998). A firm’s technology strategy also often determines whether it
aggressively pioneers new technology or takes a more conservative, ‘wait-and-see’ approach;
technologically aggressive firms tend to adopt the former approach in an attempt to develop
capabilities and technology superior to that of their competitors (Miles and Snow, 1978). Thus,
the degree of a firm’s technology aggressiveness influences decisions regarding which
capabilities and technologies to invest in and develop (Chiesa and Manzini, 1998).
A firm’s technology strategy may be a key determinant of its decision to open up the
innovation process (Davis and Harrison, 2001; Lin, Chen, and Wu, 2006), and in turn consider
outsourcing R&D a viable option. Previous research indicates that firms that have aggressive
technology strategies usually acquire less external technology (Brockhoff and Pearson, 1992).
Technologically aggressive firms are more likely to focus on internally developing, rather than
externally acquiring, new technology (Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2009). Technologically
aggressive firms typically invest intensively in developing their in-house R&D capabilities,
leading to the creation of proprietary technologies in order to achieve a technological advantage
relative to the competition. As a result, such firms are often reluctant to rely on externally
developed technology, potentially even exhibiting the ‘Not Invented Here’ syndrome (Katz and
Allen, 1982). Thus:
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Proposition 1: The degree of technological aggressiveness is negatively related to
the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable option.9
3.4.2.2. Organizational and Relational Capabilities. The current organizational
capabilities that a firm possesses are often a reflection of decisions made in the past regarding
which capabilities and technologies to develop. Firms that have heavily invested in a particular
area of science or technology are likely to have accumulated the capabilities necessary to exploit
knowledge in that field (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Roberts and Berry, 1985; Bohn, 1994), and
internally develop new technology. As a result, firms that have developed strong internal R&D
capabilities are likely to leverage such capabilities. Conversely, a firm’s capabilities may be
significantly behind those of its competitors, or it may lack the capabilities required to conduct
an R&D project in a particular area of science or technology. According to the notion of time
compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), such a firm may be unable to develop the
necessary capabilities internally in a timely, cost-effective manner. As a result, management
within a firm that either possesses inferior capabilities or that lacks the capabilities required to
conduct a specific R&D project may be more willing to consider outsourcing a viable option.
Accordingly:
Proposition 2: The strength of a firm’s technological capabilities is negatively
related to the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable option.
In addition to organizational capabilities related to exploiting scientific and technological
knowledge are ‘relational capabilities’ that help a firm to manage inter-firm relationships (Dyer
and Singh, 1998). The accumulation of such capabilities reflects past experience with inter-firm
relationships. A firm that frequently outsources R&D is likely to develop skills related to
selecting attractive partners, negotiating and enforcing contracts, and managing inter-firm
9

This proposition is tempered by research that suggests that acquiring technology from external sources is now
considered a requirement rather than an option by many firms (Jones, Lanctot, and Teegen, 2001; Edler, MeyerKrahmer, and Reger, 2002).
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relationships. As a result, managers in firms that have developed strong relational capabilities are
more likely to consider outsourcing a valid option. However, if a firm has not had much
experience with R&D outsourcing, or if it had a negative initial outsourcing experience, it may
lack relational capabilities. In this case, managers may be more reluctant to outsource R&D.
Previous research also indicates that firms that had a negative initial experience avoid
outsourcing subsequent R&D projects unless absolutely necessary (Brockhoff, 1992; Robertson
and Gatignon, 1998). Thus:
Proposition 3: The strength of a firm’s relational capabilities is positively related
to the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable option.
3.4.3. Transaction- and Project-Level Characteristics
Transaction- and project-level characteristics are the primary determinants of the R&D
outsourcing decision in the model. These factors are the most operational in nature, and thus
project managers are more likely to be familiar with these characteristics than functional
managers. It is important to note that even though these characteristics are presented as direct
determinants of the outsourcing decision, they are often intertwined with and tempered by the
contextual and initiating factors discussed above. As a result, there are potential interactions
between the levels that may help to explain why individual R&D outsourcing decisions may not
be in line with the predictions drawn from TCE alone. The following two propositions are
offered ceteris paribus, and then the potential for interactions that may enhance or diminish the
proposed effects is explored in Section 4.4.
In regards to the characteristics that are most frequently explored by TCE scholars (i.e.,
asset specificity and small-numbers bargaining), Table 2-1 briefly summarizes the findings from
the studies discussed in Section 3.4. The empirical evidence presented in the table shows general
support for the TCE contention that transactions fraught with hazards are more likely to be
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conducted in-house versus outsourced. The remainder of this subsection is therefore dedicated to
discussing the influence of project-level characteristics, primarily drawn from the technology
management literature, on the R&D outsourcing decision. These characteristics have received
comparatively less attention relative to transaction hazards.
3.4.3.1. Degree of Modularity. The degree of modularity essentially defines how easy or
difficult it is for the firm to decompose or separate out a particular research activity in order to
permit another firm to perform that task (Mikkola, 2003). When the task or the technology to be
developed is highly modular, very distinct boundaries can be drawn and the task can be welldefined. In this case, the task or the component of the technology can easily be separated. As a
result, the task can easily be communicated across firm boundaries, allowing one firm to
outsource it to the firm best equipped to complete it.
Conversely, where the task or technology is systemic and involves closely interrelated
and complex linkages, the boundaries are likely to be indistinct, making it difficult to separate
out from the overall project. In addition, there are likely to be coordination and communication
challenges associated with bridging these boundaries when the tasks are interrelated. As a result,
such a project is less likely to be outsourced due to the inherent costs of overcoming these
challenges. Thus:
Proposition 4: The degree of modularity is positively related to the likelihood of
outsourcing an R&D project.
3.4.3.2. Stage of the R&D Process. R&D encompasses a variety of activities including
basic research, applied research, and development. Each of these activities has a distinct time
horizon and can be characterized by its degree of technology and market uncertainty. Figure 3-2
illustrates how each activity corresponds to these characteristics.
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Figure 3-2. Stages of R&D
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Basic research typically refers to activities leading to fundamental, scientific discoveries,
and it is likely to have a long-term operational time horizon. Applied research is conducted to
determine if scientific discoveries can be exploited to solve a particular problem. The operational
time horizon is typically shorter for applied versus basic research. Development is often
associated with bringing together applied research to create a specific product or solution that
can be commercialized to satisfy the requirements of customers. Normally, development has the
shortest operational time horizon, as development activities are often associated with the
realization of short-term commercial goals.
In addition, technology and market uncertainty normally decrease along the continuum
from basic research to development since more questions about technical feasibility and market
acceptance are answered at each subsequent stage. Predicting whether a technology will actually
work, and gauging market responsiveness to and subsequent demand for product ideas in a very
early stage of R&D, is often difficult due to a lack of credible market research, specifically
where customers and needs are unknown and product specifications are ambiguous. In this
situation, the costs associated with trying to cope with uncertainty across firm boundaries are
likely to be high, decreasing the likelihood of outsourcing.
Conversely, predicting the market potential of a new technology is less subject to error
when customers and their current needs are known and technology is proven to be feasible. Inthe
development stage, many of the customer requirements for a new product become fixed. Thus, it
is less costly to communicate these requirements across firm boundaries. In addition,
development activities are easier to monitor due to the lower level of uncertainty, making them
less subject to the risk of the contractor acting opportunistically. This line of reasoning suggests
that development stage projects are more likely to be outsourced. Overall:
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Proposition 5: The stage of the R&D process is positively related to the likelihood
of outsourcing R&D.
3.4.4. Potential Interaction Effects
Table 3-1 summarizes the propositions and key relationships discussed above. The
individual effects of environmental factors, firm-level considerations, and transaction- and
project-level characteristics on the R&D outsourcing decision have already received considerable
attention in the literature. However, potential cross-level interactions also need to be examined.
An analysis of this more complex system of interactions provides a better understanding of such
decisions by going beyond a straightforward summation of individual effects.
The potential for interactions among the different factors examined above underscores
the importance of considering the context within which individual outsourcing decisions are
made. Such decisions can be reduced to a straightforward economic interaction, where the
outcome is based solely on transaction- and project-level characteristics. However, to gain a
more complete understanding of the decision, it is important to recognize that the firm’s
technology strategy is likely to have an impact on management’s attitude toward external
technology, which in turn influences whether outsourcing is considered a viable alternative to inhouse R&D. In firms that have adopted an aggressive technology strategy, outsourcing may
never be considered even if the transaction- and project-level factors suggest that it is the
appropriate choice.
Similarly, the firm’s possession or lack of capabilities is likely to frame the outsourcing
decision. For example, it was suggested above that when the project involves basic research, a
firm is more likely to conduct in-house R&D owing to the coordination and communication
challenges associated with highly uncertain tasks. However, if the firm lacks the technological

Table 3-1.

Summary of key relationships and propositions

Factors influencing the outsourcing decision at each level
Environmental factors
 Increasing supply and mobility of knowledge workers
 The Venture Capital market
 The increasing capability of external suppliers
 Growth of knowledge bases
 Globalization, telecommunications and the Internet
 Complexity and interaction of disparate technology
 Government policies, incentives and regulations
Technology strategy
 Technological aggressiveness
Firm-specific capabilities
 Technological capabilities


Relational capabilities

Transaction-level characteristics
 Asset-specificity
 Small-numbers bargaining

Project-level characteristics
 Degree of modularity


Stage of the R&D process

Key relationships and propositions


The barriers to and costs of outsourcing are likely to be lower in
industries and countries that exhibit many of the environmental factors
compared to contexts where the factors have not yet taken hold.



P1: The degree of technological aggressiveness is negatively related to
the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable option.



P2: The strength of a firm’s technological capabilities is negatively
related to the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable
option.
P3: The strength of a firm’s relational capabilities is positively related
to the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable option.



According to TCE:
 Firms are more likely to outsource R&D when asset specificity is
low.
 Firms are more likely to outsource R&D when there are many
capable suppliers



P4: The degree of modularity is positively related to the likelihood of
outsourcing an R&D project.
P5: The stage of the R&D process is positively related to the likelihood
of outsourcing R&D.
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capabilities to conduct the project, it may have to take a more careful look at whether internal
R&D is truly the best option. In particular, management needs to examine the trade-off between
the costs incurred to develop the required capabilities to conduct the project in-house versus the
costs of communication, coordination and monitoring. If the former costs outweigh the latter,
following Proposition 5 is likely to lead to a less satisfactory outcome if the firm’s technological
capabilities are not also taken into consideration.
It is also important to recognize that the environmental factors, at both the country- and
industry-level, are likely to have an impact on the propensity of firms to outsource R&D. For
example, in an industry such as pharmaceutical biotechnology, the general trend among the
environmental factors points to the industry being receptive to open innovation. As a result,
many firms in this industry engage in interactions with other firms. Thus, the propensity of an
individual firm to outsource R&D is likely to be influenced by the practices of other firms within
the industry. In addition, as more firms engage in outsourcing and other forms of R&D
partnerships, the network of competent potential partners is likely to increase. As a result, the
small-numbers bargaining situation is likely to be mitigated to some extent, reducing the
transaction costs associated with outsourcing. The same logic applies at the country-level; in
countries where the factors align with open innovation, more firms are likely to be engaging in
outsourcing, making it a more attractive option for individual firms. Thus, the environmental
factors are likely to have an influence on a firm’s individual technology strategy and attitude
toward externally developed technology, which in turn impacts the propensity to outsource.
The foregoing discussion highlights the importance of managers from different levels of
the firm being involved in R&D outsourcing decisions. Each level of managers is likely to
possess specific information that is needed to develop a more complete picture of the factors at
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play, as suggested by Figure 3-1. In the absence of some of the information, decisions could be
potentially arrived at that are consistent with theory at the transaction-level, but not truly feasible
given the overall context. As a result, the performance and outcome of the project may suffer.
3.5. Conclusion
Managing the R&D function in a world where the innovation process is open presents
new challenges to overcome and opportunities to exploit. Many firms have begun to take
advantage of these opportunities and acquire new knowledge and technology from a wealth of
external sources. This essay has focused on one of these external acquisition pathways, namely
R&D outsourcing.
The purpose of this essay was to develop a framework for understanding the influence of
various strategic considerations and environmental factors on the project-level R&D outsourcing
decision. It was argued that while the environmental factors that are emerging in many sectors
only indirectly influence this decision, they can act as shift parameters and increase or decrease
the costs of outsourcing. It was also posited that it is important to consider firm-specific strategic
considerations in addition to the transaction- and project-level characteristics that are typically
the focus of an R&D outsourcing decision. The potential for interactions among the different
levels of factors examined was discussed at the end of the previous section. This discussion
highlights the importance of involving different levels of management in the decision. Whereas
R&D and project managers are likely to focus on project-level considerations, senior managers
are more familiar with firm-level considerations. An important implication of this argument is
that a thoughtful analysis of the factors, which involves managers from all levels, can lead to
better informed R&D outsourcing decisions and more successful outcomes.
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While this essay examines the decision to outsource R&D from the perspective of the
‘buying’ firm, firms ‘supplying’ R&D services are likely to face their own strategic and
operational issues, influencing their decision to take on a project. An examination of the
contracting and organizational issues faced by suppliers should help buyers to understand the
conditions that influence the supplier’s decision to accept contract R&D work from a buyer
(Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Providing a complete picture of both sides of the sourcing
relationship should benefit both parties to the transaction, increasing the likelihood that a project
will result in a successful innovation outcome.
Future research should also seek to develop a better picture of the overall R&D
outsourcing process. As noted, only the actual decision itself is examined in this essay. However,
as suggested by Mahnke et al. (2005), R&D outsourcing research can benefit from adopting a
process conceptualization. It is important to acknowledge that the R&D decision is only one
stage of this process and that the roles and responsibilities played by managers at different levels
are likely to change as the process progresses. Consequently, a study that investigates the ongoing roles of the managers involved in the initial decision in the management of the project
after the contract has been signed could benefit academics and practitioners alike.
The overall purpose of this essay was to develop a framework to help researchers and
managers understand the direct and indirect influence of both strategic and environmental factors
on project-level R&D outsourcing decisions. The model developed in Figure 3-1 illustrates the
relationships between environmental factors, technology strategy, firm specific capabilities and
finally transaction- and project-level characteristics, and the potential for interactions across the
multiple levels. The model also identifies which managers are likely to possess the information
relevant at each level of Figure 3-1. Finally, several areas for future research were suggested. As

71
R&D outsourcing continues to grow in importance, many research opportunities exist to further
understand this important area of technology management. In addition, as the global economy
continues to expand and the fact that science and technological information are not limited by
boundaries, the R&D outsourcing decision represents a major strategic issue for firms.
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CHAPTER 4
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE DESIGN OF R&D ALLIANCE
CONTRACTS IN THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY
4.1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, alliances have been examined extensively in the strategic
management literature (see Inkpen, 2001; Rivera-Santos and Inkpen, 2009; Wassmer, 2010 for
reviews on this and related topics). Alliance researchers have investigated the phenomenon
through a variety of theoretical lenses such as the networks perspective (e.g., Powell, 1990;
Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996), inter-organizational learning (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Inkpen
and Tsang, 2007), and transaction cost economics (e.g., Williamson, 1985, 1991). Important
issues explored through these lenses include why firms form alliances, how alliances are
structured and what impact alliances have on performance. Research and development (R&D)
alliances10 have especially been examined in great detail (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011).
This is not surprising considering that roughly half of the alliances reported in the SDC database,
one of the most prominent sources of alliance data, involve R&D (Schilling, 2009).11
The increase in the number of R&D alliances over the last 50 years is an interesting
phenomenon in its own right. As discussed in the first essay, by the mid-20th century, in-house
R&D came to be viewed as an important source of scientific and technological knowledge
(Mowery, 1983), and a potential driver of competitive advantage (Reich, 1985). Thus, for much
of the 20th century, firms tended to favor internal R&D over collaborative R&D in order to
protect valuable knowledge and skills. However, later in the 20th century, many firms began to

10

In this essay, an R&D alliance refers to a contractual partnership formed by two or more partners, in order to pool
their complementary resources and capabilities in order to conduct collaborative R&D (and potentially other value
chain activities further downstream). However, unlike an equity joint venture, an R&D alliance does not entail the
formation of a separate legal entity.
11
Representative examples of studies that have relied on the SDC database for information about R&D alliances
include Oxley and Sampson (2004), Sampson (2005), and Li, Eden, Hitt, and Ireland (2008).
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search beyond their own boundaries in order to uncover new ideas and access resources required
for successful innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). The complex and multidisciplinary nature of
scientific research and the increased relevance of science for corporate innovation also factored
prominently in this trend (National Science Board, 2008).
Alliances between firms are now a ubiquitous phenomenon (Gulati, 1998). The growth in
the number of R&D alliances since the 1960s has been particularly explosive. Based on
information from the MERIT-CATI database, the annual number of R&D alliances formed in the
1960s hovered between just a handful and ten.12 By the end of the 1960s and into the early
1970s, this number had grown to about thirty per year, followed by a sharper increase to roughly
160 new alliances annually in the late 1970s. The phenomenon intensified during the 1980s,
peaking at over 500 new R&D alliances formed in 1989. After a slight downturn in the early
1990s, the number of new R&D alliances rebounded to nearly 700 in 1995. R&D alliance
activity subsequently declined in the late 1990s and early 2000s to mid-1980s levels, but began
to climb again in the mid-2000s.
R&D alliances enable firms to access new or critical resources and capabilities, share
risks, access complementary assets, and learn about recent advances in science and technology
(Teece, 1986; Tripsas, Schrader, and Sobrero, 1995; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996,
1998; Stuart, 2000; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008). However, forming an alliance poses the risk
that a motivated and capable firm may misappropriate its partner’s valuable knowledge (Hamel,
1991). This is an especially daunting prospect when smaller, entrepreneurial firms form alliances
with larger, established firms. While the larger firm typically possesses the ability to learn about
the smaller firm’s technology, it is often takes a substantial amount of time for the smaller firm
to learn about the larger firm’s organizational resources (Alvarez and Barney, 2001).
12

The information reported in this paragraph is drawn from Hagedoorn (2002) and Schilling (2009).
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Despite the threat of misappropriation, R&D alliances frequently require the transfer of
scientific and technical information between the partners. While the asymmetry in the ability to
learn between small and large firms complicates the transfer of such information, transfer is also
hindered when the knowledge to be exchanged is tacit and organizationally embedded (Teece,
1977; Kogut, 1988). Managers are thus advised to carefully select a governance mode (i.e.,
organizational form) that adequately responds to the degree that misappropriation hazards and
transfer challenges are present in a given transaction (Sampson, 2004b).
While a wealth of research has examined the governance mode decision, the formal
contracts that establish the terms and structure of alliances have only recently gained much
interest in the strategic management literature (Weber, Mayer, and Wu, 2009). Formal contracts
have also received considerably less attention than the relational aspects of alliance governance,
even though they provide an important blue print for conducting an exchange (Macaulay, 1963).
Many of the studies in this stream examine whether relational mechanisms, such as trust, and
formal governance are substitutes or complements (e.g., Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002;
Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger, 2004; Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom, 2005; Gulati
and Nickerson, 2008). Nevertheless, firms do devise formal contracts in a wide range of hightechnology industries, including biotechnology (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011), information
technology (Mayer and Argyres, 2004), and telecommunications equipment (Sampson, 2007).
Much of the early research on alliance contracts use contract-related variables to explain
other alliance attributes or outcomes (e.g., Parkhe, 1993; Deeds and Hill, 1999; Reuer and Ariño,
2002). More recent studies examine the determinants of contract characteristics, particularly
contractual complexity and completeness (e.g., Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer,
Ariño, and Mellewigt, 2006; Ryall and Sampson, 2009). The operationalizations of these two
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concepts are often conflated, however, leading to confusion in the literature (Weber et al., 2009).
Thus, other studies have turned to examining the general functions contracts play and/or the role
of specific clauses or groups of clauses in alliance contracts (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004;
Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Reuer and Ariño, 2007).
The central premise of the research in this stream is that in order to achieve better
performance, more complex/complete contracts are necessary to deal with the hazards that
plague transactions. Williamson (1985) suggests, however, that contracts should only include
safeguards that address the hazards that are actually present in a particular transaction. Argyres
and Mayer (2007) posit that these hazards are likely to be context-dependent. Thus, while some
safeguards may be widely applicable, others are likely to be tailored to fit the unique hazards
encountered in a particular context. Study 1 in this essay focuses on the hazards that are
prominent in one context, R&D alliances, and how partners contractually contend with such
hazards. Specifically, Study 1 examines the extent to which communication and appropriation
challenges are present in R&D alliances and the likelihood of including particular clauses
designed to cope with these challenges.
A key assumption in the contract design literature is that managers and lawyers have the
ability ‘to learn and to look ahead, perceive hazards, and factor these back into the contractual
relation, thereafter to devise responsive institutions’ (Williamson, 1996: 9). In other words,
managers and lawyers are thought to be able recognize when hazards are likely to arise or at least
learn from their experience relatively quickly and implement that knowledge when designing a
contract. Evidence suggests, however, that managers and lawyers are not as farsighted as theory
assumes (e.g., Mayer and Arygres, 2004; Lumineau, Fréchet, and Puthod, 2011). Study 1 relaxes
this assumption in order to investigate if and how previous contract design experience impacts
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the likelihood that specific contractual clauses will be included to contend with the hazards that
can be identified at the outset of R&D alliances. The study also delves into whether contracting
capabilities that are applicable in the context of R&D come about exclusively from participating
in R&D alliances, or from experience negotiating and drafting contracts for alliances involving
other value chain activities (e.g., marketing, manufacturing) as well.
A second important stream in the contract design literature examines the allocation of
decision and control rights between firms engaged in alliances. Such rights refer to provisions in
alliance contracts that provide one of the partners with ownership of key alliance assets and the
right to decide how they should be used. Research in this stream has primarily drawn on property
rights theory (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), which
suggests that the logic of incentive-alignment should guide the assignment of decision and
control rights. Study 2 follows in this tradition. It deviates, however, from previous research in
that it suggests that the rationale behind the allocation of different rights is likely to be specific to
the right in question. This suggestion is based on recent research that shows that different rights
matter to different partners (Ariño and Ring, 2010; Kloyer, 2011), and play different functions
(Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). Thus, whereas previous studies examine why one partner wins
more rights or a higher percentage of the rights available in a particular alliance contract, Study 2
investigates the factors that influence the assignment of specific rights that are important in R&D
alliances, namely the ownership of new intellectual property (IP) and severe termination rights
(i.e., those that allow one partner to unilaterally and unconditionally terminate the alliance).
While addressing important theoretical issues, the two studies conducted in this essay are
also motivated by practical, managerial concerns related to how contract design impacts alliance
performance. Sampson (2002) notes that managers often resist careful consideration of contract
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terms in fear that trust between partners may erode during the negotiation process. However,
alliances tend to have high failure rates (Dyer, Kale, and Singh, 2001). Studies have shown that
between 30% and 70% of alliances fail (Bamford, Gomes-Casseres, and Robinson, 2004). In
addition, more than 50% of all alliances are terminated (Lunnan and Haugland, 2008), resulting
in the destruction of shareholder value for the companies engaged in them (Kale, Dyer, and
Singh, 2002). Thus, investigating the questions posed in this essay may provide useful insights
about the contract design process that managers may find helpful.
Even though the contract design process is only one element of managing an alliance,
understanding this process may help to improve the likelihood of achieving success. DiMatteo
(2010) suggests that comprehension of contract law can enhance collaborative efforts and
mitigate opportunistic behavior in strategic alliances. Thus, considering that over 30% of annual
research expenditures for many of the world’s largest firms are tied up in alliances (Ernst, 2004),
the capability to design effective contracts may be a potential source of competitive advantage,
which leads to better alliance outcomes (Argyres and Mayer, 2007).
Overall, this essay is concerned with the design of contracts developed to govern R&D
alliances. Thus, the overarching research question examined is: What factors impact the design
of R&D alliance contracts? Building on this question, the two studies in this essay specifically
address:


What hazards are encountered in R&D alliances and what contractual solutions are
implemented to contend with them? (Study 1)



How does previous alliance experience impact the relationships between the hazards
encountered in R&D alliances and the contractual solutions implemented to contend with
them? (Study 1)



What factors influence the assignment of key control and decision rights in R&D alliance
contracts? (Study 2)
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Using a sample of 66 contracts from R&D alliances in the medical device industry
between 1994 and 2009, I test hypotheses concerning the inclusion of specific safeguards in
R&D alliance contracts in Study 1 and hypotheses regarding the assignment of specific control
rights in Study 2. The contracts in the sample involve partners with a considerable size
difference,13 which is important because many of the theoretical arguments developed in the
studies that follow are driven by the learning and power imbalances created by this asymmetry.
From a methodological standpoint, both studies involve non-linear models that contain
interaction effects. Because these effects cannot be interpreted in the same way as they are in a
linear model, I employed the simulation-based approach developed by King, Tomz, and
Wittenberg (2000), which was recently introduced in the strategic management literature by
Zelner (2009), to overcome this difficulty. This technique makes it possible to graphically
evaluate and interpret interaction effects in non-linear models.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section provides a
comprehensive literature review that covers several research streams that form the theoretical
and empirical backdrop for Study 1 and Study 2. Specifically, I review three of the key
theoretical lenses that have been used to examine alliances: the networks perspective, interorganizational learning, and transaction cost economics. I then narrow the focus of the review to
discuss how transaction cost economics and property rights theory jointly inform our knowledge
of contract design. Finally, I review an emerging body of the literature that examines alliance
and contracting capabilities and their impact on contract design. The section that follows then
develops the research questions that were introduced above in light of the research opportunities
identified and conclusions presented in the literature review. A detailed description of the

13

The revenue generated by the larger partner is approximately 255 times that of the smaller partner in the deals
examined in this essay.
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research setting and the data set and an overview of the two empirical studies are also provided.
Study 1 is then presented, which examines the relationship between the hazards that plague R&D
alliances and the contractual solutions implemented to mitigate them. Study 1 also investigates if
and how previous alliance experience impacts this relationship. The subsequent section presents
Study 2, which examines the assignment of two key control rights in R&D alliances. The final
section summarizes the findings and discusses the contributions from each study along with
implications for practices, limitations, and directions for future research.
4.2. Literature Review
The studies in this essay focus on the design of contracts for R&D alliances. R&D
alliances are contractual partnerships with no intervening organizational structure in which two
or more firms pool their resources in order to conduct research and/or development. Several
streams of the literature have examined various aspects of R&D alliances. I briefly review three
of these streams in this section: networks, inter-organizational learning, and transaction cost
economics. I pay particular attention to how each stream informs our knowledge about why firms
form R&D alliances, the choice between R&D alliance governance forms, and the impact that
R&D alliances have on performance. A brief summary is then offered, highlighting where the
streams overlap.
I expand upon these brief reviews, and discuss how transaction cost economics and
property rights theory jointly inform our knowledge of alliance contracts and their design. In
addition, I review an emerging body of literature that examines alliance capabilities and their
impact on contract design. I conclude with a discussion of three research opportunities related to
contract design that emerge from synthesizing the literature reviewed in this section. These
opportunities serve as the basis for the hypotheses that are developed later in this essay.
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4.2.1. The Networks Perspective
The origins of the networks view of alliances can be traced to Powell (1990).
Reconsidering his earlier beliefs (i.e., Powell, 1987), Powell suggests that alliances are not just a
hybrid or intermediate governance form; rather they are something altogether distinct from
markets and hierarchies – they are social networks. In this view, networks are considered to be
the ideal form of economic organization when there is a need to efficiently and reliably exchange
information that is difficult to quantify such as know-how and technology. The ability to transmit
information is enhanced in networks due to the relative absence of explicit quid pro quo
behavior, owing to their relational features. In essence, exchange in networks is driven by
reputation, friendship, interdependence and altruism (Macneil, 1985). Thus, the establishment of
trust is a key cornerstone of the networks perspective of alliances.
Drawing on concepts from sociology, scholars in this stream have examined the motives
for forming alliances, and the factors that impact alliance structure and firm-level performance.
Each of these areas is briefly reviewed in the following sub-sections with special attention paid
to research on R&D alliances.
4.2.1.1. Motives. In their study of collaborative R&D in biotechnology, Powell, Koput,
and Smith-Doerr (1996) set out to examine the network structure that typifies the field. In doing
so, they offer a perspective on the motives for collaborative R&D that greatly contrasts with the
more strategic rationale of transaction cost economics. Specifically, Powell et al. suggest that
collaborative R&D is ‘an admission ticket to an information network and a vehicle for the rapid
communication of news about opportunities and obstacles’ (1996: 120). This ticket is important
in industries where technology is changing rapidly. In such a situation, knowledge is likely to be
broadly distributed among the firms in the industry, rather than concentrated in any single firm.
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As a result, the locus of innovation is likely to be found in a network of inter-organizational
relationships (Powell and Brantley, 1992).
Powell et al. (1996) go on to state that staying current in the face of rapid change,
especially when knowledge is dispersed, requires action both internally and through cooperative
research with external sources. Thus, R&D alliances provide access to knowledge that is
otherwise unavailable or too costly to develop in-house. Firms need to invest in internal R&D,
however, in order to have the absorptive capacity to utilize the knowledge gained from
collaborating (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Accordingly, internal R&D and collaborative R&D
are complements rather than substitutes (Arora and Gambardella, 1994).
In sum, the networks perspective suggests that a principle motive for participating in
R&D alliances is to stay competitive currently and to expand to meet the competitive needs of
the future. R&D alliances are, however, not just a way to compensate for a lack of internal skills,
nor are they just a series of discrete transactions. Rather, R&D alliances provide a firm with
access to a broader network of knowledge to draw upon, directly from its partners and indirectly
through its partners’ ties to other firms. As a result, a firm that actively participates in R&D
alliances is likely to be able to stay abreast of rapidly changing conditions and learn about the
new opportunities arising from these changes.
4.2.1.2. Alliance Structure. Initially, the networks literature was relatively silent about
alliance structure and the choice between alliance modes. Powell (1990) suggests, based on the
evidence available, that there is no clear relationship between the legal form of alliances and
their purpose. Rather, he observes that the form of agreement appears to be tailored to the needs
of the respective parties, and to tax and regulatory considerations. Subsequent research presents a
different picture, however, drawing on the concept of embeddedness.
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Embeddedness refers to the degree to which firms are entangled in a social network
(Granovetter, 1985). Being embedded in a network provides a firm with preferential access to
information about the trustworthiness of partners while also conveying information about its own
attractiveness to other firms as a potential partner (Burt, 1992). Firms that are embedded in a
network of alliances are often presented with opportunities for new alliances by their existing
alliance partners and frequently turn to their partners for referrals regarding new partners (Gulati,
1993). These observations stand in stark contrast to the traditional view that ‘a firm on its own
initiative identifies the need for an alliance, identifies the best partner available, and chooses the
appropriate alliance form’ (Gulati, 1998: 294). Thus, research suggests that a firm’s degree of
embeddedness is likely to impact its decision to enter an alliance, choice of an alliance partner,
and choice between alternative alliance modes.
Empirical evidence indicates that embeddedness does influence the likelihood that a firm
will enter an alliance. For instance, several studies have shown that firms with more prior
alliances, that are more centrally embedded in their alliance network, or that have more focused
alliance networks, are more likely to enter into new alliances and to do so with greater frequency
(Kogut, Shan, and Walker, 1992; Gulati, 1993, 1997). Additional research echoes these findings
regarding firm centrality and the likelihood of entering new alliances (e.g., Podolny and Stuart,
1995; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Powell et al., 1996). Research also supports the
notion that embeddedness is a predictor of which available firms are likely to partner with each
other (Gulati, 1995b). Findings indicate, from a relational embeddedness perspective, firms are
likely to engage in new alliances with previous partners owing to the trust established during
prior alliances (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Goerzen, 2007). In addition, evidence
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suggests, from a structural embeddedness perspective, a firm and a potential new partner are
more likely to form an alliance if they already had prior indirect ties (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999).
Overall, there is strong support for the notion that embeddedness is a predictor of the
formation of new alliances. What is far less clear is whether, and how, embeddedness impacts
the choice between alliance governance forms. Research indicates that the use of equity in
strategic alliances diminishes as network centrality and proximity increase (Robinson and Stuart,
2007). A parallel stream in the networks tradition suggests that the history of previous
interactions between partners impacts the choice of alliance structure. Specifically, scholars
propose that as partners become more familiar with each other through subsequent alliances, they
build enough confidence in each other to forego the more hierarchical control offered by equity
alliance forms in favor of trust-based, non-equity alliances. Several studies have shown support
for this relational view, which asserts that trust substitutes for formal control mechanisms (such
as contracts) in alliances (Larson, 1992; Parkhe, 1993; Gulati, 1995a).
4.2.1.3. Performance. The networks perspective also provides insight into how alliances
impact performance. In their study of R&D alliances in biotechnology, Shan, Walker, and Kogut
(1994) find that innovative output, as measured by the number of new patents granted, is
indirectly related to network position. Specifically, highly embedded firms are more likely to
enter into multiple alliances, increasing their access to new knowledge, which in turn improves
their innovativeness. In contrast, Deeds and Hill (1996) report a curvilinear relationship between
a biotechnology firm’s number of R&D alliances and its innovative output, as measured by the
rate of new product development. This finding suggests that firms are likely to earn diminishing
returns once their alliance portfolios increase above a certain size.
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Ahuja (2000) finds that innovative output is not simply impacted by the number of
alliances that a firm participates in, but by the strength of the ties that it builds to its network
through its portfolio of alliances. Performance, as measured by patents granted, is higher when
firms have more indirect ties but fewer direct ties. For a firm with limited access to the network
through immediate partners, connections to a partner’s partners provide additional access to
information that would otherwise not flow to the firm. When a firm already has many direct ties,
however, indirect ties are less likely to contribute new information that the firm does not already
have access to through its direct ties.
4.2.2. Inter-organizational Learning
A second stream of the literature that has informed our knowledge of R&D alliances is
inter-organizational learning. Researchers in this area propose that a firm’s ability to learn from
partners and capture knowledge from outside its own boundaries are critical to competitiveness
(Ulrich, Von Glinow, and Jick, 1993). Inter-organizational learning research draws on concepts
from several streams including the capabilities perspective (e.g., Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993;
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), the knowledge-based view (e.g.,
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Zander and Kogut, 1995; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2002), and the
broader knowledge management literature (e.g., Nonaka, 1991, 1994).
Today, it is well accepted that alliances are a vehicle for inter-organizational learning,
providing partnering firms with access to new knowledge. As Inkpen and Tsang (2007) note,
firms learn with and from their partners through joint problem solving, shared execution of
alliance tasks, and observation of alliance activities. The formation of an alliance reduces the risk
that knowledge will dissipate quickly (Powell, 1987), because unlike other learning contexts, the
creation of an alliance results in a repository for knowledge. Thus, alliances provide an ideal
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platform for learning, as two firms with different skill sets and knowledge are purposefully
brought together. The differences between the firms act as a catalyst for learning by both firms.
Research in this stream has also examined the motives for forming alliances, the choice
between alliance governance modes, and the impact of alliances on performance.
4.2.2.1. Motives. The acquisition of tacit knowledge is considered to be a strong motive
for establishing an alliance (Inkpen, 2005). If knowledge is tacit, it may be difficult to obtain
without close observation of and interaction with its owners. Thus, an alliance may provide the
access needed to foster learning. Alliance learning can be classified into four types: learning
about alliance management, learning about an alliance partner, learning with an alliance
partner, and learning from an alliance partner (Inkpen and Tsang, 2007).
Learning about alliance management refers to gaining knowledge about the design and
management of alliances that may be useful in subsequent alliances (Lyles, 1988; Simonin,
1997; Gulati, 1999; Gupta and Misra, 2000). The effectiveness of a firm’s future alliances is
considered to be a function of its accumulated learning from previous alliances. Evidence
suggests that firms that have extensive alliance experience learn to manage alliances more
effectively over time (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, and Bell, 1997; Anand and Khanna, 2000;
Tsang, 2002). A caveat, however, is that the benefits derived from previous alliance experience
may depreciate rapidly, as suggested by Sampson’s (2005) study of R&D alliances in the
telecommunications equipment industry.
Learning about an alliance partner refers to gaining familiarity with the skills and
practices of a specific partner. Doz and Hamel (1998) consider this type of learning to be a key
to joint value creation. The knowledge obtained about an alliance partner may also play an
important role in the evolution of an alliance (Doz, 1996; Ariño and De La Torre, 1998).
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Learning with an alliance partner refers to situations where partners jointly enter new business
arenas and develop new capabilities. The goal in this case is for each firm to build its capabilities
in complementary areas rather than to transfer knowledge because each partner will continue to
operate in its own area of expertise (Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 2002). During an alliance,
each partner continues to develop its own skills, but learns how to use them in conjunction with
the partner’s capabilities. Mowery et al.’s (2002) study indicates that this type of learning helps
facilitate the coordination and integration of activities conducted by alliance partners.
Learning from a partner is the type of alliance learning that has received the most
attention in the literature. By definition, an alliance involves collaboration, creating the
opportunity for each collaborator to learn from its partners and gain access to knowledge that it
does not possess and may have no access to without an alliance. Learning from a partner is not
inevitable, however, as access to knowledge may be explicitly blocked by one or more partners.
Firms enter alliances with different intents regarding learning from a partner. In some cases, the
partners may seek to simply contribute their knowledge to the alliance without transferring the
knowledge that is shared with and/or developed by the alliance back into their own operations.
In contrast, a major motivation for forming an alliance is to acquire knowledge from a
partner and use it in areas unrelated to the alliance in order to create private benefits (Khanna,
Gulati, and Nohria, 1998). Hamel (1991) first described this situation in the context of
international alliances, coining the phrase ‘learning race’ to emphasize that the partners’ intent is
to out-learn each other. Once the faster learning partner learns what it set out to learn, it no
longer needs the other partner, potentially creating an asymmetry in bargaining power (Makhija
and Ganesh, 1997). This may lead to a shift in the competitive position of the partners outside of
the alliance as well.
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Learning races are exemplified by alliances that pair smaller, entrepreneurial firms with
large, established partners (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). The asymmetry in the size of the partners
is a salient feature of many alliances, as it has an impact on the relative ability of each firm to
learn. The large firm in such alliances is often able to learn the small firm’s knowledge at a faster
rate than the small firm can imitate the organizational resources of the large firm owing to an
imbalance in the scope of what the small firm needs to learn. While evidence that such races
occur is mixed (Inkpen and Tsang, 2007), concerns about effectively transferring and protecting
knowledge factor prominently into questions about alliance structure, which is the topic of the
next sub-section.
4.2.2.2. Alliance Structure. Scholars have long argued that transferring knowledge-based
assets, particularly tacit knowledge (i.e., knowledge that is not easily codified), across firm
boundaries is difficult because such knowledge is often organizationally embedded (Teece, 1977;
Kogut, 1988). Thus, learning from a partner may be hindered if the knowledge to be obtained is
tacit in nature. In order to transfer tacit knowledge, research suggests that direct interaction
between the partners is required (Leonard-Barton, 1988; Mascitelli, 2000), implying that alliance
structure is likely to be influenced by the type of knowledge to be learned from a partner.
R&D alliances often involve tacit knowledge (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). Scholars
applying the knowledge-based perspective suggest that equity joint ventures (EJVs) provide the
appropriate forum for interaction between firms to promote the transfer of tacit knowledge. In
particular, EJVs facilitate knowledge transfer through the formation of a joint venture board,
which is typically composed of managers from all venture partners (Killing, 1983). In addition,
the partners in EJVs frequently co-locate employees, further increasing the chances that
knowledge will be shared via close interaction between individuals. In comparison, non-equity
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alliances may not be as suitable an environment for learning as more hierarchically structured,
equity-based alliances.
Several studies support the notion that EJVs are preferred over non-equity alliances when
the knowledge to be learned is tacit in nature. For example, research shows that EJVs provide
more intimate human interaction than licensing agreements, making them more suitable for
transferring complicated, organizationally embedded technology (Kogut, 1988; Tsang, 1997).
Similarly, Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996) report that EJVs are a more effective conduit
for transferring complex capabilities than non-equity alliances, such as licensing agreements,
based on an analysis of patent cross-citation rates among alliance partners.
Learning from an alliance partner may also result in a negative outcome for the partner
whose knowledge is appropriated (Lorange, 1997). A loss of knowledge by one partner in a
learning race may lead to the creation of a new or strong competitor. Thus, knowledge protection
is a key issue that has implications for alliance structure. Research suggests that EJVs are
preferred over non-equity alliances when it is difficult to monitor alliance activities and when
knowledge is tacit because the structure of EJVs protects against knowledge leakage. Norman’s
(2004) finding that EJVs have the lowest level of knowledge loss concurs with this argument.
Oxley and Sampson (2004) report that limiting the scope of activities for an R&D alliance (i.e.,
by excluding downstream activities such as manufacturing and/or marketing from the alliance) is
also an effective way to protect against knowledge leakage.
4.2.2.3. Performance. The learning literature also provides insight into how alliances
impact performance. In regards to learning about alliance management, Anand and Khanna
(2000) find that performance, as measured by abnormal stock returns, is higher for firms that
have more alliance experience. Presumably, as experience accumulates, firms learn how to better
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manage alliances, resulting in value creation. Large learning effects are found in managing EJVs,
but not for licensing agreements, and the effects of learning on value creation are strongest for
R&D joint ventures, while they are weakest for marketing joint ventures (Anand and Khanna,
2000).
In regards to learning from a partner, research suggests that the characteristics of the
partners themselves impact performance, particularly the transfer of knowledge between the
partners. According to Hamel (1991), the most important factors from the learning partner’s side
that influence performance are the partner’s intent to learn, receptivity to new knowledge, and
absorptive capacity. From the teaching partner’s side, Pisano (1988) asserts that the teacher must
be willing to fully cooperate and share knowledge with the learning partner to ensure that
performance is positive. For example, activities can purposely be separated to keep the physical
proximity of experts distant, and gatekeepers can be placed at the alliance interface to block the
unrestricted flow of knowledge from the teacher to the learning firm (Baughn, Denekamp,
Stevens, and Osborn, 1997). Thus, the teaching partner’s degree of protectiveness is a strong
determinant of alliance performance.
4.2.3. Transaction Cost Economics
Alliances have been examined extensively through the lens of transaction costs
economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1975, 1985). From a TCE perspective, alliances are viewed as
mechanisms for governing transactions that are more complex than a standard market exchange
but not complex enough to warrant full integration (e.g., Williamson, 1991; Zenger and Hesterly,
1997; Gulati, 1998). In contrast to the networks perspective, alliances are considered an
intermediate or hybrid organizational form that combine elements of spot market contracting
with elements of internal organization (Williamson, 1991). The following sub-sections provide a
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brief review of what we know from the TCE literature about why firms form alliances, the
choice between alliance modes, and the impact of alliances on performance, with special
attention given to studies that examine R&D alliances.
4.2.3.1. Motives. From a TCE perspective, a primary motivation for the formation of
alliances is to organize in the most efficient way to pool resources and capabilities. Scholars in
this tradition argue that firms use alliances because markets are perceived as being unable to
effectively bundle valuable resources and capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 1994), while
hierarchies weaken incentives and reduce the flexibility to reverse decisions regarding resources
and capabilities once they are under common ownership (Ménard, 2004). Alliances are
characterized by semi-strong incentives and an intermediate degree of administrative apparatus,
along with semi-strong cooperative and autonomous adaptation, while working under a semilegalistic contract law regime (Williamson, 1991). Thus, according to TCE, alliances are
considered to be an intermediate or hybrid form of governance that lies between the two polar
extremes of markets and hierarchies.
TCE suggests that alliances often represent an attractive way to organize R&D activities.
In particular, alliances are not weighed down by the bureaucratic costs of internal organization,
making them more nimble and better able to innovate (Williamson, 1991; Oxley, 1997).
Alliances do, however, provide enhanced coordination and control compared to spot market
contracts (Williamson, 1991; Oxley, 1997). Alliances also offer access to resources not available
or easily developed in-house, owing to time-compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool,
1989), as well as economies of scale and scope in R&D (Tripsas et al., 1995).
4.2.3.2. Structure. TCE scholars initially argued that R&D activities are more efficiently
organized within hierarchies than through markets (Williamson, 1975: 203; Teece, 1988), owing
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to the difficulties associated with coordinating R&D activities across firm boundaries. However,
Teece (1988) suggests that some of the properties of internal organization can be replicated by
using partial equity ownership within hybrid forms of organization. Thus, the resources and
capabilities needed to carry out a complex R&D project can be accessed from an external party
without fully integrating with that party.
The calculus of TCE provides guidance regarding the conditions under which each form
of governance is preferred. In general, alliances are more appropriate when the degree of asset
specificity and uncertainty are moderate, and when repeat interactions are anticipated. Empirical
research, however, has not examined the choice between all three modes simultaneously. Rather,
studies have examined the dichotomous choice between in-house and external sources of R&D.
It is not entirely clear in the studies conducted by Pisano (1990) and Ulset (1996) whether the
external sources were restricted to alliances or also included spot market contracts, whereas in
Robertson and Gatignon’s (1998) study it is clear that the external mode is R&D alliances.
Regardless, the results from all three studies support the central tenets of TCE; firms are more
likely to conduct R&D in-house when transaction-specific investments are required, few
competent suppliers are available, and performance is difficult to measure.
TCE has also been drawn upon to examine the choice between different hybrid forms of
R&D collaboration. Pisano (1989) examines the motives for using partial equity investments in
collaborative relationships. He proposes that a firm is more likely to select an equity-based
alliance when the level of uncertainty is high, and relationship-specific investments are required.
He suggests that holding equity can help a firm to mitigate some of the contractual hazards
encountered through better communication and close monitoring. The results of his study of
biotechnology alliances support this argument; firms prefer equity over non-equity alliances
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when there is an R&D component in the alliance, and when there are multiple projects and few
potential collaborators.
Building on Pisano’s (1989) earlier study, Oxley (1997) examines the choice between
three modes of alliance governance: unilateral contractual agreements, bilateral contractual
agreements, and equity-based alliances. In agreement with TCE, she finds that more-hierarchical
alliances are selected over more market-like alliances when transactions involve R&D in
addition to manufacturing and/or marketing and a broader range of products/technologies. The
logic behind this finding is that more-hierarchical alliance modes, through the use of equity,
mitigate the appropriability hazards associated with hard-to-monitor activities like R&D.
Sampson (2004b) also applies TCE to examine how firms choose organizational form for
their R&D alliances, specifically the choice between EJVs and bilateral contractual agreements.
Based on a sample of R&D alliances in the telecommunications equipment industry, she finds an
inverted U-shaped relationship between the probability of selecting an EJV over a bilateral
contractual agreement and the diversity of the knowledge bases of the alliance partners. The
argument behind this finding is that at a low degree of diversity, the threat of knowledge leakage
is not high enough to warrant the formation of a separate legal entity, but as diversity increases,
establishing an EJV becomes necessary to protect against spillovers. However, the threat of
leakage is mitigated by the need for absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), limiting
each partner’s ability to misappropriate the other partner’s knowledge when their knowledge
bases are highly divergent, which in turn diminishes the need for an EJV.
4.2.3.3. Performance. Intuitively, successful alliances should contribute to positive firm
performance (Weber et al., 2009). However, there has been no empirical validation of this
contention to date. The performance of individual alliances has been examined by TCE scholars
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through the lens of the discriminating-alignment hypothesis (Williamson, 1991: 277). Studies in
this tradition investigate whether the outcome of a particular alliance is enhanced when the
governance structure selected follows the logic of TCE. For example, Sampson (2004a)
measures the costs of misaligned governance in R&D alliances in the telecommunications
equipment industry. She finds that selecting alliance governance according to the logic of TCE
substantially improves collaborative benefits (in terms of each firm’s innovate output as
measured by citation-weighted patents applied for after alliance commencement) compared to
when the mode selected contradicts the logic of TCE.
Sampson (2007) also examines characteristics that may moderate the relationship
between governance mode and performance outcomes. She finds that the degree of technological
diversity between R&D alliance partners moderates the main relationship. Specifically, under
high levels of technological diversity, EJVs contribute more to firm innovation (as measured by
citation-weighted firm patents applied for following alliance commencement) than do bilateral
contractual agreements. Taken together, these findings suggest that firms that consistently
misalign the governance of their alliances will perform poorly in the market. In the long-run,
such poor performers should be forced to exit the market.
4.2.4. Summary
The literature reviewed in this section has greatly contributed to our understanding of
R&D alliances. While the choice between alliance governance modes has been examined in
depth, the debate about the relationship between relational and formal governance mechanisms
has until recently stalled the study of the actual contracts developed to manage alliances. Argyres
and Mayer (2007) attribute the wealth of attention paid to the relational aspects of governance to
the influence of Macaulay (1963), who emphasized non-contractual relations in business. Some

94
scholars argue that relational and formal governance mechanisms are substitutes, suggesting that
contracts inhibit cooperation (Sitkin and Bies, 1993; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996), and that trust is
the key to inter-organizational success (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, 1994; Gulati, 1995, 1998).
Other scholars counter that trust and formal governance mechanisms are complements,
suggesting that greater trust manifests itself through contracts that are more detailed (Poppo and
Zenger, 2002; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer, 2007). Recent research
has sought to untangle this complex relationship. Mellewigt, Madhok, and Weibel (2007) found
that trust and formal governance are substitutes and complements, while Puranam and Vanneste
(2009) suggest that the relationship is dynamic and may evolve over time.
The focus on this debate, rather than on the structure and design of contracts, has largely
been due to data availability. Ring (2002) notes that it has traditionally been difficult to obtain
business contracts. This situation has improved, however. Since 1996, public companies have
been required to electronically file all material documents, including alliance contracts, with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This information can be retrieved from the
SEC’s EDGAR database. Another free resource is the Contracting and Organizations Research
Institute’s (CORI) database, which contains over 690,000 contracts, mostly from SEC filings.
Thus, there are now ample opportunities to examine the content of actual alliance contracts in
order to gain insight into their design and use. The recent upward trend in the number of interfirm contract studies reflects this improvement in data availability (Weber et al., 2009). I now
turn to a review of the contract design literature, particularly as it relates to R&D alliances.
4.2.5. The Contract Design Literature
Contracts are legally enforceable agreements which provide a framework for inter-firm
exchange that delineates the partners’ obligations and responsibilities to perform particular
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actions in the future (Llewellyn, 1931; Macneil, 1978). Formal contracts are particularly valuable
in the context of R&D alliances, given the substantial difficulties of developing technology
across firm borders (Ryall and Sampson, 2006). Contracts aimed at managing ongoing interorganizational relationships such as alliances typically contain provisions which outline the roles
and responsibilities of each party, how various contingencies will be contended with, how the
parties will communicate with each other, how disputes will be resolved, and how decision and
control rights will be allocated between the parties (Argyres & Mayer, 2007).
Despite their importance, formal contracts have received little attention from alliance
researchers until recently (Ariño and Reuer, 2006). Most studies that have examined formal
contracts use an economic lens, especially transaction cost economics and property rights theory
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). Each theory and the key studies
in the contract design literature that draw upon them, particularly those that focus on R&D
alliances, are reviewed in the following sub-sections.
4.2.5.1. Transaction Cost Economics. As discussed above, transaction cost economics
(TCE) was originally called upon to address questions regarding the minimization of transaction
costs through the selection of the appropriate governance structure. Scholars have, however,
increasingly applied TCE to the study of contracts, drawing on Williamson (1985, 1991). The
bulk of this research explores how transaction characteristics impact contract design, which is
salient in the context of this study considering that most R&D alliances involve a written
contract that serves as a blueprint for managing the relationship between the parties involved.
TCE is founded on two key behavioral assumptions, opportunism and bounded
rationality. Opportunism is defined as ‘self-interest seeking with guile’, which includes such
behavior as lying, stealing, and cheating, but often takes on more subtle forms of deceit

96
(Williamson, 1985: 47). Absent opportunism, an economic exchange could be satisfactorily
governed by ‘general clause’ contracting, whereby the exchange partners would simply promise
to behave in a cooperative fashion (Williamson, 1985: 66). However, ex ante, it is difficult to tell
who will and who will not act opportunistically. This problem is magnified when transactions
require relationship-specific investments. In such a case, the party whose investment is less at
risk is in position to ‘hold up’ (i.e., expropriate surplus from) the other party (Klein, Crawford,
and Alchian, 1978). Thus, TCE suggests that the parties should incorporate safeguards into the
contract to protect relationship-specific investments from opportunistic expropriation.
The second behavioral assumption is bounded rationality, which assumes that economic
actors are ‘intendedly rational, but limitedly so’ (Simon, 1957: xxiv). As such, despite an
individual’s best efforts, his or her ability to analyze all possible future contingencies that may
arise in organizing an economic exchange is limited. Absent bounded rationality, an exchange
could be governed by a comprehensive contract, because all potential contingencies could be
anticipated. However, this expectation is not realistic when bounded rationality is taken into
consideration (Radner, 1968). In addition, even if an individual could perform a comprehensive
analysis of all possible scenarios, it would likely be too costly and time consuming for any
transaction to be efficient. The situation is further complicated by uncertainty, which may arise
from the external environment or the actions of the parties involved in the transaction. Contracts,
therefore, are unavoidably incomplete (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Williamson, 1996).
In sum, while TCE suggests that individuals cannot anticipate all future contingencies
that might affect a contractual relationship, they can foresee major contractual hazards stemming
from potential opportunism by partners. Thus, even though complete contracts cannot be
devised, clauses and provisions can be drafted to mitigate identifiable contractual hazards.
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While a sizeable amount of empirical work has focused on trying to understand what
factors impact the design of alliance contracts, the bulk of this work has only accumulated in the
last twenty years. The study of contract characteristics as dependent variables is actually a
relatively recent phenomenon (Ariño and Reuer, 2006), which is interesting considering that
economists have long been interested in contracts. The lack of access to actual contracts
probably played a role in this, and may also explain why the dependent variable in many studies
is the measure of contractual detail rather than the inclusion of a specific provision.
According to Crocker and Reynolds (1993), the degree of contractual detail is an
important choice variable which should be aligned with the characteristics of an alliance in order
to safeguard against the threat of opportunism. Two measures have been used to characterize the
degree of contractual detail: completeness and complexity. Completeness, referring to how
detailed the relevant clauses are for a given alliance, is typically measured by the level of clause
specification (Ryall and Sampson, 2003), and by survey responses about the level of clause
completeness (Anderson and Dekker, 2005). Complexity, referring to how many clauses are in a
contract, is often measured by counting the number of clauses included from a predetermined list
(Parkhe, 1993). While it is difficult to assess completeness without detailed knowledge of the
alliance that a contract refers to, complexity can often be measured by simply reading the
contract and counting the clauses included. Thus, contractual complexity has typically been
measured due to the relative ease of data collection (Eckhard and Mellewigt, 2006).
The seminal article in this vein is Parkhe (1993), in which a measure of contractual
complexity is developed that includes eight provisions considered critical by legal scholars.14
These provisions were rank ordered according to their stringency. If a particular provision is
14

The provisions are: (1) rights to reports of relevant transactions, (2) notification rights for departures from the
agreement, (3) auditing rights, (4) confidentiality provisions, (5) restrictions on proprietary information, (6)
termination provisions, (7) arbitration clauses, and (8) lawsuit provisions.
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present, it is assigned the value of its ranking (i.e., first provision = 1, second provision = 2, and
so on), zero otherwise. Contractual complexity is then measured by normalizing the total of the
weighted number of provisions present, resulting in a score that can range from zero to one. A
normalized score closer to one indicates that more provisions are in place, thus the contract is
more complex. Several studies have employed this method exactly or with slight modifications
to the measure (e.g., Deeds and Hill, 1999; Reuer et al., 2006; Reuer and Ariño, 2007), while
other scholars have developed alternative measures (e.g., Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).
As noted above, TCE suggests that the degree of contractual detail is predicated by the
severity of the hazards present in an exchange. Thus, several studies have sought to explain how
prominent alliance characteristics impact complexity. Empirical tests, however, have delivered
conflicting results. For example, some studies have confirmed that a high degree of asset
specificity promotes the need for a more complex contract (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002;
Anderson and Dekker, 2005), whereas others have failed to find support for the hypothesized
relationship (e.g., Reuer et al., 2006). Similarly, some studies have confirmed a positive
relationship between contractual complexity and uncertainty (e.g., Anderson and Dekker, 2005),
while others have found a negative relationship (e.g., Saussier, 2000). Inconsistent findings have
also surfaced for the relationship between contractual complexity and prior alliance ties.
One possible explanation for these finding is that most multi-item measures of
contractual complexity contain provisions that serve totally different purposes, resulting in the
hypothesized effects cancelling out (Eckhard and Mellewigt, 2006). Consequently, aggregate
measures of complexity may be masking other contractual functions, which are impossible to
capture with a one-dimensional construct (Furlotti, 2007). Thus, Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand,
and Nooteboom (2005) suggest that research on alliance contracts would benefit from a closer
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look at the precise content of the provisions included in contracts, the intentions with which the
contract was developed, and the actual use of the contract. Answering this call, a number of
recent studies have shown that the general conceptualization of contracts as one-dimensional
legal safeguarding instruments is restrictive, and that contracts play multiple functions.
Studies in this stream can be subdivided into two categories. In the first category are
studies that propose distinct functions based on theory, or uncover distinct functions via case
study, without measuring them separately.15 In the second category are studies that propose
distinct functions and actually measure each separately, frequently using factor analysis methods
to verify if the underlying items load as hypothesized. As can be seen from Tables 4-1 and 4-2,
studies in the first category (10) outnumber those in the second (7). Again, the lack of access to
actual contracts is a possible explanation for this imbalance. Data availability is particularly
salient for studies in the second category that use factor analysis techniques, as they require a
large sample size to confirm the factor structure. Consequently, it is relatively easier to employ
case study methods to uncover functions from a small sample of contracts.
It is important to note that in some of the studies contained in the tables, the authors are
simply focusing on major contractual provisions (e.g., Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007), while other
studies are actually examining the higher-level functions that contracts play (e.g., Klein
Woolthuis et al., 2005; Mellewigt et al., 2007). Specific provisions are typically associated with
the higher-level functions, thus it is possible to look for commonalities across all seventeen
studies despite the different levels of focus and the different labels used. A careful reading of
each study reveals three functions that appear repeatedly: safeguarding, coordination and
contingency adaptability.
15

Reuer and Ariño’s (2007) study is also included in this category. The authors do not start from the hypothesis that
contracts can perform multiple functions. Rather, they uncover two distinct dimensions when they perform a factor
analysis on Parkhe’s (1993) multi-item contractual complexity measure.

Table 4-1. Studies that propose distinct contract functions based on theory, or uncover distinct functions via case study, without
measuring them separately
Study

Details

Safeguarding

Coordination

Lerner and
Merges (1998)

Large sample study of biotech alliances,
data from Recombinant Capital database.



Control of Intellectual
Property



Alliance management



Avadikyan et
al. (2001)
Dekker (2004)

Case study of two fuel cell development
projects.
Case study of railroad alliance project.



Incentive



Coordination




Determination of
alliance scope
Governance structure
Learning





Coordination of tasks

Klein
Woolthuis et al.
(2005)
Mellewigt et al.
(2007)
Reuer and
Ariño (2007)
Argyres and
Mayer (2007)

Case study of four collaborative
innovation projects.



Management of
appropriation
concerns
Legal safeguarding



Coordination



Sign of commitment

Large scale survey, HR outsourcing
contracts.
Survey of 91 alliances in Spain.



Control



Coordination



Enforcement



Coordination

Theory article; primarily focused on
contracting in high-tech industries.





Assign
roles/responsibilities
Communication

Hagedoorn and
Hesen (2007)

Case study of a small sample of
technology development partnership
contracts drawn from MERIT-CATI
database.





Decision/control
rights
Dispute resolution
Dispute settlement
mechanisms
Property rights
Damage measures
Warranties



Dispute resolution





Payment terms and
incentives
Structure and
administrative
processes

Mayer and
Teece (2008)

Case study of 15 aerospace alliance
contracts.






Information exchange

Contingency
Adaptability



Safeguarding for
contingencies



Contingency
planning




Revisions
Adaptation
(hardship and force
majeure)

Other



Faems et al.
(2008)

Case study of two exploratory R&D
alliances.



Formalization of
monitoring




Formalization of task
division
Formalization of
information flows
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Table 4-2.

Studies that propose distinct functions and actually measure each separately

Study

Details

Luo (2002)
Anderson and
Dekker (2005)

Survey of 293 international joint
ventures in China.
Survey of 858 transactions for IT
products and services.

Ryall and
Sampson
(2006)

Small sample of technology
alliance contracts from the SDC
database.

Argyres et al.
(2007)
de Jong and
Klein
Woolthuis
(2009)
Ryall and
Sampson
(2009)
Vanneste and
Puranam
(2010)

Sample of IT service contracts
from one IT services firm.
Survey of 391Dutch high-tech
alliances

Small sample of technology
development contracts from the
SDC database.
Survey of IT procurement
contracts from 788 Dutch SMEs

Safeguarding

Coordination





Assignment of rights
Legal recourse






Monitoring
Penalties
Termination clauses
IP rights



Safeguarding risks and
spillover




Monitoring
Penalties



Legal clauses

Term specificity

Contingency
Planning
 Contingency
adaptability





Task description





Coordination and
communication





Adjustment
mechanisms

Other




After-sales service
Product and price





Contract
completeness
Cost sharing
Technology aspects



Contract detail

Contingency
planning
Safeguarding
external
contingencies

Technical clauses
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Given the volume of research on alliance contracts by TCE scholars, it is not surprising
that fifteen studies (out of seventeen) propose and/or measure a safeguarding function. These
studies demonstrate that alliance contracts tend to include safeguarding provisions when the level
of asset specificity is high (e.g., Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Reuer and Ariño, 2007; de Jong
and Klein Woolthuis, 2009), as well as when there are significant spillover risks (de Jong and
Klein Woolthuis, 2009). It is also not unexpected that a coordination function is proposed and/or
measured in fourteen studies given the rise of alliance research drawing on the capabilitiesperspective and the relational-view of contracting. These studies reveal that contracts include
coordination provisions when the degree of interdependence between the alliance partners is
non-trivial (Argyres et al., 2007), while fewer coordination provisions are included when
uncertainty is driven by the need to innovate (Argyres et al., 2007) and when there is trust
between the partners (de Jong and Klein Woolthuis, 2009). While not investigated as often as the
safeguarding and coordination functions, seven studies propose and/or measure a contingency
adaptability function. The studies show that interdependence also influences the use of
contingency adaptability provisions (Argyres et al. 2007), as do prior ties between alliance
partners (Mayer and Argyres, 2004).
In sum, recent research shows that alliance contracts play multiple functions (i.e.,
safeguarding, coordination, contingency adaptability), and that different antecedents influence
the inclusion of the provisions associated with each function. Argyres and Mayer (2007)
synthesize this research. Drawing primarily on TCE, they discuss the relationships between five
key transaction hazards (opportunism, complexity, appropriability, the lack of observability, and
the lack of verifiability) and the types of provisions that typically appear in contracts (the roles
and responsibilities of each party, how various contingencies will be contended with, how the
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parties will communicate with each other, how disputes will be resolved, and how decision and
control rights will be allocated between the parties). An important takeaway from Argyres and
Mayer (2007) is that the provisions included in an alliance contract are impacted by the nature of
the hazards present and industry context. In other words, certain hazards are more likely to
appear in some contexts than others. As a result, provisions designed to contend with such
hazards are likely to be context-specific.
Provisions that provide one or both parties with control over specific aspects of an
alliance can be found that play at least one of the three functions uncovered in the research
reviewed in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. Ownership of the intellectual property (IP) developed during an
alliance is one example. The assignment of IP rights plays a safeguarding role, which protects
the party that holds the rights from expropriation. While TCE is largely silent about which
partner should obtain such rights, property rights theory, is not.
4.5.2.2. Property Rights Theory. As developed by Grossman, Hart and Moore (e.g.,
Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), property rights theory (PRT) is
similar to TCE in that it focuses on firm boundary and scope issues, describing an incomplete
contracting approach to explain firm-level vertical integration decisions. Based on the logic of
incentive-alignment, the basic premise of PRT is that firms arise when parties cannot write
complete contracts and thus the allocation of control over key assets and decisions is important.
While PRT was not directly developed to explain alliance contracts, it has nonetheless come to
greatly inform our understanding of them.
The main assumption of PRT is that it is impossible for two parties to write a verifiable
contract, enforceable in a court of law, that specifies the amount of effort and the output of each
party. Bounded rationality plays a role in why this is so; there are several possible contingencies,
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not all of which can be foreseen at the time the contract is drafted. To overcome this problem,
control over key assets should be assigned to the party whose marginal contribution to the
outcome of the alliance is indispensable (i.e., has the greatest impact). Control over key assets
grants the controlling party the right to make decisions about how such assets should be used that
cannot be specified in the contract ex ante. The controlling party gains bargaining power from
control over key assets that enables it to appropriate a majority of the returns resulting from the
alliance. When allocated efficiently, this incentive should induce the controlling party to make
decisions that maximize the returns from the alliance and refrain from acting opportunistically.
Aghion and Tirole (1994) adapt the general PRT model to an R&D alliance between two
firms. In their model, they assume that the firm conducting research does not possess financial
resources of its own, cannot borrow any funds, and lacks the complementary capabilities to
commercialize the resulting innovation itself. Thus, the research firm turns for funding to a
partner, which may intend to utilize the innovation itself or resell it to other firms, but cannot
carry out the research on its own. The success of the research project in the model is an
increasing function, though at a decelerating rate, of both the effort exerted by the research firm
and the financial resources supplied by the funding firm. While simplistic in many respects, the
model is representative of many ‘real world’ alliances, especially with regard to the size disparity
between the partners that it portrays.
Drafting a contract to govern an R&D alliance is challenging. While ownership of the
resulting innovation can be assigned in an enforceable contract, and the resources to be provided
by the funding partner can also be specified, it is difficult to write a contract for the delivery of a
specific innovation owing to uncertainty. In addition, it is difficult to write an enforceable
contract that specifies the amount of effort to be supplied by the research firm, and even if effort
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can be contracted it is difficult to verify that the effort has been exerted. From these initial
assumptions and conditions, Aghion and Tirole (1994) consider two polar cases: (1) the research

Financing Firm
Research Firm

Marginal Contribution

firm has ex ante bargaining power, and (2) the funding firm has ex ante bargaining power.

Financing Firm

Financing Firm

Research Firm

Financing Firm

Research Firm

Financing Firm

Ex Ante Bargaining Power
Figure 4-1. Allocation of control rights according to Aghion and Tirole (1994) model
Figure 4-1 shows the predictions from the model. Ownership of the research output will
always be efficiently allocated (i.e., follow the basic incentive-alignment premise of PRT) when
the bargaining power rests with the research firm. In this case, the rights to the innovation will be
retained by the research firm if the marginal impact of its contribution on the alliance is greater
than that of the funding firm’s investment (Quadrant III), and transferred to the funding firm in
exchange for a cash payment if the marginal impact of the funding firm’s investment is greater
(Quadrant II). The model also predicts that the allocation of ownership is efficient when the
funding firm holds the leverage if the marginal impact of its investment is greater than that of the
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research firm’s effort. In this case, the funding firm obtains the rights (Quadrant I). However, if
success hinges on the marginal contribution of the research firm when the funding firm holds the
leverage, the ideal outcome will not be attained. While the funding firm is willing to exchange
the rights for cash, the research firm is unable to compensate the funding firm because of its
financial constraints. Thus, contrary to PRT, the funding firm retains the rights to the innovation
in this scenario (Quadrant IV).
The Aghion and Tirole (1994) model presents a situation where the parties haggle over a
single, indivisible property right to any forthcoming innovation. However, a wide variety of
rights are assigned in actual contracts in addition to ownership of any resulting innovation. For
example, R&D alliance contracts are likely to include clauses that restrict or allow one or both
parties to terminate the alliance, and expand/extend the alliance. Clauses are also likely to be
drafted that restrict or allow one or both parties to license the IP developed during the alliance to
a third party. In addition, the right to delay or suppress journal publications based on the
technology underlying any IP developed during the alliance may be granted to one or both of the
partners. While the aforementioned rights are relatively independent of industry context, other
rights may be included that are context-dependent such as the right to manage the governmental
approval process in an industry where the introduction of new products is regulated.
Based on interviews with practitioners, Lerner and Merges (1998) suggest that it is the
accumulation of various rights, rather than control over any specific right, that makes a
prospective alliance favorable. Thus, starting with Lerner and Merges (1998), scholars have
focused on explaining why one firm wins more rights or a larger percentage of the available
rights in an R&D alliance contract. The setting for the vast majority of this research has been
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pharmaceutical biotechnology.16 As a result, most of the studies in this stream rely on the list of
control rights developed in this context by Lerner and Merges (1998), or examine a subset of
these rights (see Table 4-3 for the rights examined in representative published studies). For
example, Adegbesan and Higgins (2011) investigate the allocation of ‘pie-splitting’ control
rights (i.e., those that confer ownership or control over activities and the intermediate outputs
from the alliance that directly affect how the value to be created is to be divided between the
partners), such as ownership of patented and unpatented IP, the right to manufacture the final
product, and the right to control the marketing process.
Several studies confirm the basic PRT hypothesis that control rights are assigned
according to the marginal contribution (i.e., relative indispensability) of each alliance partner.
For example, Lerner and Merges (1998), Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003), Higgins (2007) and
Adegbesan and Higgins (2011) find that more rights or a larger share of rights are assigned to the
funding firm when research is in an early stage. The logic behind this finding is that early-stage
projects are in greater need of funding. In addition, there is presumably a high degree of
information asymmetry between the partners in early-stage projects. Thus, the rights should be
allocated to the funding firm to induce its optimal level of investment.
A second proxy for marginal contribution examined in several studies is the number of
patents held by the research firm at alliance inception. Lerner and Merges (1998) suggest that if
the research firm has a strong patent portfolio, the initial research is already likely to have been
completed. In this situation, the research firm’s relative contribution to the alliance will be
modest. Thus, more rights should be assigned to the financing firm to provide an incentive to
invest in the alliance. While Lerner and Merges (1998) confirm this contention, Adegbesan and
16

Two exceptions are Elfenbein and Lerner’s (2003) investigation of Internet portal alliances, and Leiponen’s
(2008) study of the interaction between knowledge-intensive business service providers and their client firms in
Finland.

Table 4-3. Key controls rights in representative studies that examine their allocation
Lerner and Merges (1998);
Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003)
Key aspects of alliance management
1. Right to manage clinical trials
2. Right to undertake process development
3. Right to manufacture final product
4. Right to market universally
5. Right to market product alone
Determination of alliance scope
6. Right to expand alliance breadth
7. Right to expand alliance duration
8. Right to terminate alliance without cause
9. Right to terminate particular projects
10. Right to sub-license
11. Right to sub-license after expiration/termination
12. Right to ‘shelve’ project
Control of IP
13. Ownership of patents
14. At least partial patent ownership
15. Control of patent litigation process
16. Right to ‘know-how’ transfer
17. Ownership of ‘know-how’
18. Right to delay publication
19. Right to suppress publication
Governance structure
20. Control of project steering committee
21. Seat on R&D firm’s board
22. Equity in R&D firm
23. Right to participate in R&D firm’s financing
24. Right to register R&D firm’s stock
25. Ability to make public equity purchases

Higgins (2007)

Adegbesan and Higgins (2011)

IP rights
1. Ownership of patents
2. Control and responsibility for patent litigation
3. Transfer of unpatented R&D ‘know-how’
Licensing rights
4. Right to sub-license
5. Royalty payment tie-ins
Clinical trials and distribution rights
6. Management of clinical trials
7. Control of initial manufacturing process
8. Marketing rights to product
Exit rights
9. Product reversion rights upon termination
10. Right to terminate without cause

IP rights
1. Partial patent ownership
2. Exclusive patent ownership
3. Right to transfer of unpatented ‘know-how’
4. Ownership of unpatented ‘know-how’
Licensing rights
5. Right to sub-license
6. Continued licensing right on expiration
Manufacturing rights
7. Right to manufacture final product
Marketing rights
8. Basic marketing rights
9. Universal marketing rights
10. Control of entire marketing process
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Higgins (2011) findings suggest that it is simply the research firm’s possession of patents at
alliance inception, rather than the size of its patent portfolio, that impacts the allocation decision.
It is important to note that Adegbesan and Higgins’ (2011) do not draw on PRT
explicitly. Rather, their theoretical approach derives from Adegbesan (2009), who uses the
‘bargaining perspective on resource advantage’ (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) which builds upon
strategic factor market theory (Barney, 1986) to account for instances where acquiring firms
display heterogeneous complementarity to target resources. Drawing on the bargaining
perspective, Adegbesan and Higgins (2011) examine a third factor which could be considered a
proxy for marginal contribution, superior complementarity. They argue that research firms with
more early-stage R&D project experience are likely to possess superior research capabilities,
making them attractive partners. Thus, the research firm should retain more rights. In addition,
they suggest that funding firms with more late-stage R&D project experience should obtain more
rights because they are likely to possess superior downstream complementary assets required for
commercialization. The authors’ results show strong support for both hypotheses.
Several studies have also examined the direct impact of bargaining power on the
allocation of control rights. Investigating the influence of bargaining power is important from a
theoretical standpoint considering that the results of the Aghion and Tirole (1994) model depend
on the relative bargaining position of each alliance partner. In addition, examining the impact of
bargaining power is salient in the context of pharmaceutical biotechnology alliances given the
frequent size disparity between the research partner (typically a small biotechnology firm) and
the funding partner (typically an established pharmaceutical manufacturer).
Using financial measures to gauge the health (and thus bargaining power) of the research
firm, Lerner and Merges (1998), Lerner et al. (2003), and Higgins (2007) find that cash-
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constrained research firms relinquish more control rights to the funding firm. A similar outcome
is observed when public IPO funds available in the year prior to the alliance are limited. Higgins
(2007) finds that funding firms with research pipeline concerns (and thus less bargaining power)
also tend to give up more control rights, especially in later stage alliances. Finally, Adegbesan
and Higgins (2011) find that funding partners with larger alliance portfolios obtain a greater
share of ‘pie-splitting’ control rights. The logic behind this finding is that the funding partner is
in a better bargaining position because it is less reliant on any one alliance or partner, which is in
line with anecdotal evidence that pharmaceutical firms with more alliances are able to extract
more concessions from their biotechnology research partners (Lerner and Merges, 1998).
It is important to note that the Aghion and Tirole (1994) model does not propose that
bargaining power directly impacts the allocation of control rights. Rather, the model suggests
that bargaining power distorts the relationship between marginal contribution and the allocation
of rights, specifically if the research partner’s contribution is more important (i.e., indispensable)
when the funding firm holds the leverage. Thus, bargaining power is treated somewhat like a
moderator in the model. The only test of this interaction is found in Lerner and Merges (1998).
The authors discover a statistically significant interaction, but not the one proposed by Aghion
and Tirole (1994). Instead, they find that the research firm cedes fewer rights if its contribution is
not as critical as the financing firm’s when it possesses the leverage in the relationship. Referring
back to Figure 4-1, Lerner and Merges’ (1998) findings suggest that the inefficient outcome
occurs in Quadrant II rather than in Quadrant IV.
One parallel line of research delves into the part of the Aghion and Tirole (1994) model
that investigates the relationship between bargaining power and performance. In a study of
transactions between knowledge-intensive business service providers and their clients, Leiponen
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(2008) examines the consequences of the service firm relinquishing its rights to the resulting
innovation when it is in a weaker bargaining position despite its contribution being critical to the
outcome. She finds that misallocation of the control over the intellectual output due to bargaining
power differences results in a 23 percent reduction in the probability of service innovation,
which is a socially sub-optimal outcome.
In a related study, Kloyer (2011) investigates the effect of the assignment of different
rights, including IP ownership, the right to control the management of the R&D process, and the
right to control the marketing of final products, on supplier opportunism. He examines whether
any of these rights provide a supplier with a greater incentive to refrain from behaving
opportunistically and exert the optimal amount of effort to attain a successful innovation
outcome. His findings indicate that IP ownership is the only right that provides such an incentive
and has an impact on preventing supplier opportunism in early-stage, market-distant R&D
alliances. The logic behind this finding is that R&D firms lose their original bargaining power
once the R&D results are transferred to the funding partner, providing little incentive to exert an
optimal amount of effort. This means that the R&D firm will have to rely on another basis of
power to ensure that funding partner provides it with a fair share of the returns from the
innovation. Only IP ownership provides enough power because it is a right that is enforceable in
court. Thus, retaining IP ownership helps restore some of the R&D firm’s bargaining power,
providing an incentive to exert optimal effort and refrain from behaving opportunistically.
Rather than the relationship between bargaining power and performance, Lerner et al.
(2003) investigate the relationship between bargaining power and contract renegotiation. Using
the availability of public market financing as a proxy for bargaining power, the authors suggest
that R&D firms are more likely to initiate contract renegotiations prior to the minimum term
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stipulated in the contract during periods of increased financing activity when the contract
initially favors the funding firm. The logic behind this suggestion is that in such a market,
bargaining power has shifted to the R&D firms. Lerner et al.’s (2003) results are consistent with
this hypothesis. It is important to note, however, that this study only examines whether the
contract was renegotiated (as indicated by a publicly-available amendment to the original
contract). The authors do not provide any details regarding which rights were the focus of the
renegotiation between the alliance partners.
A final study that diverges from traditional PRT research is Ariño and Ring (2010). The
authors, drawing on the broader literature that focuses on the formation stage of alliances and the
negotiation process (Zajac and Olsen, 1993; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Doz, 1996; Ariño and
de la Torre, 1998; Ariño, de la Torre, and Ring, 2001), analyze a single case study of a
negotiation between two family-owned firms interested in forming an international joint venture.
They find that the logic firms use to decide how to allocate various rights, including the
composition of alliance boards, the roles to be played by personnel from each firm, and which
decisions each firm will have control over, is jointly shaped by procedural and distributive
justice. They also find that this logic evolves over time and is shaped by revelations about the
capabilities of each party and by exogenous events. In addition, they discover that each partner’s
relative bargaining power is influenced by the organizational role of the negotiators. Overall,
Ariño and Ring’s (2010) study provides a process view of how the negotiating position of each
party is shaped which, in turn, impacts the allocation of control and property rights.
4.2.6. Alliance Capability
The final stream of the literature reviewed in this section is an emerging area in strategic
management that emphasizes the importance of a firm’s ‘alliance capability’. Drawing on the

113
inter-organizational learning literature and the dynamic capabilities perspective, research on this
topic has focused on how firms learn to manage individual alliances and build their alliance
capability (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002). Khanna defines alliance
capability as ‘a firm’s ability to identify partners, initiate alliances, and engage in the ongoing
management and possible restructuring and termination of these alliances’ (1998: 351). Scholars
suggest that possessing alliance capability is the key to mastering the difficult tasks associated
with alliance management (Kogut, 1989), achieving tangible and intangible collaborative
benefits (Simonin, 1997), maximizing the probability of alliance success (Kale et al., 2002), and
creating competitive advantage through alliances (Draulans, de Man, and Volberda, 2003).
Alliance experience is considered an important building block for generating alliance
capability (Simonin, 1997; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Ireland, Hitt, and Vaidyanath, 2002; Kale
et al., 2002; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). Research shows,
however, that alliance capability is not created by simply accumulating more experience through
participation in additional alliances. Rather, firms need to actively engage in leveraging previous
alliance experience by transferring lessons and the specific know-how from prior alliances to
other existing alliances, as well as to new alliances (Powell et al., 1996; Kale et al., 2002). This
research parallels the stream of the inter-organizational learning literature that examines the
process of learning about alliance management that was discussed earlier in this review.
Scholars have identified several keys to successfully creating alliance capability
including an alliance learning process (Simonin, 1997; Khanna, 1998; Lorenzoni and Lipparini,
1999; Kale and Singh, 2007), a firm’s routines to capture, codify, store, integrate, and diffuse
prior and ongoing alliance knowledge (Powell et al., 1996; Simonin, 1999; Anand and Khanna,
2000; Kale et al., 2002; Heimeriks, Duysters, and Vanhaverbeke, 2007), and training programs
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for managers and executives (Dyer, Kale, and Singh, 2001; Draulans et al., 2003). Research
indicates that firms that institutionalize these keys by establishing a dedicated alliance function
achieve better alliance- and firm-level performance (Kale et al., 2002). This relationship is
mediated, however, by the firm’s alliance learning process (Kale and Singh, 2007).
Based on extensive interviews with managers from companies reputed to have effective
alliance capabilities, Dyer et al. (2001) uncovered five key phases of the alliance life cycle (see
Figure 4-2). The third phase of this cycle, alliance negotiation and governance, encompasses the
design and drafting of alliance contracts. If the concept of alliance capability is unpacked further,
specific contract design capabilities emerge from the lessons learned at this phase. Argyres and
Mayer (2007) argue that these capabilities can become a distinct source of competitive advantage
as firms learn over time to design more effective contracts, and remedy earlier insufficiencies in
contract detail when writing subsequent contracts. The limited research that has examined
contract design capabilities suggests that learning is short-lived, however, unless firms
deliberately capture lessons from previous contracting experiences (Mayer and Argyres, 2004).
In the absence of explicit processes, managers are unlikely to document their own contracting
experiences, or to seek out knowledge from other managers about their contracting experiences.

Alliance
Business Case

Partner
Assessment and
Selection

Alliance
Negotiation and
Governance

Alliance
Management

Assessment and
Termination

Figure 4-2. The five phases of the alliance life cycle
Source: Dyer et al. (2001)
4.2.7. Conclusion
Three research opportunities emerge from synthesizing the literature reviewed in this
section. First, it is apparent that scholars believe that contracts play a wide variety of roles in an
alliance. Research suggests that contracts do more than safeguard an exchange against various
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hazards; they also serve as a framework to coordinate the actions of the partners and provide the
partners with guidance regarding how to cope with unforeseen contingencies when they arise. As
discussed above, several of the studies summarized in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 employ factor analysis
techniques to tease out these functions from predetermined lists of clauses. Implicit in this
research is the notion that more complex contracts lead to better exchange performance. TCE
suggests, however, that particular transaction hazards and/or characteristics are mitigated by
including specific provisions, not just more or more detailed clauses (Williamson, 1985). In fact,
including irrelevant clauses may actually lead to prolonged and contentious negotiations between
exchange partners, which can be avoided if the issues that such provisions contend with are not
present in the exchange. In addition, adding more detail than required makes a contract harder to
follow and enforce. Thus, there is an opportunity to examine why specific clauses are included in
a contract and what function they play.
Poppo and Zenger (2002) have called on scholars to examine particular provisions in
contracts rather than relying on global measures. Weber et al. (2009) suggest that a promising
avenue is to identify the prominent transaction hazards encountered in a specific industry, and
determine which provisions are typically included in a contract to contend with the hazards that
are identified. Along these lines, the first research opportunity that this essay addresses is the
identification of the key hazards and challenges associated with R&D alliances in the medical
device industry and the contractual mechanisms designed to cope with them.
Second, this literature review highlights a major assumption about the ability of managers
and lawyers to undertake complex tasks such as drafting contracts. TCE supposes that managers
and lawyers know which issues they should be aware of when they draft contracts, and have the
foresight to anticipate when such issues are likely to arise in a particular transaction. Recent
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evidence from the alliance capability and inter-organizational learning literatures suggest,
however, that this may not be the case, especially if managers and lawyers lack previous
experience drafting contracts (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Lumineau et al., 2011). Thus, the
second research opportunity that emerges is to examine the role that prior experience plays in the
development of alliance capabilities, specifically those related to the design of R&D alliance
contracts. Of particular interest is whether experience with other types of alliances (i.e.,
marketing, supply) is valuable in the context of R&D alliances. Research indicates that the key
issues in R&D alliances are quite different from those in alliances that involve other value chain
activities (e.g., Dyer et al., 2001). Thus, I also explore whether the experience gained from
participating in marketing and supply alliances leads to the development of capabilities that
contribute to successfully designing R&D alliance contracts.
Finally, studies employing PRT have greatly advanced our knowledge of the allocation of
control rights in R&D alliance contracts. Empirical research indicates that bargaining power
plays a strong role in the assignment of control rights, often outweighing the concerns of
incentive alignment, particularly in the context of pharmaceutical biotechnology. As noted,
Leiponen (2008) finds that a sub-optimal amount of effort is exerted when the ownership of
innovative outputs is misallocated, owing to bargaining power differences. Kloyer (2011)
discovers, however, that the incentive to exert optimal effort can be restored if the research
partner retains ownership of the IP. The same incentive is not provided to the research partner
when it gains control over the management of the R&D process or over the marketing of final
products. Together, these findings suggest that certain rights are more important to obtain than
others in order to elicit the optimal degree of effort from one of both alliance partners.
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Ariño and Ring’s (2010) case study provides insight into how firms initially determine
which provisions to negotiate over and what the terms should be. They suggest that perceptions
of procedural and distributive justice jointly shape the negotiating positions of the parties related
to property and control rights. In the case that they document, managers engage in negotiations
over specific rights, such as the composition of the alliance board, the roles to be played by
personnel from each firm, and which decisions each firm will have control over, not counts or
shares of rights. Lerner et al. (2003) show, however, that contracts are not immutable. Rather,
they are living documents that can be amended if bargaining power shifts during an alliance.17
Taken together, these studies suggest that a fruitful research avenue to examine is the
allocation of specific rights rather than investigating why one firm ‘wins’ more of the rights that
are available at the outset of contract negotiations (some of which may be immaterial to one or
both firms). Managers do discuss individual rights, as the Ariño and Ring (2010) study
demonstrates. Most previous empirical work, however, has not examined whether distinct
allocation mechanisms underlie different rights that play different functions, leading to mixed
results (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). One exception is Elfenbein and Lerner’s (2003) study of
Internet portal alliances in which incentive alignment arguments explain the allocation of rights
associated with ownership, while the assignment of rights associated with control was responsive
to measures of the relative bargaining power of the two parties. Thus, this essay investigates the
factors that influence the allocation of rights that play different functions.
Lastly, whereas the Aghion and Tirole (1994) model suggests that ex ante bargaining
power distorts the allocation of control and decision rights as predicted by PRT, previous
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It is important to note that the authors only examined whether a renegotiation took place (as indicated by a
publicly-available amendment to the original contract). They did not examine which particular clauses and rights
were renegotiated. Based on the amended contracts that I examined, however, renegotiation of the entire contract is
not typically the norm. Rather, amendments tend to focus on narrower issues and the re-allocation of specific rights.
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research has primarily treated it as having a direct impact. Therefore, this essay will examine
whether bargaining power plays role a moderating or direct role in determining how rights are
assigned in R&D alliances.
4.3. Research Design
This section starts by recapping the role that contracts play in alliances and the theories
that address contract design. The research questions that are examined in the two studies in this
essay are then introduced, followed by a description of the research setting and the data set. A
brief overview of the two empirical studies conducted in this essay concludes this section.
4.3.1. Brief Recap of the Role of Contracts in Alliances
Alliances have become important mechanisms through which firms exchange products,
services and knowledge (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Mowery et al., 1996; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).
Such exchange often involves lengthy contracts aimed at improving the financial performance of
the partner firms, implying that the ability to manage alliances to achieve superior performance
is crucial (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000). From a managerial standpoint, the
ability to design alliance contracts efficiently and effectively is potentially an important source of
competitive advantage (Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Thus, it is important to understand the role
that alliance contracts play and how they are designed.
In general, a contract is ‘an agreement which is legally enforceable or legally recognized
as creating a duty’ (Atiyah, 1989: 40). The precise role that contracts play differs depending on
the theoretical lens applied. In agency theory, contracts are viewed as a means to align incentives
and share risks (Eisenhardt, 1989). In transaction cost economics (TCE), contracts are seen as
safeguarding devices that offer protection against opportunism (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson,
1985, 1991). Contractual provisions establish penalties for non-cooperative behavior, which
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should curb such behavior, or, at a minimum, compensate the injured party if it occurs.
According to property rights theory (PRT), contracts are used to assign specific rights to each
party to elicit optimal effort in order to ensure successful outcomes (Grossman and Hart, 1986;
Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995).
All three theories suggest that contracts establish the governance mechanisms through
which transacting parties contend with incentive conflicts. Contracts also provide a blueprint for
conducting an economic exchange (Macaulay, 1963). As discussed in the literature review,
alliance contracts typically contain provisions that define each party’s roles and responsibilities,
the allocation of decision and control rights, how to deal with contingencies, how the parties will
communicate, and how disputes will be resolved (Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Thus, in addition to
safeguarding, contracts establish a framework that allows partners to coordinate and adapt their
actions as an alliance unfolds (Llewellyn, 1931; Crocker and Masten, 1991; Gulati, Lawrence,
and Puranam, 2005).
Empirical evidence suggests that alliance contracts display considerable heterogeneity.
For example, in Lerner and Merges’ (1998) study of 200 biotechnology alliances, some of the 25
provisions examined (see Table 4-3 for a list of these provisions) appear in as few as 6% of the
contracts, while others are included in up to 93%. A similar degree of heterogeneity is exhibited
in Reuer et al.’s (2006) analysis of alliances in the German telecommunications industry. They
find that of Parkhe’s (1998) eight critical provisions (see fn. 14), the incidence of each ranges
between 11% and 93%. While less heterogeneity is exhibited in Reuer and Ariño’s (2007) study
of alliances across a variety of industries in Spain, the incidence of these provisions still varies
between 26% and 58%.18

18

For the sake of comparison with the studies conducted by Lerner and colleagues, equity joint venture contracts are
excluded from the ranges reported in the studies conducted by Reuer and colleagues.
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The variance in the structure of alliance contracts suggests that contract design is not a
one-size-fits-all exercise, but rather an idiosyncratic process. Research has primarily drawn on
economic theories in order to gain insight into this process. From an agency theory perspective,
the optimal contract in the standard principal-agent model is comprehensive in the sense that all
parties’ obligations can be specified in all future states of the world, to the fullest extent possible.
If this were the case, there would never be a need to revise or renegotiate the contract as an
alliance unfolds because any changes or additions should have been anticipated and built into the
contract initially. In practice, however, contracts are not comprehensive and are often revised and
renegotiated over the course of an alliance, as shown by Lerner et al. (2003).
According to TCE and PRT, contracts are incomplete because they are costly to devise.
Hart (1995) explains that the source of these costs is three-fold. First, in an uncertain world
plagued by the threat of ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ or opportunism (Williamson, 1985: 47),
it is difficult to foresee and plan for all contingencies due to bounded rationality (Simon, 1957).
Second, even if a plan can be devised, negotiating may be difficult because the parties involved
may lack a common language to describe states of the world and the actions that should be taken.
Third, even if the parties can plan and negotiate a contract that accounts for various future
contingencies, it may be difficult for them to write the plan down in a way that an outside party
(such as a court of law) can understand and enforce. In other words, the parties must able to
communicate with each other, as well as with outsiders who may not be familiar with the
environment that the contracting parties operate in.
While unavoidably incomplete due to these costs, firms are nonetheless observed making
efforts to devise contracts that are lengthy and that contain detailed provisions to assist in the
management of alliances. TCE provides guidance regarding the conditions under which certain
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types of provisions should be included in alliance contracts. Williamson (1985) suggests that
contracts should include specific types of safeguards, rather than more or more detailed
safeguards, to mitigate specific hazards. From a practical standpoint, adding unnecessary details
and irrelevant safeguards can lead to longer, more contentious negotiations or even a stalemate
between the partner firms. Additional details also make contracts more difficult to follow and
harder to enforce (Weber et al., 2009).
While TCE provides guidance regarding when to include specific types of contractual
provisions, it is relatively silent about how to assign provisions that provide one partner with
specific decision and control rights, such as IP ownership and the right to control the marketing
of new products resulting from an alliance. PRT fills this void, suggesting that the assignment of
such rights is determined by two factors: the importance of each partner firm’s contribution to
the alliance, and each firm’s relative bargaining power (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1990; Aghion &Tirole, 1994). In general, PRT suggests that control should be granted to
the partner firm whose marginal contribution to the alliance is indispensable. Bargaining power
may distort the optimal assignment of such rights, however, and as a result, the partner firms
may not exert full effort.
As discussed in the literature review, much of the research that employs PRT focuses on
understanding why one partner wins a larger share or greater number of the rights available in
alliance contracts. Kloyer (2011), however, is an exception. In his study of R&D alliances in the
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, he examines whether the assignment of specific rights
matters. Kloyer discovers that it is important for the research firm to control the IP generated in
order to restore its incentive to exert optimal effort, which is lost if there is an imbalance in ex
ante bargaining power favoring the funding partner. Neither control over the R&D process or the
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marketing of the final product provides the same incentive. Ariño and Ring’s (2010) case study
of the alliance formation process also provides evidence that firms negotiate for control over
specific terms that are important to each partner, such as the composition of the alliance board,
rather than simply haggling over which partner should obtain more rights (which may or may not
actually be very important to that partner).
In sum, contracts are shaped by individuals who are limited in their ability to foresee all
possible contingencies that may arise and potentially impact alliances. As a result, contracts are
unavoidably incomplete, leading to their frequent revision and renegotiation. Economic theories
suggest, however, that despite their cognitive limitations, managers are farsighted enough ‘to
learn and to look ahead, perceive hazards, and factor these back into the contractual relation,
thereafter to devise responsive institutions’ (Williamson, 1996: 9). In other words, managers can
anticipate some hazards, and in response, draft contracts that appropriately contend with the
hazards identified. In equilibrium, TCE also assumes that firms that consistently design
inadequate contracts and that fail to learn from these mistakes will perform poorly (Williamson,
1985). In turn, these poor performers will be forced to exit the market. Thus, only alert managers
and well-designed contracts will survive, which is the premise underlying TCE’s discriminating
alignment hypothesis (Williamson, 1991).
4.3.2. Research Questions
Alliances between firms are now a ubiquitous phenomenon (Gulati, 1998). The ability to
form and manage them more effectively than competitors has become critical to firm-level
performance. Negotiating the terms and drafting a detailed contract to govern the relationship
between the partner firms are important activities that occur during the alliance negotiation and
governance stage of the alliance life cycle (see Figure 4-2) (Dyer et al., 2001). Thus, because
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contract design is an important aspect of alliance management, I examine the following
overarching question in this essay: What factors impact the design of R&D alliance contracts?
The literature surveyed in the previous section points to three specific questions related to
the overarching research question that warrant further investigation. First, managers are assumed
to be economically rational and make decisions regarding contract structure that conform to
TCE. Scholars acknowledge, however, that we lack explanations for the inclusion of specific
provisions in contracts (e.g., Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Specifically, they suggest that some
provisions are context-specific because some contractual hazards are more prevalent in some
contexts than others. This observation points directly to the first research question addressed in
this essay: What hazards are encountered in R&D alliances and what contractual solutions are
implemented to contend with them?
Second, while Williamson (1996: 9) suggests that economic agents learn from their
experience, TCE has only recently incorporated learning into its framework (e.g., Williamson,
1999; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). TCE’s equilibrium assumption implies that learning is
relatively quick and thorough, and that firms that do not learn from their contract mistakes are
not likely to survive for long. Evidence indicates, however, that managers may not learn as fast
or be as farsighted as TCE suggests (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Lumineau et al., 2011).
Rather, as suggested by the inter-organizational learning literature, extensive experience may be
required to learn how to design contracts that reflect the critical hazards present in an alliance.
Managers entering into their first alliance may lack an understanding of what hazards are likely
to arise. Thus, the second question that this essay seeks to understand is: How does previous
alliance experience impact the relationships between the hazards encountered in R&D alliances
and the contractual solutions implemented to contend with them?
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Finally, research is just starting to examine the contract negotiation process, and the role
of bargaining power in this process, in an attempt to understand why partners focus on obtaining
specific rights and not others. Such research departs from earlier work that examines why one
partner wins more rights or a larger share of the rights available in an R&D alliance contract.
Whereas this earlier work suggests that the same underlying mechanism explains the allocation
of a bundle of rights, more recent research proposes that because individual rights play different
functions, their assignment is expected to be explained by different mechanisms (Adegbesan and
Higgins, 2011). Thus, the final research question examined in this essay is: What factors
influence the assignment of key control and decision rights in R&D alliance contracts?
4.3.3. Research Setting19
In the studies that follow, an empirical context is required in which R&D alliances
between large firms and smaller, entrepreneurial firms are relatively prevalent because the
learning and bargaining power disparities that result from size asymmetry are features that factor
prominently in the arguments that are developed and examined. The medical device industry
provides an appropriate setting for this purpose.
Section 321, paragraph (h) of the U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
defines a medical device as:
‘[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro
reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or
accessory, which is–
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other
animals, or
19

Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section comes from Ernst and Young (2010) and Seligman (2011).
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(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or
other animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes
through chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals
which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its
primary intended purposes.’
New medical devices are regularly developed and introduced that improve the diagnosis
and treatment of various diseases and conditions. Such devices may be based on existing
technologies or on new technologies that have a profound impact on healthcare practices.
Global medical device sales for 2009 (the latest year for which information is available)
are estimated to be between $206 billion and $350 billion. The U.S. market represents roughly
47% of this total. Germany, the UK, and France account for about 50% of sales in the European
Union. The global market is expected to continue to grow at a compound annual growth rate of
over 5% through 2014, reflecting favorable worldwide demographic trends. Growth is expected
to be driven by demand for new devices that show promise to be at least as effective as
competing pharmaceutical treatment options across many major therapeutic categories.
The medical device industry is extremely diversified, covering several related industries
with hundreds of thousands of products. In addition to products which are used directly to treat
patients, some devices are used for drug development and the analysis of laboratory samples for
medical research. Medical devices can generally be divided into two categories: (1) conventional
products with little technological differentiation and a wide variety of uses, and (2) hightechnology products that depend on cutting-edge science to address specific therapeutic and
diagnostic applications.
Conventional devices are comparatively easy to manufacture. Margins tend to be narrow
due to low entry barriers and intense price competition. As a result, manufacturers depend on
high sales volumes for profits. Firms often obtain long-term supply contracts with large-scale
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institutional healthcare providers (i.e., hospital chains, health maintenance organizations, nursing
homes) to be successful. Some examples of conventional devices include intravenous products,
anesthesia items, surgical apparel, traditional wound dressings, kits, and trays. While many of
these products are designed to be disposable, an instrument such as a stethoscope may be a oncein-a-lifetime purchase for a physician. Conventional products often evolve over time. For
example, traditional untreated gauze-based wound dressings are being replaced by new products
that incorporate biologically-derived materials that stimulate faster healing.
Major diversified companies rely on the cash generated from the sales of conventional
products to fund the development of high-tech devices. Such products are less vulnerable to
competition because they tend to require substantial R&D and regulatory review before they can
go on the market. In addition, high-tech devices that address previously unmet medical needs are
often able to command a premium price. In turn, firms are able to profit from the sizeable
margins available from such products until competitors develop a similar device. Products in this
category include implantable cardiovascular and orthopedic devices, advanced wound care
management systems, and many surgical instruments, as well as a few in vitro diagnostic tests.
Large corporations with global scale dominate the medical device industry, offering full
lines of conventional and high-tech products. Small and mid-sized companies can find
opportunities to compete though, especially in sectors that rely on innovation. Table 4-4 contains
a list of the 10 largest global medical device manufacturers in 2009, ranked in terms of total
sales. Nearly all of the world leaders are based in the U.S. Only a few non-U.S. firms, such as
Smith and Nephew plc (London, UK) and the diversified conglomerates Royal Philips
Electronics AV (Amsterdam, the Netherlands) and Siemens AG (Munich, Germany), have an
influence on the industry.
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Table 4-4. Ten largest global medical device companies, 2009
Company
Johnson and Johnson
GE Healthcare
Siemens Medical Systems
Medtronic
Philips Medical Systems
(a unit of Royal Philips Electronics)
Covidien
Boston Scientific
Abbott Labs
Becton Dickinson
Stryker
Source: Company reports

Medical device sales
(in millions of US$)
23,574
17,438
16,015
14,599
10,933

% of total sales
from medical devices
38.1
16.7
10.2
100.0
29.7

8,995
8,188
7,813
7,161
6,723

29.2
100.0
73.2
100.0
100.0

In the U.S., the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the principal agency responsible
for protecting the public from dangerous or ineffective medical devices. Firms manufacturing
devices must obtain FDA approval before they can sell their products in the U.S. or export them
abroad.20 Firms must also meet the regulatory requirements of foreign governments if products
are tested or marketed abroad. Japan, Australia and the EU have regulations and approval
processes similar to the U.S., while developing countries such as those in Latin America and
Asia generally have minimal regulatory oversight.
In 1976, the U.S. Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
to address concerns about the malfunctioning of new devices. Since then, U.S.-based device
manufacturers have been required to provide extensive documentation to the FDA regarding
product safety and efficacy. The FDA reviews this material in order to determine whether
marketing approval should be granted. The amount of evidence submitted to the FDA depends
on the degree of risk the device presents to the patient. Devices fall into one of three general
classifications for new submissions; these categories are briefly summarized in Table 4-5.

20

The FDA does not regulate products that are both made and sold abroad by U.S. companies.
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Table 4-5. General classifications for new medical device submissions
Classification
Class I

Description
 Devices which pose little patient risk (e.g., stethoscopes, surgical
scalpels)
 Manufacturers only need to register their facilities and list their
products with the FDA
 Facilities must conform to good manufacturing practices (GMPs)
Class II
 Devices that pose a moderate risk to the patient (e.g., x-ray machines,
endoscopes, surgical lasers)
 Manufacturers have to provide the FDA with evidence of safety and
efficacy
 Products must meet certain performance standards
 Manufacturers are responsible for post-market surveillance and
maintenance of patient registries
Class III
 Technologically sophisticated products that entail significant risk to
patients (e.g., cardiac pacemakers, angioplasty catheters, stents)
 Must go through extensive clinical trials before FDA will review, let
alone approve
Source: Seligman (2011)
To gain marketing approval, manufacturers must submit one of two kinds of filings,
either a premarket notification (also known as a 510(k) notification) or a premarket application
(PMA). A 510(k) filing is the most common, applying to Class I, Class II and some Class III
devices that are substantially similar to approved products that are already on the market. In most
cases, descriptive data and a labeling review are sufficient to support a 510(k) submission, but
clinical studies may be necessary for some Class III devices. The FDA reviews 510(k) filings
and grants marketing clearance to those that it accepts, rather than formal approval. In 80% of
cases, it takes 3-6 months to obtain clearance after a 510(k) is submitted (Emergo Group, 2011).
A PMA must be submitted to the FDA for Class III medical devices that are not similar
to those currently on the market or that employ novel treatment methods. A PMA is more
complex and time-consuming to prepare than a 510(k) because the file submitted typically
contains a large quantity of animal and clinical testing data, as well as manufacturing data, all of
which are carefully reviewed by the FDA before approval is granted. The costs for clinical trials
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in support of a PMA are substantially higher than for a 510(k), typically four to ten times greater.
Firms must also file for an investigational device exemption (IDE) to obtain permission from the
FDA to use complex new devices in clinical trials. If permission is granted, the IDE allows a
manufacturer to use their device to conduct limited human clinical trials, typically involving
fewer than 100 people. The entire FDA review process, which may involve public meetings to
discuss the application, normally takes 18 months to two years after a PMA is filed.
The development and introduction of innovative new products drive growth in the
medical device industry. R&D spending, however, varies significantly from firm to firm.
Companies manufacturing conventional products generally do not invest much in R&D, while
those pursuing high-tech products maintain high levels of R&D spending. Overall, the range is
wide (5-15%), but average R&D intensity is approximately 10%.21
Ideas for new devices come from many sources. Manufacturers often collaborate with
customers, seeking input on applications and design from the earliest stages of development.
There are numerous accounts of physician-inventors approaching companies with ideas either for
novel products or for ways to improve existing ones (e.g., Spetz, 1995; Lettl, Herstatt, and
Gemuenden, 2006). Several studies have shown that many important scientific instrument
inventions originated from user innovators, not from firms.22 University researchers are also an
important source of medical device innovations (Blume, 1995; Gelijns and Rosenberg, 1995).
Many large medical device firms are hesitant to develop high-tech products. Instead, they
acquire or ally with small firms working on pioneering technologies to minimize their risk.
Alliances have become important vehicles for R&D and product development in the medical
21

For comparison, the R&D intensity for the average industrial company is 3-4%.
Early studies by von Hippel (1976) and Shaw (1985) reported that upwards of 80% of scientific instruments were
conceived by user innovators. A more recent study by Chatterji, Fabrizio, Mitchell, and Schulman (2008) reported
that physicians accounted for almost 20% of the approximately 26,000 medical device patents filed in the U.S. from
1990 to 1996.
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device industry over the last 40 years, with contractual alliances overtaking joint ventures as the
dominant alliance mode in the industry during the 1990s (Hagedoorn, 2002). As a result, large
companies often commercialize breakthrough products despite not necessarily originating them.
Another factor contributing to the proliferation of contractual R&D alliances in the
medical device industry since the early 1990s is the transition from an emphasis on mechanical
innovations to biological innovations, and combinations of the two. Such innovations, known as
convergence products, incorporate biologically active ingredients into traditional medical
devices. Examples include joint implants coated with drugs that speed healing, implantable
pumps used to deliver drugs directly to the site of an injury, and drug-eluting stents that help to
prevent restenosis (i.e., the reoccurrence of the narrowing of a blood vessel) in diseased
peripheral or coronary arteries. Developing convergence products requires expertise in biology
and pharmacology, which a traditional, engineering-oriented medical device manufacturer often
does not possess. Thus, many firms pursuing the development of drug-device combination
products have formed alliances in order to access knowledge and the skills that they lack.23
Overall, the evidence reviewed in this section suggests that the medical device industry is
an ideal research setting – it is highly R&D intensive, the emergence of convergence products
presents a capabilities challenge to industry incumbents, and most of the R&D alliances between
large firms and their smaller, entrepreneurial partners are organized contractually.
4.3.4. Data Set
The sample of contracts employed to test the hypotheses developed in this study was
obtained from Windhover Information, Inc., a Connecticut-based firm that was acquired by
Elsevier Business Intelligence in March 2008. Windhover’s Strategic Transactions database
23

In addition to drug-device combination products, there are also medical devices that incorporate wireless
capabilities in order to transmit patient data. These products require expertise in software development and
information technology, which also may not be within the knowledge portfolio of a traditional device manufacturer.
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contains information on approximately 4500 medical device, research equipment and in vitro
diagnostic alliances, including over 430 actual contracts. To my knowledge, there are currently
no published studies in the strategy literature that have employed this database, making it
difficult to comment on how compressive Windhover’s coverage is of R&D alliances in the
medical device industry relative to the true amount of alliance activity in the industry over the
time period covered by the database (1991-2012). However, Windhover collects information
from a variety of sources including directly from companies in the medical device industry as
well as from representatives of the investment banking, venture capital, consulting and other
industry-support sectors. In addition, Windhover’s research staff extensively monitors press
releases and SEC documents to ensure that transactions are captured in a timely fashion for
inclusion in the database. The contracts collected come from forms 10-K, 10-Q, S-1 and 8-K,
and they are available because publicly traded firms are required by the SEC to disclose
materially relevant transactions (i.e., those that account for ≥5% of the firm’s annual revenue).
Due to limited coverage between 1991 and 1994, I only investigate alliances in the
database for the period 1995-2009. According to Windhover’s classification scheme, roughly
2600 of the transactions in the database during this window involve R&D. Windhover was able
to a locate contracts from SEC filings in 280 of these cases. However, Windhover’s scheme
classifies several agreements where intellectual property (IP) or a previously developed product
is simply being licensed as an R&D alliance. Thus, deals that did not involve an active R&D
component were screened out of the sample. It is important to note though that many of the
contracts included in the final sample do contain licensing provisions that address the usage and
ownership of IP, issues which are critical in R&D alliances. In addition, while the contracts in
the final sample focus on end-product-driven R&D, some also involve process development.
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Following the convention in previous work (e.g., Higgins, 2007; Lerner and Merges,
1998), I also excluded contracts involving universities, medical centers, other non-profit
organizations, and government agencies, as the contracts drafted for these cases are likely to
adhere to very specific templates dictated by state and federal mandate. In addition, I excluded
alliances (1) where one of the firms was private, (2) with more than two partners, (3) where one
partner had controlling interest in the other partner, and (4) where the contract served only as an
amendment to an earlier contract.24
After taking the screening criteria into account, the final sample contains 66 contracts
with 44 unique buyers and 53 unique suppliers. The firms involved in each deal were classified
as a buyer or supplier by examining the flow of payments. The firms providing funding and/or
making an equity investment in the other partner are classified as buyers, while the firms
receiving funding and/or an investment are designated as suppliers. Payments were not made in a
few of the partnerships in the sample, so support documents (e.g., 10-K summaries, press
releases) were used to determine the role of each party. It is important to note that this
classification scheme corresponds with the terminology introduced in the hypotheses section of
Study 1 regarding buyers and suppliers of technology in R&D alliances. Four firms served as
both a buyer and a supplier in the sample.
Table 4-6 provides the yearly distribution of the contracts in the sample. It is important to
note that the sample only contains publically available contracts. Thus, it is difficult to
definitively state whether the observed distribution is representative of the actual level of R&D
alliance activity in the medical device industry during the 1995-2009 period. However, the
pattern generally follows the trends reported by Hagedoorn (2002) and Schilling (2009) through
at least 2005. The activity for the period after 2005 also appears to reflect the slight improvement
24

In two cases, I was able to locate the contract corresponding to the original alliance agreement.
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in the U.S. economy at mid-decade, followed by the recession that started in late 2007-early
2008.
Table 4-6. Yearly distribution of contracts
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total

Frequency
1
2
1
8
8
10
12
2
7
1
3
3
6
1
1
66

Percent (%)
1.52
3.03
1.52
12.12
12.12
15.15
18.18
3.03
10.61
1.52
4.55
4.55
9.09
1.52
1.52
100.00

Cum. percent (%)
1.52
4.55
6.06
18.18
30.30
45.45
63.64
66.67
77.28
78.79
83.33
87.88
96.97
98.48
100.00

For each contract in the final sample, I extracted the following information from the deal
summary compiled by Windhover: (1) if an equity investment was made by the buyer, (2) the
potential deal value (i.e., the total value of any up-front payments plus potential milestone and
R&D payments), and (3) if any royalties will be paid to the supplier. To ensure that the summary
information was accurate, I checked it against the actual contract terms. Table 4-7 provides
selected information about the deals associated with each contract and the firms participating in
them. I used the actual contracts to determine if the clauses of interest in Study 1 are included
and how the key rights of interest in Study 2 are assigned in each alliance in the sample.
In addition, I collected patent data for each firm in the final sample of R&D alliance
contracts. This information was collected from three sources: Delphion, FreePatentsOnline, and
Google Patents. Delphion provides complete text and images of all U.S. patents granted by the
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U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) since 1974, and bibliographic text and some images
since 1971. FreePatentsOnline provides complete text and images of all U.S. patents granted by
the USPTO since 1976. The Delphion and FreePatentsOnline collections also include full images
for most patents dating back to 1790. In instances where I could not find a patent in the Delphion
or FreePatentsOnline collections, I turned to Google Patents, which provides images for all U.S.
patents ever granted by the USPTO.
Table 4-7. Selected information about the sample
Number of deals with an equity investment

Average deal value
No. of deals with potential royalty payments
Buyer, average revenue in year prior to deal
Supplier, average revenue in year prior to deal

25 (37.9% of sample)
Common stock: 19
Preferred stock: 9
$23.8 million
37 (56.1% of sample)
$10.9 billion
$42.7 million

Since firms do not always assign patents to the subsidiary where the technology was
developed, the corporate-level knowledge portfolio of each firm rather than of single subsidiaries
has to be measured. Failure to capture patents assigned to each subsidiary in a corporate structure
leads to a noisy measure of a firm’s knowledge portfolio, and in turn, biased parameter estimates
(Kennedy, 2003). To avoid this issue, a patent portfolio was constructed for each firm based on
the patents assigned to the parent firm as well as those assigned to all of its subsidiaries. To
identify all of the subsidiaries associated with each firm in the sample, I used the Directory of
Corporate Affiliations. The Directory contains information on the subsidiaries and affiliates of
both public and private, U.S. and non-U.S. firms. To ensure that the subsidiaries listed in the
Directory were actually associated with the parent firm at the time the alliance was established, I
gathered a comprehensive history of each firm’s mergers and acquisitions from Mergent Online.
In addition, the firms involved in several of the alliances are themselves subsidiaries. In each of
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these instances, the ultimate parent firm was identified, and then the above procedure was
followed to identify all subsidiaries associated with that parent. I then collected all of the patents
assigned to the firms identified as part of each corporate tree for the purposes of constructing
several of the key independent variables employed in Studies 1 and 2.
Firm-level financial information was collected from Compustat, and information about
firm-level alliance experience and the history of prior alliances between partners was gathered
from the Strategic Transactions database. The measures constructed from the information
collected from these additional sources are described in detail in the two studies that follow.
4.3.5. Overview of Studies 1 and 2
Study 1 identifies the prominent hazards that firms are likely to encounter in R&D
alliances. A conceptual model is developed, which relies on the logic of TCE, specifying the
relationships between these hazards and the inclusion of specific provisions. The impact of
previous alliance experience on the proposed relationships is also addressed. The relationships in
the model are then translated into specific hypotheses, which are then tested using the data set
described above.
From a theoretical standpoint, managers and lawyers are assumed to be economically
rational. Consequently, it is also assumed that contract design is guided by the logic of economic
theories. The hypotheses developed in Study 1 explore these assumptions. Specifically, by
examining how previous alliance experience influences contract design, I hope to gain insight
into whether managers implement what they have learned from experience rather quickly as TCE
assumes, or whether learning is more slow and incremental as suggested by studies in the interorganizational learning and alliance capabilities literatures. This is a potentially important
contribution of Study 1 that expands on what has been done in previous research.
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Study 2 addresses the assignment of control rights in R&D alliance contracts. As noted
by Adegbesan and Higgins (2011: 191), ‘most previous empirical work has failed to account for
functionally differentiated subsets among control rights, leading to mixed results.’ For instance,
in their study of internet-portal alliances, Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) found support for
incentive-alignment arguments for the assignment of one subset of control rights, while the
assignment of a second subset was responsive to the relative bargaining power of the partners.
Thus, tests of theory can be confounded by the distinct allocation mechanisms underlying
different control rights. This finding is in line with the research discussed previously that
suggests that it is the assignment of individual rights, rather than the accumulation of many
rights, that matters to the firms engaged in contract negotiations.
Study 2 extends research on control rights by focusing on predicting the allocation of two
rights that are important in R&D alliances, namely ownership of IP and unilateral termination
rights. The conceptual model developed in Study 2 proposes that there are different underlying
allocation mechanisms for each of these rights due to the role that they play. The empirical study
conducted also investigates whether bargaining power directly influences the allocation of such
rights or moderates the main relationships proposed. Thus, the main contribution of this study is
that it explores the factors that influence how individual rights are assigned in R&D alliances,
especially the pathway through which bargaining power operates.
4.4. Study 1: Contractual Solutions to the Hazards Encountered in R&D Alliances and the
Impact of Previous Alliance Experience on their Implementation
4.4.1. Introduction
R&D alliances can provide firms with several benefits such as access to new technologies
and the shortening of development cycle times, but they are also fraught with hazards. Partners
often must share knowledge with each other specific to the alliance activities. However, doing so

137
creates the opportunity for one or both partners to misappropriate such knowledge. Knowledge
outside of the scope of the activities being performed may also be exposed during the alliance,
creating the risk of ‘leakage’. Thus, managers are faced with two hazards in an R&D alliance: (1)
adequately promoting the transfer of knowledge critical to the performance of the alliance while
(2) protecting against the actions of a potentially opportunistic partner. These hazards are
especially daunting in alliances that partner smaller, entrepreneurial firms with larger firms
owing to the disparity in the learning rate between such firms (Alvarez and Barney, 2001).
Drawing on the logic of transaction cost economics (TCE), this study examines how these
hazards are dealt with contractually in R&D alliances.
TCE suggests that particular hazards can be mitigated by devising the appropriate
contractual safeguards (Williamson, 1985). This assertion supposes that managers and lawyers
know which challenges they should be aware of in the first place, and have the foresight to
anticipate when such issues are likely to arise in a particular transaction. Recent evidence
suggests that this may not be the case, especially if managers and lawyers lack previous
contracting experience (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Lumineau et al., 2011). However,
managers and lawyers are more likely to have learned how to design contracts that reflect the
critical challenges present in the partnership if they possess such experience. Thus, this study
examines how previous alliance experience impacts contract design.
This study also explores whether all alliance experience is created equally. From an
operational standpoint, the knowledge and capabilities required to manage R&D alliances are
likely to be quite different than those needed in manufacturing or marketing alliances. In
addition, research indicates that the key contractual issues in R&D alliances are quite different
from those in alliances that involve other value chain activities (e.g., Dyer et al., 2001). Thus, the

138
hazards that are prominent in R&D alliances are likely to be different than those encountered in
marketing and/or manufacturing alliances. As a result, managers and lawyers may not know
which challenges to be on the lookout for and which contractual solutions to implement if they
lack experience designing R&D contracts or if they have only designed contracts for situations
that involve other value chain activities.
Overall, the following research questions are addressed by this study:
1. What contractual solutions are implemented to contend the hazards encountered in
R&D alliances?
2. How does previous alliance experience impact the relationships between the hazards
encountered in R&D alliances and the contractual solutions implemented to contend
with them?
The rest of this study is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses why
R&D alliances are different than those that involve other value chain activities and why these
differences give rise to the hazards that plague R&D alliances. This discussion is then followed
by an exposition of the theoretical approach adopted in this study. A conceptual model of the
relationships to be investigated is then developed. This model is used to generate a series of
hypotheses, the tests and results of which are then detailed. Finally, I end by more fully
discussing the results and their implications.
4.4.2. Theory Development
4.4.2.1. Major Hazards in R&D Alliances. The major challenges in R&D alliances
stem from the knowledge-based nature of the resources contributed by each partner firm and the
idiosyncratic nature of R&D itself. As a result, alliance outcomes are determined by the extent to
which these challenges can be mitigated. Alliances involving R&D differ from those that involve
manufacturing, marketing or component supply in two important ways. First, firms pool their
knowledge in R&D alliances. This knowledge is subject to leakage, or unintended transfer,
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because transfer may occur upon pooling25 and intellectual property (IP) rights offer only
imperfect protection against leakage (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Second, R&D projects are
more idiosyncratic and uncertain than manufacturing, marketing or supply activities. As
Holmstrom (1989: 309) notes, R&D projects are:
‘(a) risky – there is a high probability of failure, but also prospects for
extraordinary returns; (b) unpredictable – many future contingencies are
impossible to foresee; (c) long-term and multi-stage – the project has an
invention, a development and a completion stage, and can be terminated between
those; (d) labor intensive – all stages require substantial human effort; and (e)
idiosyncratic – not easily comparable to other projects.’
Consequently, it is difficult to observe the inputs into the R&D process, due to their knowledgebased nature, and it is difficult to verify whether the effort exerted by the partners is optimal by
examining the outputs since the link between effort and outcome in R&D is not clear. These
characteristics give rise to the two major opportunism hazards that plague R&D alliances:
shirking and misappropriation.
Shirking occurs when one or more of the partners contribute less effort and/or lower
quality inputs to the joint R&D activities than originally agreed upon. For example, one or both
of the partners may re-allocate knowledgeable personnel originally assigned to the alliance to
other alliances or internal projects. The partners may also hold back knowledge relevant to the
alliance. Shirking is particularly problematic in R&D alliances because it is difficult to observe a
lack of effort and to determine when relevant knowledge is being withheld. Even if the outcome
can be observed, it is difficult to verify in a court of law whether it was a lack of effort or
insufficient knowledge transfer that lead to the performance shortcomings of a specific R&D
alliance. Thus, the probability of shirking increases when it is difficult to detect.

25

During an alliance, one partner may inadvertently transfer its proprietary knowledge to another partner without
receiving any compensation, which is essentially Arrow’s (1971) fundamental paradox of information – information
must be shared to be valued, but after it has been shared it has no additional value (Williamson, 1985).
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Misappropriation, or the uncompensated leakage of knowledge between firms, is a welldocumented phenomenon in the TCE literature (Pisano, 1990; Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Singh,
1998). This hazard is acutely problematic when a smaller, entrepreneurial firm forms an alliance
with a larger firm (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). A ‘learning race’ in which each firm tries to
acquire specific knowledge from the other firm is likely to ensue in this situation (Hamel, 1991).
Specifically, the larger firm attempts to obtain the smaller firm’s technology, while the smaller
firm tries to learn about and imitate the larger firm’s organizational resources and capabilities.
The first partner to finish learning can then withdraw from the alliance, thus the characterization
of the alliance as a learning race.
A learning race often favors the larger firm (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). The smaller firm
frequently lacks the managerial or financial resources to fully understand, evaluate, and imitate
the larger firm’s organizational capabilities, which are embedded in complex processes and
routines (Barney, 1995). Conversely, the larger firm often possesses the resources required to
misappropriate the smaller firm’s technology. This task is made easier because the smaller firm
often provides the larger firm with a significant amount of detail about its technology upfront in
order to convince the larger firm to form an alliance. In addition, the smaller firm may expose
proprietary knowledge that is outside of the scope of the alliance along with knowledge that is
relevant to the alliance.
The implications of these hazards are straightforward for the realization of the alliance
objectives. Alliance success hinges on the ability of the partner firms to freely cooperate, while
refraining from acting opportunistically. TCE suggests that these competing objectives can be
satisfied by selecting the proper governance mode (Williamson, 1985). Thus, if cooperation can
be achieved, the partners are less likely to shirk on the alliance or misappropriate each other’s
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knowledge, improving the chances of success. This suggestion adheres to TCE’s discriminating
alignment hypothesis, which predicts that performance should be superior when the governance
mode is properly aligned with the attributes of a transaction (Williamson, 1991).
Several studies have examined the choice between alternative R&D alliance governance
modes (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997; Sampson, 2004b). The conclusion from these studies is
that equity joint ventures (EJVs) are required when the threat of opportunism is high, unless the
partners’ knowledge bases greatly diverge. In practice, however, most R&D alliances are not
organized as EJVs. Only 6.5% of the R&D alliances examined in Sampson’s (2004b) study of
the telecommunications equipment industry are organized as EJVs; the rest are organized
contractually. A similar ratio is found in the MERIT-CATI database, which focuses on ‘strategic
technology agreements’ between industrial partners (Schilling, 2009). According to this
database, EJVs account for less than 10% of the R&D alliances formed since the mid-1980s
across a variety of low-, medium- and high-tech industries. This trend indicates that ‘[b]y and
large, companies seem to increasingly prefer contractual partnerships to joint ventures’
(Hagedoorn, 2002: 481).
One potential explanation for the increase in the number of contractual R&D alliances is
that the additional set up and administrative costs associated with EJVs offset the benefits from
enhanced cooperation and the prevention of opportunism. In other words, the hazards faced may
not be severe enough to warrant establishing a separate legal entity to contend with them. In
addition, EJVs may not be the appropriate governance form to deal with the high degree of
technical uncertainty encountered in R&D. It is also difficult to quickly change course in EJVs,
and EJVs are costly to disband. In contrast, contractual alliances are more flexible and easier to
adapt as R&D activities unfold.
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It would be presumptuous to assume, however, that R&D alliances organized as
contractual partnerships are absent of opportunism and that the partners freely cooperate with
each other. Such issues are still likely to be present and require attention. The TCE approach to
contracting suggests that these problems can be mitigated by drafting specific contractual
provisions that act as substitutes for the hierarchical governance mechanisms employed in EJVs.
The conceptual model presented in Figure 4-3 adopts this approach in order to investigate how
contracts are structured to contend with the hazards that are encountered in R&D alliances.
Transferability

Communication Provisions

Appropriability

Safeguarding Provisions

Previous Alliance
Experience

Figure 4-3. Conceptual model for study 1
Shirking may take the form of intentionally holding back knowledge from the alliance. It
may be difficult, however, to differentiate between such situations and those where knowledge is
insufficiently exchanged because it is difficult to transfer. Thus, while it is often hard to
determine why knowledge transfer was inadequate after the fact, managers can anticipate when it
might be a problem by assessing transferability when setting up the alliance. Figure 4-3 shows
that managers should incorporate communication provisions in an R&D alliance contract to
contend with knowledge transfer issues, whether they stem from intentional shirking or not.
However, in line with Argyres and Mayer (2007), I argue that the exact provisions to be drafted
will depend on the precise nature of the hazard in this context.
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Far from being easy to transfer, knowledge has been characterized as relatively immobile
(Attewell, 1992), inert (Kogut and Zander, 1992), and even ‘sticky’ (von Hippel, 1994). The
literature proposes that several factors influence transferability. Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad (1989)
suggest that transferability is impacted by how easily knowledge can be transported, interpreted,
and absorbed. Winter (1987) proposes that characteristics of knowledge itself, including how
tacit, teachable, articulated, observable, complex, and systemic it is, influence its transferability.
Von Hippel (1994) suggests that transferability is impacted by firm-level characteristics such as
the reliability of the source, and the absorptive capacity of the recipient (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990). Hamel’s (1991) case study of nine international alliances indicates that transferability is
also influenced by firm-level traits such as intent, transparency, and receptivity.
The degree of transferability also provides insight into the mechanisms through which
knowledge is exchanged. When transferability is high, knowledge is readily exchanged between
the partner firms, whereas it is more difficult to transmit when transferability is low. Simpler
transfer mechanisms can be employed in the former situation, while more complex mechanisms
are often required when knowledge is difficult to transfer. Thus, the provisions incorporated in
an R&D alliance contract should reflect the complexity of the transfer mechanism. Based on this
logic, I suggest that different communication provisions should be drafted depending on the
degree of transferability, rather than proposing that communication provisions in general are
required when transferability is low, and vice versa. The hypotheses developed in the next
section examine how two of these factors, namely tacitness and knowledge diversity, determine
the nature of transferability, which influences the type of communication provision necessary
and the likelihood of its inclusion in an R&D alliance contract.
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The second important hazard in R&D alliances is the misappropriation of knowledge.
According to the logic of TCE, managers should incorporate safeguarding provisions in R&D
alliance contracts when the threat of appropriability is high. Again, I propose that there is a more
nuanced relationship. Specifically, I suggest that the precise provisions to incorporate will
depend on the mechanism through which knowledge is appropriated. The same factors that
characterize the nature of transferability also describe the nature of appropriability (Sampson,
2004b). Thus, this study also examines how tacitness and knowledge diversity determine how
knowledge is appropriated, which impacts the type of safeguarding provision required and the
likelihood of its inclusion in an R&D alliance contract.
The key relationships in the model draw on TCE, which assumes that managers learn
relatively quickly from their experience, allowing them to design contracts responsive to the
hazards that they perceive. This assumption is explored by investigating the impact of previous
alliance experience on these key relationships. Several hypotheses proposing a moderating effect
for previous alliance experience are also developed in the following section.
4.4.3. Hypotheses
4.4.3.1. The Ease of Knowledge Transfer and Communication Provisions. The ability
to transfer knowledge in an R&D alliance is impacted by many factors including the
characteristics of knowledge itself and of the alliance partners. Examining two of these factors,
tacitness and knowledge diversity, provides an idea of how difficult it is to share knowledge
between partners in an R&D alliance, which in turn influences the type of communication
provision required and the probability of its inclusion in an R&D alliance contract.
Firms that form R&D alliances are essentially declaring their intent to share their
knowledge with their partners. According to Winter (1987), the ability to share knowledge is
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impacted by whether knowledge is explicit or tacit. Explicit knowledge has been described as
‘know-what’ (Brown and Duguid, 1998) and refers to knowledge that has been formalized and
codified. Because it has been documented, explicit knowledge is fairly easy to identify, store,
retrieve, and share (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Zander and Kogut, 1995). Tacit knowledge, in
contrast, has been described as ‘know-how’ (Brown and Duguid, 1998) and refers to intuitive,
hard-to-define knowledge that is largely experiential in nature. Because it is difficult to articulate
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Szulanski, 1996), and often resides in the mind of the individual
responsible for its development (Leonard and Sensiper, 1998), tacit knowledge is more difficult
to share than explicit knowledge without direct interaction between individuals (Leonard-Barton,
1988; Mascitelli, 2000).
As noted by Alvarez and Barney (2001), large firms establish R&D alliances with
smaller, entrepreneurial firms in order to gain access to new technologies. Using the terminology
of a sourcing arrangement, large firms can be thought of as ‘buyers’ of technology and smaller
firms as ‘suppliers’ of technology. The knowledge underlying new, ‘state-of-the-art’ technology
is often tacit (Winter, 1987), and organizationally embedded (Teece, 1977; Kogut, 1988). When
the supplier’s knowledge is tacit in nature owing to its relative newness, the transfer challenge is
likely to be intensified. As a result, the need for and type of communication between the partners
is likely to be a function of the degree of tacitness of the knowledge contributed to the alliance
by the supplier, which in turn impacts the ease of its transfer to the buyer.26
Based on the arguments outlined in the previous paragraphs, the exchange of technical
documents is not likely to be an effective or efficient transfer mechanism when the knowledge to
be shared by the supplier is tacit owing to its newness. In this case, I expect R&D alliance
26

Knowledge transfer may not be as salient an issue for the supplier as it is for the buyer, as knowledge transfer is
likely to be one-way (i.e., from the buyer to the supplier), especially in regards to the knowledge underlying the
product/technology under development in the alliance.
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contracts are likely to include a provision that explicitly allows key personnel from each partner
firm to interact on a face-to-face basis in order to discuss technical matters and share knowledge.
The inclusion of such a provision in an R&D alliance contract is akin to co-location, which is
employed in joint ventures to overcome knowledge transfer challenges. In sum, I can state the
hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the tacitness of the supplier’s knowledge, the greater
the likelihood of including a contractual provision that allows for face-to-face
communication between key personnel from each R&D alliance partner.
A second factor that is expected to influence the ease of knowledge transfer and in turn
the type of communication provision required and the likelihood of its inclusion in an R&D
alliance contract is the similarity of the partners’ knowledge portfolios. The ability to obtain
knowledge from an outside source is limited by a firm’s own experience in related areas (Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). As a firm gains experience in a particular field of
science or technology, it learns the technical language that is associated with and widely known
by practitioners in that field. Research suggests that having a shared language impacts the ease
and efficiency of knowledge transfer (Newcomb, 1953; Runkel, 1956; Dearborn and Simon,
1958; Triandis, 1960; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Allen and Cohen, 1969; Tushman, 1978).
When firms are familiar with similar fields, they are likely to share a common language
in the fields where their knowledge bases overlap. Sharing a common language allows technical
employees to effectively communicate with their counterparts from other firms about their
coinciding interests (Hagstrom, 1965), through both digital (e.g., verbal and natural languages)
and analogical (e.g., symbols and non-verbal) means (Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, 1967).
Conversely, when firms lack a high degree of overlap in their knowledge bases, they are less
likely to share a common language. In this case, the receiving firm may misinterpret or be unable
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to understand the knowledge that is being transferred (Cherry, 1965). In addition, less personal
forms of communication are often less effective in the absence of a common language (Berger
and Luckmann, 1966). As a result, it may be difficult to transfer unfamiliar methods and
techniques across firm boundaries through written forms of communication alone.
In the absence of a common language, direct interaction between individuals may be
necessary in order to transfer knowledge between organizations. The richness of knowledge
tends to be lost without face-to-face contact (Allen, 1977). Research also suggests that
individuals are the key conduits of knowledge transfer (Malecki, 1991), especially in R&D
alliances when the partners’ knowledge bases are divergent (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003).
Thus, I expect that R&D alliance contracts will include a provision that allows key personnel
from each partner to directly communicate with each other on a face-to-face basis when there is
less overlap between the partners’ knowledge portfolios. Again, the inclusion of such a provision
is akin to co-locating personnel in a joint venture. In sum, I offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The higher the dissimilarity between the knowledge bases of the
R&D alliance partners, the greater the likelihood of including a contractual
provision that allows for face-to-face communication between key personnel from
each R&D alliance partner.
4.4.3.2. The Threat of Appropriation and Safeguarding Provisions. The degree of
tacitness also has implications for appropriability, which in turn influences the type of
safeguarding provision required and the likelihood of its inclusion in an R&D alliance contract.
Tacit knowledge is difficult to misappropriate for the same reasons that hinder its transfer: it is
hard to articulate, experience-based, and often resides within the mind of the individual or
individuals responsible for its development. However, tacit knowledge may be acquired if
individuals change employers (Argote and Ingram, 2000). Because tacit knowledge is often
difficult to separate from those who possess it, Dosi (1988) suggests that hiring provides a way
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to acquire knowledge that is otherwise immobile. Other research also proposes that the mobility
of employees provides a way for firms to obtain knowledge developed by other firms without
permission (e.g., Teece, 1982; Winter, 1987). Song, Almeida, and Wu (2003) call this
phenomenon ‘learning-by-hiring.’
In addition to obtaining new technology, large firms form R&D alliances with smaller,
entrepreneurial partners in order to gain access to ‘state-of-the-art’ technical talent (Alvarez and
Barney, 2001). As a buyer of technology, a large firm may try to appropriate the tacit knowledge
underlying the supplier’s new technology by offering employment to the supplier’s personnel
responsible for developing the technology. A potential way to contractually safeguard against
misappropriation through learning-by-hiring is to prohibit the recruitment of key scientific and
technical employees involved in the alliance. Thus, based on these arguments, I expect that an
R&D alliance contract is likely to include a non-solicitation covenant when the knowledge
possessed by the supplier’s employees is tacit owing to its newness.27 I can state the hypothesis
as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The higher the tacitness of the supplier’s knowledge, the higher the
probability of including a non-solicitation provision in an R&D alliance contract.
The similarity of the partners’ knowledge portfolios also has implications for
appropriation, which in turn impacts the type of safeguarding provision necessary and likelihood
of its inclusion in an R&D alliance contract. Partners with dissimilar knowledge bases have more
to learn from each other than when their portfolios are homogeneous. As a result, one partner
may try to obtain as much knowledge as they can from the other partner in areas unrelated to or
outside of the scope of the focal partnership. This knowledge can then be utilized in other
27

In practice, non-solicitation provisions rarely prohibit only the buyer from hiring key personnel from the supplier.
Usually the clause is drafted to forbid either partner from engaging in such behavior. The inclusion of a nonsolicitation covenant, however, is often a more salient issue for the supplier than the buyer in an R&D alliance given
the buyer’s motives for forming the alliance.
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projects, or with other partners, without any compensation paid to the partner it was captured
from. Thus, as the degree of knowledge diversity increases, so does the incentive to behave
opportunistically.
Despite this incentive, it is difficult to obtain and utilize knowledge in areas new to the
firm if it lacks experience in related fields (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal,
1990). In addition, when the partners’ portfolios are dissimilar, they are not likely to share a
common language. Thus, misappropriating unfamiliar knowledge is likely to be difficult, even if
there is a desire to do so. In this case, for misappropriation to occur, key individuals need to
change firms. Again, learning-by-hiring provides a mechanism through which difficult-to-obtain
knowledge can move across firm boundaries. To prevent this from occurring, a non-solicitation
covenant can be included in the contract. Thus:
Hypothesis 4: The higher the dissimilarity between the knowledge bases of the
R&D alliance partners, the higher the probability of including a non-solicitation
provision in an R&D alliance contract.
4.4.3.3. The Moderating Influence of Previous Contracting Experience. Hypotheses
1-4 rely on the logic of TCE, which asserts that specific contractual solutions can be designed to
contend with particular contractual challenges (Williamson, 1985). This assertion assumes that
managers and lawyers know which issues to watch for in the first place, or that they at least learn
relatively quickly from their experience, allowing them to design contracts responsive to the
hazards they perceive. Research in both the inter-organizational learning and alliance capabilities
literature suggests, however, that learning occurs slowly and incrementally. For example, in a
study of eleven development contracts between the same two partners in the personal computer
industry, Mayer and Argyres (2004) found that managers and lawyers were unlikely to devise a
solution for a particular issue until they had experienced it for themselves. Similarly, in a study
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of a contractual partnership in the animated film industry, Lumineau, Fréchet, and Puthod (2011)
found that managers lacking previous contracting experience struggled to craft a contract that
contained sufficient detail to protect their interests. However, as they worked through successive
iterations of the contract over a period of seventeen months, they became more familiar with and
better able to foresee the key challenges.
Together, these findings suggest that participating in the contract design process might
sensitize managers and lawyers to the challenges that they were previously unaware of, helping
them to better recognize and contend with such challenges in future contracting situations. In
essence, as managers and lawyers learn about alliance management, particularly about contract
design, the experience that they accumulate should help them to better manage alliances over
time. In subsequent research, Argyres and Mayer (2007) introduce the concept of ‘contract
design capabilities’ to describe the skills and knowledge that managers and lawyers accumulate
over time about how to draft the appropriate contractual solutions to cope with contracting
hazards. Based on this notion, managers and lawyers are expected to learn how to design more
effective contracts that are responsive to the hazards they perceive as they gain more experience
with the negotiation stage of the alliance life cycle.
In relation to Hypotheses 1-4, managers and lawyers with little or no experience may not
be as familiar with the challenges that are likely to arise in an alliance as their counterparts that
have participated in many alliances. As a result, I expect that the R&D alliance contracts drafted
by managers and lawyers with more contract design experience are more likely to be in line with
the predictions of TCE than the contracts drafted by managers and lawyers with less contracting
experience. Stated differently, I expect that contracts drafted by experienced managers and
lawyers are more likely to include the appropriate provisions when the situation requires them
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than the contracts drafted by their less experienced counterparts facing the same contracting
hazards.
To this point of the study, the discussion of the impact of contract design capabilities has
not discriminated between alliances that involve R&D and those that involve other value chain
activities. Research indicates, however, that managing different types of alliances (i.e., R&D
alliances, marketing alliances, supply alliances) requires different capabilities (e.g., Draulans et
al., 2003). While it is likely that firms gain contract design capabilities from experience with all
types of alliances (Ryall and Sampson, 2009), the issues that are most salient in R&D alliances
are likely to be very different than those that are critical in alliances focused on other value chain
activities (Dyer et al., 2001). For example, the challenges that are of central concern in R&D
alliances (i.e., the efficient transfer of knowledge and the prevention of appropriation) are not
likely to be as pertinent in marketing and supply alliances. Thus, managers and lawyers may not
possess the knowledge and skills required to draft a contract for an R&D alliance if they have
only designed contracts for other types of alliances.
Based on these arguments, I expect that R&D alliance contracts designed by managers
and lawyers with previous experience drafting contracts for R&D alliances will better conform to
the predictions of TCE than those of their counterparts with less relevant experience. In sum, I
can state the hypotheses as follows:
Hypotheses 5a: The positive relationship between the tacitness of the supplier’s
knowledge and the probability of including a contractual provision that allows for
face-to-face communication between key personnel from each R&D alliance
partner will be strengthened as managers and lawyers gain contracting
experience (especially experience drafting R&D alliance contracts).
Hypotheses 5b: The positive relationship between the diversity of the partners’
knowledge portfolios and the probability of including a contractual provision that
allows for face-to-face communication between key personnel from each R&D
alliance partner will be strengthened as managers and lawyers gain contracting
experience (especially experience drafting R&D alliance contracts).
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Hypotheses 5c: The positive relationship between the tacitness of the supplier’s
knowledge and the probability of including a non-solicitation provision will be
strengthened as managers and lawyers gain contracting experience (especially
experience drafting R&D alliance contracts).
Hypotheses 5d: The positive relationship between the diversity of the partners’
knowledge portfolios and the probability of including a non-solicitation provision
will be strengthened as managers and lawyers gain contracting experience
(especially experience drafting R&D alliance contracts).
4.4.4. Measures
The data set described in Section 4.3.4 is employed here to develop the key dependent,
independent and control variables used to test the hypotheses under investigation in this study.
4.4.4.1. Dependent Variables. To test the hypothesized relationships, I developed two
dependent variables, facilities access and non-solicitation, which are described next.
From discussions with practitioners and legal scholars and a thorough literature review, I
identified an important contractual solution that creates a direct communication channel between
R&D partners: the express grant of access to each firm’s facilities to observe, discuss, and
conduct development work, jointly if necessary. A dummy variable, facilities access, was created
to capture whether this solution was implemented in each contract. The variable was set to one
when this term appears in the contract, zero otherwise. As argued above, exchanging technical
documents (i.e., codified knowledge) may be sufficient in many cases to facilitate knowledge
transfer, but actual face-to-face interaction may be required when the knowledge being shared by
the supplier is particularly tacit in nature or the partners’ knowledge portfolios are dissimilar.
In order to prevent knowledge leakage through learning-by-hiring, the legal scholars and
practitioners that I spoke to recommended the inclusion of a non-solicitation covenant in an
R&D alliance contract. Such a clause is designed to prohibit each firm from hiring the other
firm’s employees during the alliance and for a fixed, but reasonable, period of time after the
alliance ends. Whereas the validity and enforcement of non-competition and non-solicitation
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provisions in employment contracts varies significantly from state to state (Stuart and Sorenson,
2003; Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 2009), non-solicitation covenants in alliance contracts are
nearly universally found to be valid and enforceable.28 Using information directly from the final
sample of contracts, a single dummy variable is created to capture the use of non-solicitation
covenants. When such a covenant is included in an R&D contract, non-solicitation is set to one,
zero otherwise.
4.4.4.2. Independent Variables. To test Hypotheses 1, 3, 5a and 5c, a measure of
tacitness is required. The exact specifications of the product under development in an R&D
alliance are often kept confidential in the contract that is made publically available. However, the
suppliers in many alliances tend to specialize in a rather narrow area of technology. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that the supplier’s patent portfolio is representative of the knowledge that
the supplier is contributing to the alliance.
In order to assess the degree of tacitness of the knowledge shared by the supplier, I
modified the ‘recency’ measure developed by Nerkar (2003). The measure was operationalized
as follows: I first compiled each supplier’s U.S. patent portfolio by gathering all granted patents
that were applied for in the five years prior to the date on the alliance contract. I then obtained
the application year for all U.S. patents referenced in each patent in each firm’s portfolio. To
measure the age of the knowledge in each patent, I calculated the median difference between the
patent’s application date and that of the patents it references (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). I then
measured the age of the supplier’s overall patent portfolio as the median of the median
differences calculated in the previous step. I then examined the distribution of this variable
across all supplier portfolios and found that the largest median difference was 13.5 years. Based
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Personal communication with Matt Marx on June 10, 2011. Confirmed by James R. Muldoon, an attorney with
two decades of alliance contracting experience, on July 21, 2011.
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on this examination, I transformed the median age to reflect the ‘recency’ of the supplier’s
knowledge by subtracting 13.5 from the median age. The knowledge underpinning newer, ‘stateof-the-art’ technology is often tacit in nature (Winter, 1987), thus I suggest that this measure is
an acceptable proxy for the degree of tacitness of the supplier’s contributed knowledge.
Essentially, the transformation assigns a higher value to newer (i.e., more tacit) knowledge and a
lower value to older (i.e., less tacit) knowledge.
A measure of knowledge diversity is necessary to test Hypotheses 2, 4, 5b and 5d. The
diversity of the partners’ knowledge portfolios is captured by examining the extent to which the
partners involved in each contract patent in the same technology classes. The original measure
was developed by Jaffe (1986) and has been used recently by Sampson (2004b), Oxley and
Sampson (2004), and Sampson (2007). The measure effectively captures the position of one
partner firm’s knowledge portfolio relative to that of the other partner. The fact that patents are
categorized according to underlying technology and not the end products per se is a distinct
advantage in this study. Similar products can have very different underlying technologies and,
thus, can reflect very different knowledge bases. For example, a firm producing traditional X-ray
scanners does not necessarily have the technological knowledge to produce more advanced
ultrasound scanners or MRI scanners, despite the fact that all of these products would be
considered medical imaging devices. Thus, one can capture knowledge similarities between
firms in different industries as well knowledge differences between firms in the same industry by
using patent technology classes.
To construct this variable, each firm’s knowledge portfolio is generated by measuring the
distribution across patent classifications of the patents applied for in the five years prior to the
formation of the alliance. This distribution is captured by a multidimensional vector, Fi = (Fi1 …
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Fis), where Fis represents the number of patents assigned to partner firm i in patent class s.
Diversity of partner firm knowledge is then:

√(

)(

)

where i ≠ j. Knowledge diversity varies from zero to one, with a value of one indicating the
greatest possible diversity between the partners’ portfolios.
This measure is not sensitive to the number of patents in a class and captures differences
between the partners based on diversity rather than the volume of patents in the same class.29 As
measured here, knowledge diversity is akin to measuring the angle between the individual
vectors that represent the patent portfolios of allying firms. While this measure does not control
for the fact that some technology classes are more similar to each other than others, the use of
top-level patent classes instead of subclasses (which is similar to using a two-digit SIC code
instead of a four-digit SIC code) reduces this problem to the extent possible.
Three measure of previous contracting experience were developed to investigate
Hypotheses 5a-5d. The first measure captures total previous contracting experience. While it
would be ideal to have individual-level information regarding the experience of the exact
managers and lawyers involved in drafting each contract in order to measure previous
contracting experience, such information is not readily available. Thus, overall firm-level
experience, as measured by the number of previous alliances entered into by each partner in the
five years prior to the contract date, is used as a reasonable proxy. Research suggests that five
years is considered to be the average period in which the experience gained from a previous
29

Sampson (2007) notes that while firms may suggest patent classifications on patent applications, the examiners at
the USPTO make the final decision regarding class assignments. She goes on to state that most firms use
experienced patent attorneys to file their patents. These attorneys typically suggest the appropriate classification for
a given application. The attorneys and examiners also normally correspond during the patent examination process,
thus minimizing the risk of misclassification, virtually ensuring that there is no systematic misclassification.
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alliance contributes to a firm’s alliance capabilities (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). The total
number of R&D, marketing, and supply alliances entered into by each firm was gathered from
Windhover’s Strategic Transactions database.
The distribution of prior alliances among the firms in the sample is skewed. Most firms
have no prior alliances (22.0% of sample firms in the five years prior to the year that the contract
was signed). The next largest group has only one prior alliance (20.5%), while only 48.5% of the
sample firms have more than two prior alliances. Approximately 21% of the firms have more
than ten prior alliances. Ryall and Sampson (2009) suggest that the difference in experience
between one and two prior alliances is likely greater than the difference between seven and eight
prior alliances. However, Mayer and Argyres (2004) find evidence that learning to contract is a
slow, incremental process. Thus, to fully explore the moderating effect of total previous
contracting experience, I measure it as a continuous variable in this study. I collected separate
counts for each partner involved in each alliance to investigate whether there is a difference
between the experience accumulated by buyers (presumably larger firms) and the experience
accumulated by suppliers (presumably smaller, entrepreneurial firms).
The second measure developed captures each partner’s previous R&D contracting
experience. Again, it would be ideal to have individual-level information regarding the
experience of the managers and lawyers involved in drafting the contracts examined in this
study. However, as noted above, this information is simply not available. Thus, a procedure
similar to the one employed to measure total previous contracting experience was used to
develop the measure for previous R&D contracting experience. Separate counts of the number of
previous R&D alliances were collected from the Strategic Transactions database for each partner
in the five years prior to the alliance. The distribution of R&D alliances among the firms in the
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sample is likewise skewed. Most firms have not participated in an R&D alliance (36.4% of
sample firms in the five years prior to the year that the contract was signed). The next largest
group has only one prior R&D alliance (22.0%), while only 30.3% of the sample firms have
more than two prior R&D alliances. Approximately 17% of the firms participated in more than
five prior R&D alliances.
To further investigate whether there is a difference between the experience gained
drafting R&D contracts and the experience gained drafting contracts for all alliances types, I
developed a third measure, which captures each firm’s R&D contracting experience intensity. I
did so by dividing each firm’s number of previous R&D alliances by its total number of previous
alliances. Thus, this measure ranges from zero to one, where a value closer to one indicates that
more of the firm’s contracting experience has been dedicated to drafting R&D contracts. The
intuition behind this measure is that firms with a higher percentage of alliance experience
concentrated on R&D alliances are more likely to learn about the challenges and hazards that
plague such alliances and how to draft the appropriate contract in subsequent R&D alliances
compared to firms that have focused more on alliances involving other value chain activities.
4.4.4.3. Controls. I included a several control variables in the econometric analyses to
eliminate the possibility that alternative factors may drive the hypothesized relationships. Using
information directly from the contract associated with each deal, a dummy variable is used to
capture whether the buyer has committed to contribute any capital to the supplier over the course
of the alliance. Alliance payment is set to one when the contract indicates that the buyer will
make any type of payment (i.e., upfront, milestone, R&D) to the supplier, zero otherwise. The
capital contributed by the buyer is essentially a hostage in that it is out of the buyer’s control
once it is paid to the supplier (i.e., the supplier might use the contributed capital for conducting
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activities related to the alliance, however, it may redirect the funds to internal projects or other
alliances). The literature suggests that the buyer is likely to desire a more detailed contract in
exchange for this hostage (Robinson and Stuart, 2007).
Again, using information directly from the contract associated with each deal, a dummy
variable is used to capture if the buyer takes an equity stake in the supplier as part of the alliance.
Equity is set to one if the buyer takes any type of equity holding (common or preferred stock),
zero otherwise. This variable controls for the possibility that ownership provides an alternative to
the contractual solutions that can be implemented to contend with the knowledge transfer and
appropriation concerns encountered in R&D alliances. Ryall and Sampson (2009) provide some
support for this notion, finding that contracts are likely to be less detailed (i.e., contain fewer
provisions) when the buyer takes an equity stake in the supplier as part of the alliance. This
finding is not consistently significant across specifications in their study, however.
A measure was also included to control for cases where the same partners were involved
in a previous alliance. It may simply be the case that firms that have worked together in the past
utilize the same contract template for their subsequent alliances. There is also evidence that firms
that have engaged in multiple alliances learn how to contract with each other, leading them to
draft more detailed contracts for their subsequent alliances (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004).
Other research suggests that detailed contracts inhibit trust (e.g., Ring and Van de Ven, 1992;
Gulati, 1995a), leading firms that have established trust by partnering in the past to prefer less
detailed contracts when they engage in subsequent alliances. Therefore, to control for this factor,
I include a dummy variable, same partner, which is set equal to one if there are any earlier
alliances recorded in the Strategic Transactions database that bring together the same partners in
the five years prior to the current alliance, zero otherwise.
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Finally, I control for the fact that some firms have more than one contract in the sample.
These contracts may not be independent of each other. Firms may use a similar contract structure
in all of their alliances (regardless of whether it is with a previous or new partner), reflecting an
organizational norm rather than the actual need to include specific provisions in the contract. I
control for the possible lack of independence by clustering observations by firm for the purposes
of calculating standard errors (Huber, 1967). In the limited number of instances where a contract
can be assigned to more than one firm (i.e., because both partners have multiple contracts in the
sample), the contract is assigned to the firm with the greater number of contracts in the sample
for the purposes of correcting the standard errors. As most of the firms in the sample are only
involved in one contract, fixed effects are not used.
4.4.5. Methods
Probit analysis is the appropriate technique to use to test the hypotheses given the
dichotomous nature of the dependent variables in this study. Under the probit model, the
probability of including a facilities access provision in an R&D alliance contract and the
probability of including a non-solicitation provision in an R&D alliance contract are modeled in
two separate equations as functions of alliance-, supplier-, and partner-specific variables. These
variables are proxies for the level of contractual hazards (i.e., the ease of knowledge transfer and
the threat of appropriation). Taking this example further, assume that the contractual hazards in
alliance  are determined by the following specification:
Y =  + 
where Y is the unobservable measure of the contractual hazards associated with alliance ; X is
a vector of the independent and control variables described in the previous section;  is a vector
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of elasticities for these variables; and  is a normally distributed, random error term. While Y is
not observed, we do observe the following:
Inclusion of Provision = 0, if Y ≤ 
Inclusion of Provision = 1, Y> 
where  is an unknown threshold parameter. The probability of observing whether or not the
provision is included is as follows:
Pr[Inclusion = 0|] = Pr[ ≤ ’’
Pr[Inclusion = 1|] = Pr[ > ’’
where  is the cumulative standard normal (CSD) distribution. Assuming  is normally
distributed, the above equation is appropriately estimated via probit.30 The mean and the variance
of  are normalized to zero and one, respectively, in the probit model using a CSD distribution.
Specifically, using the binary probit approach, I estimate the following general equations
for the probability of the inclusion of each provision of interest:
(1) Facilities access= + *Alliance payment +*Equity*Same partner
+*Tacitness +*Knowledge diversity +*Previous experience +*
Tacitness*Previous experience +*Knowledge diversity*Previous
experience + 
(2) Non-solicitation= + *Alliance payment +*Equity*Same partner
+*Tacitness +*Knowledge diversity +*Previous experience +*
Tacitness*Previous experience +*Knowledge diversity*Previous
experience + 
If standard OLS techniques could be employed, I would expect 4 (the coefficient of the
variable that measures the degree of tacitness) to be positive and significant in equations (1) and
(2) when facilities access and non-solicitation equal one according to Hypotheses 1 and 3,
respectively. That is, an R&D alliance contract is more likely to include these provisions when
The model can also be estimated with a logistically distributed . As the cumulative normal and logistic
distributions are very similar, except at the tails, the use of probit and logit are unlikely to yield substantially
different results. Substantial differences are likely observed only where the sample size is quite large, such that the
number of observations in the tails of the distributions increases, highlighting the differing widths of the
distributions at the tails (Maddala, 1983: 23).
30
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the degree of tacitness of the knowledge contributed by the supplier is high. Similarly, if
standard OLS was applicable, I would expect 5 (the coefficient of the variable that measures
knowledge diversity) to be positive and significant in equations (1) and (2) when facilities access
and non-solicitation equal one according to Hypotheses 2 and 4, respectively. That is, an R&D
alliance contract is more likely to include these provisions when there is little or no overlap in
the partners’ knowledge portfolios. The magnitude of the estimated conditional ‘main’ effects of
these factors, however, is not simply the value of the coefficient associated with the respective
variables. Rather, in a non-linear model, such binary probit, the magnitude of the effects varies
depending on the variable of interest’s starting value, the magnitude of the change in that
variable, and the values of the other variables in the model (Long and Freese, 2006: 171).
The four interaction terms in equations (1) and (2) correspond to Hypotheses 5a-d,
respectively. These interactions allow me to examine whether managers and lawyers learn from
their previous contracting experience, enabling them to design contracts that more accurately
reflect the hazards present in a given transaction. It is important to note that I have developed
three different measures of previous contracting experience. Thus, I estimate separate models
that examine the moderating impact of each partner’s (1) total previous contracting experience,
(2) previous R&D contracting experience, and (3) R&D contracting experience intensity.
If OLS techniques were applicable, the sign of the coefficient and the robust standard
error associated with each interaction would provide direct evidence about the impact and
statistical significance of the moderator. Unfortunately, I cannot follow this straightforward
approach because the coefficients and standard errors of interaction terms in non-linear models,
such as the binary probit models employed in this study, cannot be interpreted in the same way
as they are in linear models. As noted by Huang and Shields (2000) and Ai and Norton (2003),
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the sign of the interaction term coefficient need not correspond to the direction of the
hypothesized conditional effect that motivated the inclusion of the interaction term in the first
place. In addition, the standard error of the coefficient associated with the interaction term does
not convey direct information about the statistical significance of the interaction effect.
To overcome the difficulty of interpreting the results from a probit analysis with multiple
interaction terms, I followed the simulation-based approach developed by King, Tomz, and
Wittenberg (2000), which was recently introduced in the strategic management literature by
Zelner (2009). This simulation technique makes it possible to graphically evaluate the change in
the predicted probabilities associated with an empirically relevant change in the value of the
independent variable of interest with all other variables held constant at relevant values. In
addition, this technique makes it possible to present the effects of the interaction terms in
equations (1) and (2) graphically, allowing for the examination of both the direction and
magnitude of these effects. The approach also allows for an examination of the statistical
significance of the interaction terms by specifying an additional test option in Stata.
4.4.6. Results
Table 4-8 provides summary and correlation statistics for the dependent, independent and
control variables used in the analyses. Preliminary analysis of this table provides some insight
about the determinants of the inclusion of facilities access and non-solicitation provisions. The
summary statistics indicate that there is moderate heterogeneity in the independent and control
variables. The correlation statistics also indicate facilities access and non-solicitation (i.e., the
dependent variables) are positively and statistically significantly correlated with the primary
independent variables (tacitness and knowledge diversity) in three out of four cases. These results
tentatively suggest that the inclusion of the provisions of interest is driven by these factors.
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There are a moderate number of statistically significant correlations between and among
the control and independent variables in Table 4-8, suggesting that there may be multicollinearity
problems, especially when the interaction terms are formed. High levels of multicollinearity can
lead to problems estimating regression coefficients (Marquardt, 1980). Centering variables often
helps to minimize such problems (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman, 1996). Thus, I
mean-centered tacitness, knowledge diversity, and all of the measures of previous contracting
experience as a precaution before creating the interaction terms, as suggested by Aiken and West
(1991). I then calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs). All individual VIFs and the average
VIF for each model are below the recommended threshold of 2.5, which suggests that there is
little multicollinearity (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980; Kleinbaum, Kupper, and Muller, 1988).
Table 4-9: Summary of results for study 1
Hypotheses (Predicted sign)
Conditional ‘main’ hypotheses
Facilities access provision
H1: Tacitness (+)
H2: Partners’ knowledge diversity (+)
Non-solicitation provision
H3: Tacitness (+)
H4: Partners’ knowledge diversity (+)
Interactions
Facilities access provision
H5a: Tacitness x Previous experience (+)
H5b: Partners’ knowledge diversity x
Previous experience (+)
Non-solicitation provision
H5c: Tacitness x Previous experience (+)
H5d: Partners’ knowledge diversity x
Previous experience (+)
Significant control variables
Alliance payment
Note: Statistically significant results in bold

Sign of result

H1: + (p<0.10 or better; Models 3, 5, & 7)
H2: not supported
H3: + (p<0.10 or better; Models 16, 18, & 22)
H4: + (p<0.05 or better; Models 16, 18, & 22)

H5a: + (p<0.05; Model 7)
H5b: not supported

H5c: not supported
H5d: not supported

+ (p<0.10 or better; Models 3, 5, 7, 9, 16 & 18)

Table 4-9 is presented here to provide the reader with a brief summary of the results for
this study. A more complete discussion of the results follows. Table 4-9 shows that several of the
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conditional ‘main’ hypotheses are supported, specifically Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4. Very little
support, however, is shown for the hypotheses that propose interactions; only Hypothesis 5a is
supported. The table also shows that some support was found for the influence of the control
variable alliance payment on the inclusion of the provisions of interest. Further discussion of
these findings is warranted given that several measures were used as proxies for previous
contracting experience. The interpretation of the results depends on the measure employed.
Table 4-10 presents the binary probit estimations for when the dependent variable is the
probability of including a facilities access provision in an R&D alliance contract, while Table 411 presents the estimations for when the dependent variable is the probability of including a nonsolicitation provision. Model 1 in Table 4-10 and Model 14 in Table 4-11 include only the
alliance-specific control variables (i.e., alliance payment, equity, and same partner). Models 2, 4,
6, 8, 10, and 12 in Table 4-10 and Models 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, and 25 in Table 4-11 add the
primary independent variables of interest (i.e., tacitness and knowledge diversity) and the various
measures of previous contracting experience. Models 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13 in Table 4-10 and
Models 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, and 26 in Table 4-11 add the interactions between the primary
independent variables and the various measures of previous contracting experience.
Of the fully-specified models (i.e., those with interaction terms), the Wald-2 statistic is
significant at the p<0.05 level or better only for Models 3, 5, 7, and 9 in Table 4-10, and Models
16, 18, and 22 in Table 4-11. Thus, I focus on these models in order to examine the hypotheses
developed in this study. I also conducted tests to determine if these models are statistically
significant improvements over their respective restricted models (i.e. Model 1 and Model 14).
The standard likelihood-ratio test cannot be employed in this case because the standard errors are
generated by clustering observations. To overcome this problem, I used the Wald test, which

Table 4-10. Results of bionomial probit regression analyses for facilities access provision a
Independent variables
Model 1
Model 2
Constant
-0.877*
(0.391)
-0.928*
(0.432)
Tacitness
0.152†
(0.084)
Knowledge diversity
-0.186
(0.582)
Buyer's total previous contracting experience (BTPCE)
-0.011
(0.019)
Buyer's previous R&D contracting experience (BRDCE)
Buyer's R&D contracting experience intensity (BRDCEI)
Tacitness x BTPCE
Knowledge diversity x BTPCE
Tacitness x BRDCE
Knowledge diversity x BRDCE
Tacitness x BRDCEI
Knowledge diversity x BRDCEI
Alliance payment
0.742†
(0.403)
0.783†
(0.431)
Equity
-0.213
(0.415)
-0.266
(0.454)
Same partner
-0.304
(0.569)
-0.104
(0.675)
Log pseudolikelihood
-39.542
-37.410
Wald 2
3.88
7.30
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
3.70
Wald Test (vs. previous model)

Model 3
-1.208*
(0.484)
0.224**
(0.074)
-0.293
(0.697)
-0.029
(0.025)

Model 4
-0.892*
(0.405)
0.127
(0.083)
-0.209
(0.621)
0.015

0.009
-0.186**

(0.040)

Model
-1.040**
0.143†
-0.319

5
(0.406)
(0.075)
(0.723)

-0.005

(0.047)

Model
-0.939*
0.127
-0.256

6
(0.401)
(0.089)
(0.635)

0.767

(0.521)

Model
-1.055*
0.201*
-0.181

0.892†

7
(0.414)
(0.080)
(0.733)

(0.521)

(0.010)
(0.069)
0.000
-0.310*

1.044*
(0.477)
-0.409
(0.444)
-0.180
(0.654)
-34.119
39.51***
27.36***
7.85*

(0.022)
(0.140)

0.734†
(0.441)
-0.219
(0.461)
-0.305
(0.605)
-37.456
6.92
3.07

0.914*
(0.451)
-0.304
0.465
-0.409
(0.622)
-35.630
29.15***
15.89**
4.97†

0.671†
(0.398)
-0.053
(0.477)
-0.170
(0.533)
-36.697
7.35
3.59

Model 11
-1.164*
(0.473)
0.161
(0.104)
0.322
(0.772)

Model 12
-0.916*
(0.397)
0.139
(0.085)
-0.129
(0.650)

Model 13
-0.902*
(0.397)
0.136
(0.487)
-0.097
(0.683)

0.543†
(0.287)
-1.392
(1.787)
0.765†
(0.442)
-0.136
(0.541)
0.040
(0.470)
-34.552
15.67*
11.63*
3.62

a

N = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Table 4-9 cont. Results of bionomial probit regression analyses for facilities access provision a
Independent variables
Model 8
Model 9
Constant
-0.978*
(0.401)
-0.994*
(0.399)
Tacitness
0.134
(0.087)
0.160
(0.101)
Knowledge diversity
-0.090
(0.620)
0.036
(0.685)
Supplier's total previous contracting experience (STPCE)
0.113**
(0.019)
0.137†
(0.025)
Supplier's previous R&D contracting experience (SRDCE)
Supplier's R&D contracting experience intensity (SRDCEI)
Tacitness x STPCE
0.025
(0.045)
Knowledge diversity x STPCE
0.134
(0.288)
Tacitness x SRDCE
Knowledge diversity x SRDCE
Tacitness x SRDCEI
Knowledge diversity x SRDCEI
Alliance payment
0.953*
(0.448)
1.020*
(0.488)
Equity
-0.255
(0.468)
-0.284
(0.481)
Same partner
-0.883
(0.656)
-0.825
(0.635)
Log pseudolikelihood
-35.973
-35.747
Wald 2
10.61
15.51*
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
9.21*
12.16*
Wald Test (vs. previous model)
0.48

Model 10
-1.127*
(0.477)
0.122
(0.085)
0.035
(0.678)
0.286**

(0.107)

0.347*

(0.143)
0.232

0.075
0.555

1.196*
(0.566)
-0.326
(0.460)
-1.022
(0.631)
-35.058
9.43
9.20*

(0.432)

0.215

(0.448)

(0.088)
(0.531)

1.310*
(0.604)
-0.369
(0.462)
-0.781
(0.589)
-34.379
10.62
10.50†
1.33

0.801†
(0.443)
-0.295
(0.479)
-0.273
(0.521)
-37.390
6.49
3.29

0.095
(0.196)
1.253
(1.421)
0.857†
(0.440)
-0.359
(0.487)
-0.288
(0.516)
-36.847
6.73
3.72
1.28

a

N = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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Table 4-11. Results of bionomial probit regression analyses for non-solicitation provision a
Independent variables
Model 14
Model 15
Constant
-1.044**
(0.349) -1.561***
(0.443)
Tacitness
0.296**
(0.103)
Knowledge diversity
2.313**
(0.878)
Buyer's total previous contracting experience (BTPCE)
-0.083***
(0.443)
Buyer's previous R&D contracting experience (BRDCE)
Buyer's R&D contracting experience intensity (BRDCEI)
Tacitness x BTPCE
Knowledge diversity x BTPCE
Tacitness x BRDCE
Knowledge diversity x BRDCE
Tacitness x BRDCEI
Knowledge diversity x BRDCEI
Alliance payment
0.677
(0.465)
1.227*
(0.542)
Equity
-0.199
(0.431)
-0.937†
(0.562)
Same partner
-0.585
(0.594)
0.773
(0.855)
Log pseudolikelihood
-34.971
-25.874
Wald 2
3.72
22.28**
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
17.16***
Wald Test (vs. previous model)

Model 16
-1.440**
(0.456)
0.227*
(0.104)
2.141*
(0.930)
-0.056*
(0.028)

Model 17
-1.268**
(0.415)
0.231*
(0.098)
1.963*
(0.794)
-0.111*

(0.046)

Model 18
Model 19
Model 20
-1.225**
(0.443) -1.106***
(0.342) -1.298***
(0.357)
0.176†
(0.107)
0.173
(0.111)
0.228*
(0.107)
1.716*
(0.861)
1.786*
(0.770)
2.090*
(0.842)
-0.076†

(0.044)
0.525

-0.018
-0.066

(0.689)

0.736

(0.746)

(0.013)
(0.096)
-0.044†
-0.265

1.285*
(0.585)
-0.861
(0.590)
0.173
(0.701)
-24.906
29.81***
19.79**
3.67

(0.025)
(0.200)

1.061*
(0.507)
-0.995*
(0.496)
0.322
(0.753)
-28.420
17.51**
13.85**

1.150*
(0.558)
-0.967†
(0.566)
-0.383
(0.606)
-26.419
27.17***
22.57***
7.33*

0.725
(0.548)
-0.612
(0.519)
-0.096
(0.670)
-30.350
8.79
5.82

Model 24
-1.042**
(0.372)
0.191*
(0.095)
1.976*
(0.810)

Model 25
-1.051**
(0.367)
0.174†
(0.103)
1.690*
(0.781)

Model 26
-1.015**
(0.370)
0.167†
(0.093)
1.776*
(0.839)

0.429
(0.315)
-2.871
(2.550)
0.841
(0.591)
-0.684
(0.518)
0.215
(0.697)
-28.888
9.45
8.67
3.54

a

N = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Table 4-10 cont. Results of bionomial probit regression analyses for non-solicitation provision a
Independent variables
Model 21
Model 22
Constant
-1.057**
(0.367) -1.051**
(0.366)
Tacitness
0.174†
(0.103)
0.228*
(0.097)
Knowledge diversity
1.735*
(0.770)
2.077**
(0.744)
Supplier's total previous contracting experience (STPCE)
-0.010
(0.057)
0.022
(0.089)
Supplier's previous R&D contracting experience (SRDCE)
Supplier's R&D contracting experience intensity (SRDCEI)
Tacitness x STPCE
0.045
(0.052)
Knowledge diversity x STPCE
0.285
(0.277)
Tacitness x SRDCE
Knowledge diversity x SRDCE
Tacitness x SRDCEI
Knowledge diversity x SRDCEI
Alliance payment
0.743
(0.538)
0.814
(0.552)
Equity
-0.719
(0.484)
-0.785
(0.481)
Same partner
-0.091
(0.778)
0.110
(0.746)
Log pseudolikelihood
-30.687
-30.114
Wald 2
8.48
15.83*
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
6.11
12.79*
Wald Test (vs. previous model)
1.59

Model 23
-1.068**
(0.361)
0.173†
(0.103)
1.767*
(0.786)
0.015

(0.129)

0.049

(0.139)
-0.220

0.032
0.389

0.778
(0.554)
-0.727
(0.492)
-0.178
(0.785)
-30.692
8.07
5.89

(0.431)

-0.269

(0.429)

(0.083)
(0.456)

0.790
(0.561)
-0.752
(0.484)
-0.055
(0.749)
-30.467
10.63
8.37
0.77

0.713
(0.532)
-0.687
(0.497)
-0.082
(0.654)
-30.577
9.32
7.10†

-0.015
(0.164)
0.868
(1.587)
0.678
(0.534)
-0.690
(0.490)
-0.070
(0.649)
-30.452
10.32
8.11
0.34

a

N = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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indicates that these models are statistically significant improvements over Model 1 and Model
14, respectively, at the p<0.05 level or better in all seven cases.
As noted in Table 4-9, the control variable alliance payment appears to drive the
inclusion of facilities access and non-solicitation provisions in an R&D alliance contract to some
extent. The sign of the coefficient is consistently positive and significant at the p<0.10 level or
better across Models 3, 5, 7, and 9 in Table 4-10. It is also positive and significant at the p<0.05
level in Models 16 and 18 in Table 4-11. This result is not surprising given that the funding
committed by the buyer is essentially a hostage. As noted above, the buyer is likely to desire a
more detailed contract in exchange for this hostage (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). In other words,
the buyer may demand a contract that contains more provisions in order to protect its investment,
even if those provisions are unnecessary. Tables 4-10 and 4-11 indicate that none of the other
control variables have consistently statistically significant effects on the inclusion of facilities
access and non-solicitation provisions in an R&D alliance contract.
Turning first to the baseline hypotheses, Hypothesis 1 suggests that when the supplier’s
knowledge is more tacit, a facilities access provision is likely to be included in an R&D alliance
contract to enhance knowledge transfer. It would appear that some support is found for this
hypothesis, as the coefficient for tacitness is statistically significant in the predicted direction at
the p<0.10 level or better across Models 3, 5, and 7 in Table 4-10. Hypothesis 2 proposes that
when there is little or no overlap in the partners’ knowledge portfolios, a facilities access
provision is likely to be included in an R&D alliance contract to prevent misappropriation. No
support is found for this hypothesis, as the coefficient for knowledge diversity is not statistically
significant in any of the models estimated in Table 4-10. Hypothesis 3 suggests that when the
supplier’s knowledge is tacit, a non-solicitation provision is likely to be included in an R&D
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alliance contract to facilitate knowledge transfer. Some support is found for this hypothesis, as
the coefficient for tacitness is statistically significant in the predicted direction at the p<0.10
level or better in Models 16, 18, and 22 in Table 4-11. Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicts that when
the partners’ knowledge portfolios are dissimilar, an R&D alliance contract is likely to include a
non-solicitation provision to prevent misappropriation. Some support is found for this
hypothesis, as the coefficient for knowledge diversity is statistically significant in the predicted
direction at the p<0.05 level or better in Models 16, 18, and 22 in Table 4-11.
As noted above, coefficients in non-linear models are not directly indicative of the
magnitude of the effect size. The interaction terms in the fully-specified models in Tables 4-10
and 4-11 further complicate matters. In such cases, the conditional ‘main’ effect of a variable
depends on the coefficient of the variable it is interacted with in addition to its own coefficient,
the change in its value, and the values selected for all of the other variables in the model. The
Stata procedure introduced by Zelner (2009), which utilizes the simulation approach developed
by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000), allows for a graphical interpretation in order to assess
the magnitude and statistical significance of such conditional ‘main’ effects. Specifically, the
procedure produces a plot which shows whether the change in the predicted probabilities
associated with a change in a variable is statistically significant in the expected direction at
different values of the variable it is interacted with. An additional option can be included to
examine whether the interaction effect is statistically significant over a meaningful range of the
moderating variable as well. Thus, this technique is used to further investigate Hypotheses 1-4
and to examine if there is any support for the moderation effects proposed in Hypotheses 5a-d.
Figures 4-4, 4-5 and 4-6, which correspond to Models 3, 5, and 7 in Table 4-10,
graphically examine the proposed relationship between an increase in the tacitness of the
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supplier’s knowledge and the likelihood of including a facilities access provision in an R&D
alliance contract (i.e., Hypothesis 1). To create these graphs, tacitness was changed from two
standard deviations below to two standard deviations above its mean to investigate the impact of
a substantial difference on the probability of including a facilities access provision. For the other
variables in the model, binary variables were set to their mode, while continuous variables were
set to their mean. The value of the variable that tacitness was interacted with in each model (i.e.,
the three measures of buyer’s contracting experience) was allowed to vary over its entire range.
Panel A in each figure shows the plot that was generated using Zelner’s (2009) Stata
procedure, while Panel B shows the plot that was created in Excel. The differences in the plots
are a function of how they were developed. Zelner’s (2009) procedure runs 1000 simulations in
order to generate the values of the coefficients used to create the index function that the predicted
probabilities are calculated from. Thus, these values should be close to their true values, based on
the principles of statistical sampling. In contrast, to create the graph in Panel B, I simply used the
original values for the coefficients generated in Stata in order to calculate the index function in
Excel, which is in turn converted into a predicted probability.
The resulting Excel plots in Panel B are smoother in appearance than the graphs
generated by the simulation in Panel A, but the general trends are similar in both panels. I
include both plots for illustrative purposes, but the statistical significance can only be evaluated
from the plots generated using the simulation technique. The values along the x-axis are meancentered in Panel A, so Panel B is included with the original values for interpretation purposes.
In Panel A of Figures 4-4 and 4-6, the heavy dots indicate a statistically significant
change, at the p<0.05 level or better, in the predicted probability of including a facilities access
provision when the degree of tacitness increases from two standard deviations below the mean to
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Figure 4-4. Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a facilities access
provision at various values of the buyer’s total previous contracting experience
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Figure 4-5. Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a facilities access
provision at various values of the buyer’s previous R&D contracting experience
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Figure 4-6. Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a facilities access
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two standard deviations above the mean, holding all other variables constant at meaningful
values. However, this relationship is not statistically significant across the entire range of the
experience variables that tacitness is interacted with. In Panel A of Figure 4-4, the change in the
predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when buyer’s total previous
contracting experience ranges from zero to five or is twenty-seven and above.31 In Panel A of
Figure 4-6, the change in the predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when
buyer’s R&D contracting experience intensity is between 0% and 30%. Thus, the graphs show
that statistical significance is conditional on the values selected for the other variables in the
model, providing only partial support for Hypothesis 1.
Both figures do appear to show that the change in the predicted probability associated
with an increase in the value of tacitness increases as the values of the previous contracting
experience variables also increase. In other words, the figures indicate that there might be a
positive interaction between tacitness and previous contracting experience, as proposed in
Hypothesis 5a. An additional option can be specified in the Stata procedure to determine if an
interaction effect is statistically significant. I tested to see if the interaction effect was significant
between values of zero and ten for buyer’s total previous contracting experience in Panel A of
Figure 4-4, and between values of 0% and 50% in Panel A of Figure 4-6. While the change in
probability did increase in both figures (23% in Panel A of Figure 4-4, 73% in Panel A of Figure
4-6), the increase was only statistically significant for Panel A of Figure 4-6 at the p<0.05 level
or better. Panel A of Figure 4-6 corresponds to Model 7 in Table 4-10, in which tacitness is
31

While the magnitude of the change in the predicted probability remains above 0.7 in Panel A of Figure 4-4 for
values of buyer’s total previous contracting experience greater than twenty-seven, there is an inflection point in the
curve at about this value where the change in the predicted probability starts to slightly decline over the rest of the
range. The same inflection point is not exhibited in Panel B of Figure 4-4, as the change in the predicted probability
continues to increase over the rest of the range, illustrating the difference between the plots generated by the
simulation and those created in Excel. Thus, while the simulation suggests that the change in predicted probability is
not statistically significant at values over twenty-seven, the Excel plot provides some evidence to the contrary.
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interacted with buyer’s R&D contracting experience intensity. While this finding provides some
support for Hypothesis 5a, further discussion is required to explain why the proposed interaction
effect is only significant in Model 7. I offer an explanation in the following section of this study.
Figures 4-7, 4-8, and 4-9, which correspond to Models 16, 18, and 22 in Table 4-11,
graphically examine the proposed relationship between an increase in the tacitness of the
supplier’s knowledge and the likelihood of including a non-solicitation provision in an R&D
alliance contract (i.e., Hypothesis 3). The same procedure that was applied above was used to
generate these graphs. In Panel A of Figures 4-7, 4-8, and 4-9, the heavy dots indicate a
statistically significant change, at the p<0.05 level or better, in the predicted probability of
including a non-solicitation provision when the degree of tacitness increases from two standard
deviations below the mean to two standard deviations above the mean, holding all other variables
constant at meaningful values.
The resulting graphs again show that this relationship is not statistically significant across
the entire range of the experience variables that tacitness is interacted with. In Panel A of Figure
4-7, the change in the predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when buyer’s
total previous contracting experience is greater than eleven. In Panel A of Figure 4-8, the change
in the predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when buyer’s previous R&D
contracting experience is greater than three. Finally, in Panel A of Figure 4-9, the change in the
predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when supplier’s total previous
contracting experience is less than three or greater than five.32 Thus, the graphs again show that
32

Similar to the issue encountered in Panel A of Figure 4-4, there is an inflection point in the curve in Panel A of
Figure 4-9 for values of supplier’s total previous contracting experience greater than approximately six where the
change in the predicted probability starts to slightly decline over the rest of the range. This same inflection point is
not exhibited in Panel B of Figure 4-9, as the change in the predicted probability continues to increase over the rest
of the range, illustrating the difference between the plots generated by the simulation and those created in Excel.
Thus, while the simulation suggests that the change in predicted probability is not statistically significant for values
greater than six, the Excel plot provides some evidence to the contrary.

176

-.5

0

.5

1

Panel A

-10

0
10
20
Buyer's Total Previous Contracting Experience

30

Panel B

Change in Probability of Including
Non-solicitation Provision

1.0
0.8

0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Buyer's Total Previous Contracting Experience

Figure 4-7. Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a non-solicitation
provision at various values of the buyer’s total previous contracting experience
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Figure 4-8. Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a non-solicitation
provision at various values of the buyer’s previous R&D contracting experience
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statistical significance is conditional on the values selected for the other variables in the model,
providing only partial support for Hypothesis 3.
Figures 4-7 and 4-8 show that that the change in the predicted probability associated with
an increase in the value of tacitness actually decreases as the values of the previous contracting
experience variables also increase. In other words, these figures indicate that there might be a
negative interaction between tacitness and the two measures of the buyer’s previous contracting
experience, contrary to what was proposed in Hypothesis 5c. However, Figure 4-9 appears to
indicate that there is a positive interaction between tacitness and supplier’s total previous
contracting experience, as predicted in Hypothesis 5c.
I used the additional option in the Stata procedure to determine if the interaction effect
exhibited in any of these plots is statistically significant. I tested to see if the interaction effect
was significant between zero and ten for buyer’s total previous contracting experience in Panel
A of Figure 4-7, between zero and five for buyer’s previous R&D contracting experience in
Panel A of Figure 4-8, and between zero and ten for supplier’s total previous contracting
experience in Panel A of Figure 4-9. Neither the decrease in the change in the probability in
Figures 4-7 and 4-8 nor the increase in the change in the probability in Figure 4-9 were
statistically significant at the p<0.05 level or better over the specified ranges. Thus, it would
appear from these findings that there is no statistical support for Hypothesis 5c. However, the
change in the predicted probability in Figures 4-8 and 4-9 is approximately -42% and +36%,
respectively. From the standpoint of economic significance, these differences warrant further
discussion. Again, I offer an explanation for these interesting findings in the following section.
Figures 4-10, 4-11, and 4-12, which correspond to Models 16, 18, and 22 in Table 4-11,
graphically examine the proposed relationship between an increase in the partners’ knowledge
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diversity and the likelihood of including a non-solicitation provision in an R&D alliance contract
(i.e., Hypothesis 4). Again, the simulation procedure was applied above to generate the graphs in
Panel A of each figure. In Panel A of Figures 4-10, 4-11, and 4-12, the heavy dots indicate a
statistically significant change, at the p<0.05 level or better, in the predicted probability of
including a non-solicitation provision when knowledge diversity is varied from one standard
deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean, holding all other variables constant at
meaningful values.
The graphs again show that statistical significance is conditional on the value of the
experience variable that knowledge diversity is interacted with. In Panel A of Figure 4-10, the
change in the predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when buyer’s total
previous contracting experience is greater than twelve. In Panel A of Figure 4-11, the change in
the predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when buyer’s previous R&D
contracting experience is greater than five. In Panel A of Figure 4-12, the change in the predicted
probability is not significantly different from zero when supplier’s total previous contracting
experience is greater than nine.33 Thus, the graphs provide only limited support for Hypothesis 4.
Similar to Figures 4-7 and 4-8, Figures 4-10 and 4-11 show that that the change in the
predicted probability associated with an increase in the value of knowledge diversity decreases as
the values of the previous contracting experience variables also increase. That is, these figures
indicate that there might be a negative interaction between knowledge diversity and the two
measures of the buyer’s previous contracting experience, which runs contrary to Hypothesis 5d.
33

Again, there is an inflection point in the curve in Panel A of Figure 4-12 for values of supplier’s total previous
contracting experience greater than approximately nine where the change in the predicted probability starts to
slightly decline over the rest of the range. This same inflection point is not exhibited in Panel B of Figure 4-12, as
the change in the predicted probability continues to increase over the rest of the range, illustrating the difference
between the plots generated by the simulation and those created in Excel. Thus, while the simulation suggests that
the change in predicted probability is not statistically significant for values greater than nine, the Excel plot provides
some evidence to the contrary.
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Figure 4-10. Effect of an increase in knowledge diversity on the probability of including a nonsolicitation provision at various values of the buyer’s total previous contracting experience
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It does appear, however, that there is a positive interaction between knowledge diversity and
supplier’s total previous contracting experience in Figure 4-12, as predicted by Hypothesis 5d.
The additional option in the Stata procedure was again employed to determine if the
interaction effect exhibited in any of these plots is statistically significant. I tested to see if the
interaction effect was significant between zero and ten for buyer’s total previous contracting
experience in Panel A of Figure 4-10, between zero and five for buyer’s previous R&D
contracting experience in Panel A of Figure 4-11, and between zero and ten for supplier’s total
previous contracting experience in Panel A of Figure 4-12. Neither the decrease in the change in
the probability in Figures 4-10 and 4-11 nor the increase in the change in the probability in
Figure 4-12 were statistically significant at the p<0.05 level or better over the specified ranges.
Thus, it would appear from these findings that there is no statistical support for Hypothesis 5d.
However, the change in the predicted probability in Figure 4-12 is approximately +31%. Again,
from the standpoint of economic significance, this difference warrants further discussion.
4.4.6.1. Robustness Tests. Logistic regression techniques were employed in place of
probit as a robustness test. As expected, the results were substantially identical. This is not
surprising given that the cumulative normal and logistic distributions are very similar, except at
the tails. Considerable differences between the results of logit and probit are expected only when
the sample size is large. In such a case, the number of observations in the tails of the distributions
likely increases, highlighting the differing widths of the distributions at the tails (Maddala, 1983:
23). The sample size is relatively small in this study (N = 66), suggesting that it is unlikely that
there is much of a difference between the number of observations in the tails of the distributions.
Additional robustness tests were conducted that examined the sensitivity of the results to
the time window for the measures tacitness, knowledge diversity, same partner, and previous
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contracting experience. Three- and seven-year windows were also investigated. As noted above,
five years was selected as the ideal window for examining the impact of previous contracting
experience based on Heimeriks and Duysters (2007). As the variables tacitness and knowledge
diversity are also essentially measuring capabilities, I used the same time window when
developing these measures for consistency. The primary argument is that there are stocks and
flows of capabilities (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Over time, as firms learn new knowledge, some
of the old knowledge is likely to be displaced. Thus, varying the window between three, five, and
seven years serves to examine if different stocks and flows of knowledge and capabilities impact
the relationships proposed in this study. The results are fairly robust for the five and seven year
windows, while some of the statistical significance is lost when the measures using the three year
window are employed. These findings suggest that knowledge stocks and alliance capabilities
may turnover or depreciate at a moderate rate, lending support for the five year window
suggested in the literature.
4.4.7. Discussion
In this study, I set out to examine the impact of various hazards on the design of R&D
alliance contracts. Specifically, I suggested that in order to overcome knowledge transfer issues,
R&D alliance contracts should include a provision that creates a mechanism for employees from
both partners to communicate face-to-face. In addition, I proposed that in order to safeguard
against ‘learning-by-hiring’, a non-solicitation provision should be included in R&D alliance
contracts. Four baseline hypotheses were developed to investigate these suggestions.
I noted that the baseline hypotheses are rooted in the logic of TCE, which assumes that
managers and lawyers can develop contracts which are relatively responsive to the hazards they
perceive in a given transaction. TCE also assumes that managers and lawyers learn relatively
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quickly from their previous experience. If they do not, firm-level performance is expected to
suffer due to the inability to develop effective contracts. Recent research suggests that this
learning process is not a quick as TCE assumes (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Lumineau et al.,
2011). Thus, this study also investigated if and how previous contracting experience impacts the
inclusion of specific provisions designed to solve problems related to specific transaction
hazards. Hypotheses proposing a moderating effect of experience were developed. The results
reported in the previous section provide some support for the baseline hypotheses and limited
support for the hypotheses proposing a moderating effect for previous experience. A deeper
investigation of the results is warranted to sort out and interpret the models that were tested.
The results indicate that experienced buyers are more likely to recognize situations that
require a facilities access provision to facilitate the transfer of the supplier’s tacit knowledge and
include such a provision in the contract than buyers with little or no experience. In addition, the
lack of support for the conditional ‘main’ effect and the moderation effect in the models where
the measures of the supplier’s previous contracting experience are interacted with tacitness is in
line with the notion that the inclusion of a facilities access provision is not as salient an issue for
the supplier. Together, these finding are not surprising given that technical knowledge is often
only transferred from the supplier to the buyer in an R&D alliance. Because of this one-way flow
of knowledge, the supplier may not want to include a facilities access provision in an R&D
alliance contract out of fear that doing so will allow the buyer to quickly learn all of its technical
knowledge and terminate the alliance. The buyer, however, is likely to possess the leverage to
demand its inclusion when the situation warrants. Given the substantial size disparity between
the buyers and suppliers in the sample (as measured by annual sales revenue), the buyers are
likely to hold a considerable amount of bargaining power.
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An interesting result is that the predicted moderation effect is only statistically significant
when the buyer’s R&D contracting experience intensity is interacted with tacitness, suggesting
that it is not simply the total number of previous alliance contracts (or R&D alliance contracts)
that a firm has drafted that helps it to ‘learn how to contract’ (Mayer and Agyres, 2004), but the
fraction of its total experience dedicated to R&D alliances. The logic behind this finding is that
buyers in R&D alliances are more likely than their partners to have an in-house attorney or
business development manager with previous experience negotiating and designing contracts. In
addition, some very large buyers, for example F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. (Roche), have a
dedicated alliance management group. Such a function serves as a repository of the knowledge
gained from previous contracting experience. Thus, buyers that have engaged in a higher
percentage of R&D alliances are more likely to possess a greater stock of relevant knowledge
readily available for use when contracts are drafted for subsequent R&D alliances. This finding
also provides some support for the notion that all contracting experience is not equal. Rather, it
appears that the type and intensity of the experience matters as the hazards encountered in R&D
alliances are likely to be different than those that are of concern in marketing or supply alliances.
The results also indicate that experienced suppliers are more likely to recognize situations
that require a non-solicitation provision to prevent ‘learning-by-hiring’ and include such a
provision in the contract than less experienced suppliers. While the interaction effects in Model
22 are not statistically significant, the positive change in the probability of including such a
provision at higher levels of tacitness and knowledge diversity as the supplier’s experience
increases has economic significance. In addition, the inclusion of a non-solicitation provision in
an R&D alliance contract is likely to be a more important issue for a smaller, entrepreneurial
firm, as its employees are its key resource.
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It is important to note that the moderator in Model 22 is the supplier’s total contracting
experience, which would seem to indicate that all contracting experience contributes equally to
learning. Table 4-8 shows, however, that there is a strong correlation between the supplier’s total
previous contracting experience and its previous R&D contracting experience. An examination
of the raw data shows that 30% of the suppliers in the sample have not participated in any
alliances, and 47% have not participated in an R&D alliance. For almost half of the suppliers that
have participated in at least one R&D alliance, all of their previous experience has been
dedicated to R&D alliances. This is not surprising given that many of the suppliers in the sample
are young, entrepreneurial firms, which have most likely spent their formative years focused on
developing their core technologies rather than engaged in many alliances. However, once these
firms have developed their technological capabilities, they become sought after R&D alliance
partners. Thus, it appears that total previous experience is driven by previous R&D contracting
experience for most suppliers, which tentatively can be interpreted to indicate that suppliers learn
how to contract as they gain experience drafting R&D alliance contracts.
Finally, it is worth discussing the magnitude and direction of the interaction between
tacitness and the buyer’s previous R&D experience. As noted in the results, Panel A of Figure 48 shows that the change in the predicted probability associated with an increase in tacitness
decreases as the buyer’s previous R&D experience increases, which runs counter to what was
expected. While the additional test indicates that the interaction effect is not statistically
significant, the magnitude of the change (-43%) is sizeable. The economic significance of this
finding is that experienced buyer’s may actually prefer not to include a non-solicitation provision
in an R&D alliance contract when knowledge is tacit as a way to salvage an alliance if it is
terminated. In other words, experienced buyers may have learned from past alliances that it is
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desirable to keep the option to hire the supplier’s talent available, especially when the supplier’s
knowledge is tacit. Alternatively, large buyers may possess enough leverage over their smaller,
entrepreneurial partners to prevent the inclusion of a non-solicitation provision when it is
warranted. For example, in the sample examined in this study, the contracts that govern Roche’s
alliances with CombiMatrix Corp. and deCode Genetics do not contain a non-solicitation
provision despite the highly tacit nature of each supplier’s knowledge.
Overall, the results from this study provide valuable insight into the process of learning
how to contract. While statistically significant results are limited, the findings lend some support
to the notion that when a term is relevant to a firm, managers and lawyers with previous
experience drafting contracts for R&D alliances are more likely to include the term when it is
necessary than managers and lawyers lacking such experience. The results also offer some
support for the notion that learning how to contract is not quite as quick as TCE suggests, which
is in line with evidence from the inter-organizational learning and alliance capabilities literatures.
4.5. Study 2: The Assignment of Key Control and Decision Rights in R&D Alliances
4.5.1. Introduction
In recent years, several studies of contract design have examined the allocation of control
and decision rights in R&D alliances (e.g., Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner et al., 2003;
Higgins, 2007; Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). Such rights refer to the provisions in alliance
contracts that allocate ownership of key alliance assets and provide the ability to make decisions
regarding their use. Based on the logic of incentive-alignment, the assignment of such rights in
an alliance contract is considered to be a critical factor in eliciting the optimal degree of effort
from both partners. Thus, determining how to ‘correctly’ assign such rights is important from
both a theoretical and managerial standpoint.
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Previous research has primarily examined why one partner ‘wins’ a larger share of the
rights that are available in R&D alliance contracts. Recent studies suggest, however, that firms
are more interested in obtaining specific rights rather than simply accumulating as many rights as
possible (Ariño and Ring, 2010). Other research shows that the incentive-alignment objective
can only be accomplished by getting the assignment of specific rights correct (Kloyer, 2011). In
addition, because different rights play different functions, the underlying mechanisms explaining
their assignment are expected to be different (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). Therefore, this
study deviates from previous research in that it examines the assignment of two rights considered
key in the context of R&D alliances, namely foreground intellectual property (IP) rights and
unilateral termination rights.
Control of IP is considered to be an important issue in R&D alliances (Hagedoorn and
Hesen, 2007). The division of IP rights is expected to determine how the relational rents
generated are shared between the alliance partners. According to property rights theory (PRT),
control over foreground IP is crucial from the standpoint of encouraging each party to contribute
its resources to the alliance in order to achieve an optimal innovation outcome. Lacking the
proper incentive, one or both of the partners may shirk on the alliance. Thus, properly assigning
such rights is particularly important, especially when the partners are likely to develop multiple
patentable innovations and continue to work together in the future.
The right to terminate an R&D alliance is also critical given the observability and
measurement problems associated with R&D that were discussed in Study 1. The lack of
verifiability gives rise to the threat of ‘project substitution’ or ‘project cross-subsidization’,
wherein resources allocated to the alliance are diverted to other projects or alliances in order to
obtain private benefits. The threat of termination can be employed to help align the incentives of
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the parties, and prevent such problems from occurring. Not surprisingly, termination rights
appear in many R&D alliance contracts, but only those that provide the right to unilaterally and
unconditionally terminate the partnership (i.e., severe termination rights) are expected to combat
the verifiability problem. Together, examining the allocation of these two specific rights
addresses the following research question:


What factors influence the assignment of key control and decision rights in R&D
alliance contracts?

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next section, I briefly review
and discuss the theory upon which the conceptual model for this study rests. The model is then
used to develop a series of hypotheses, the tests and results of which are then detailed. Finally, I
end by further discussing the results from this study and their implications.
4.5.2. Theory Development
PRT suggests that the proper assignment of control rights in an R&D alliance contract is
critical in order to create an incentive structure that will elicit the optimal degree of effort from
both partners. Aghion and Tirole’s (1994) model posits that control should be granted to the
partner whose marginal contribution is critical (i.e., indispensable) to the alliance outcome. The
model assumes, however, that alignment is achieved via assignment of a single, undifferentiated
‘ownership’ right. Lerner and Merges (1998) note that in actual alliances, this right is divided
into several smaller parts that assign control over specific aspects of the residual rights that flow
from ownership. According to Adegbesan and Higgins (2011), control rights can be further
differentiated based on the function that they play. For instance, some rights split the returns
from an uncertain future pie between alliance partners, while others give one partner the ability
to punish the other partner if it does not comply with the terms of the contract.
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Foreground IP is an example of a right that splits the returns from an uncertain future pie.
Economic studies of the sources and implications of appropriability (e.g., Levin, Klevorick,
Nelson, and Winter, 1987; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) highlight the importance of protecting the
returns from innovation. Without such protection, innovators are less likely to invest in R&D at
an optimal level because their ability to appropriate the returns from their innovations is limited.
Thus, studies in this area are concerned with how the rights to control the results of innovation
activities create the proper incentives to encourage innovators to take risks and invest in R&D.
The notion that IP rights for individual innovators provide an incentive to invest in R&D
is similar to PRT-logic regarding the assignment of IP rights in R&D alliances. In an alliance
that results in a single patentable innovation, PRT predicts that the corresponding IP right should
be assigned to the partner whose marginal contribution is indispensable (i.e., critical to the
alliance outcome). Thus, if the research firm’s effort is indispensable, it should retain control
over the IP. Conversely, if the funding firm’s investment is indispensable to the realization of the
innovation, control should be transferred to the funding firm in exchange for compensation.
In each case, the incentive is created for the R&D firm to optimally commit its resources
to the alliance. In the former, retaining ownership of the IP right allows the R&D firm to capture
the value of its innovation by licensing it to the funding firm (and potentially to other interested
parties). Licensees typically pay a fee to the R&D firm as well as royalties on any products that
they sell that include the innovation. In the latter, the payment made by the funding firm in
exchange for ownership should reflect the discounted value of the R&D firm’s innovation.
Many R&D alliances, however, result in multiple patentable innovations. Furthermore,
both partners are often involved in conducting R&D activities. In such cases, Aghion and Tirole
(1994) suggest that each party should control the IP rights to the innovations where it has a
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‘comparative advantage’ in creating value. This notion is explored further by Leiponen (2008).
She notes that if each firm individually tries to maximize its control of IP, the incentives to
innovate are not necessarily optimized. To restore the proper incentives, she suggests that ‘[i]n
some instances, both partners are better off when control rights are allocated to the party that is
best positioned to innovate’ (Leiponen, 2008: 1373).
Taking this idea further, the assignment of rights should not only take each partner’s
ability to currently utilize IP into consideration, but also each partner’s ability to build upon it in
the future. In essence, proactively considering which party is best suited to exploit IP today and
in the future should lead to an allocation of rights that strategically creates an ideal incentive
structure for both partners to optimally invest in the alliance. Thus, Figure 4-13 shows that each
partner’s relative ability to exploit IP influences the assignment of foreground IP rights,
especially when an alliance is likely to result in multiple patentable innovations.
Assignment of
Foreground IP Rights

Ability to Exploit IP

?
?
Bargaining Power

Assignment of
Severe Termination
Rights

Observability/Verifiability

?
?
Bargaining Power

Figure 4-13. Conceptual model for study 2
A termination clause is an example of a right that allows one partner to punish the other
for non-compliance, essentially providing the compliant partner with a means to safeguard its
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investment in the alliance against opportunistic behavior. Including such a right in an R&D
alliance contract should create the proper incentives ex ante to discourage non-compliance.
Determining when one partner is not complying with the contract is not trivial, however, due to
the potential lack of observability and verifiability in R&D alliances. These factors feature
notably in agency theory (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979) and PRT.
In an R&D alliance, each partner undertakes specific tasks, the inputs of which may not
be observable, giving rise to the potential of shirking. In response to this threat, provisions can be
incorporated that clearly describe each partner’s roles and responsibilities, creating a benchmark
against which their actions can be judged to involve shirking (Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Even if
a task being performed by one partner is observable, however, it may not be verifiable in a court
of law. For example, in an R&D alliance between a large firm and a smaller, entrepreneurial
firm, it is likely that the partners possess different goals. While the large firm is primarily
interested in developing new products, the smaller firm may have several competing interests.
On the one hand, the smaller firm’s interests may be in alignment, as developing new
products for or with its partner ensures future cash flows. Smaller firms may, however, desire to
enhance their own reputation by bringing products to market on their own. Equity markets view
this as a sign of the quality of a firm’s research and management acumen (Lerner and
Malmendier, 2010). Smaller firms with sought after new technology are also likely to be juggling
multiple alliances. In both cases, the smaller firm may be tempted to shift resources to other
projects. Thus, while specific individuals can be named and tasks assigned in an R&D alliance
contract, it may be difficult to verify whether a smaller firm is diverting resources.
Diverting alliance resources to alternate uses is known as ‘project substitution’ or ‘project
cross-subsidization’ (Lerner and Malmendier, 2010). In response, a provision that is stronger
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than assigning roles and responsibilities is required to establish an incentive structure that will
discourage shirking. Severe termination rights, namely those that can be invoked unilaterally and
without cause, provide just such a mechanism. The conceptual model in Figure 4-13 shows this
relationship. It is important to note that while the logic of incentive-alignment guides the
assignment of severe termination rights, the underlying mechanism is different than the one that
guides the allocation of IP rights. Rather than the relative abilities of the partners, the assignment
of severe termination rights is proposed to be a function of the inability to verify that shirking
has occurred even if observable stipulations can be included in an R&D alliance contract.
The relationship between bargaining power and the assignment of control rights also
needs to be taken into consideration. Bargaining power refers to the ability of one party to win
concessions from another party (Dwyer and Walker, 1981), and to influence the outcome of a
negotiation (Schelling, 1956). As noted earlier, the allocation of control rights should adhere to
the logic of incentive-alignment when the research firm holds a strong bargaining position
(Aghion and Tirole, 1994). However, with the exception of Lerner and Merges (1998), previous
research has examined the direct effect of bargaining power rather than testing whether it distorts
or ‘moderates’ the PRT predictions as proposed by Aghion and Tirole (1994). As shown in
Figure 4-13, I propose that both pathways should be tested to investigate if and how bargaining
power influences the assignment of key control rights in R&D alliance contracts.
In sum, the theoretical literature does not differentiate between the different types of
control and decision rights that can be allocated among alliance partners. Rather, theory speaks
in general about the assignment of any suitable rights that mitigate the incentive-alignment
problem. In practice, decision and control rights can take many forms and play many functions.
In addition, the studies by Ariño and Ring (2010) and Kloyer (2011) indicate that obtaining
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control over specific rights that address specific, pertinent issues is what is important to firms
when they negotiate. Thus, the hypotheses that are developed in the next section suggest that
there are different factors that impact the allocation of different rights due to the functions that
they play, the problems that they solve, and which party desires to obtain control. I also propose
that we could still stand to learn more about the influence of bargaining power on the allocation
of different control rights in R&D alliances. Consequently, hypotheses are developed to
investigate the pathway through which bargaining power operates.
4.5.3. Hypotheses
4.5.3.1. Ownership of Foreground IP in R&D Alliances. PRT offers a relatively
straightforward solution for assigning IP when the result of an R&D alliance is a single
innovation – the right should be awarded to the partner whose marginal contribution is critical to
the alliance outcome. However, when there are multiple innovations, potentially developed by
each partner, the assignment of the IP rights associated with each innovation is likely to be
determined by factors other than each partner’s marginal contribution (Aghion and Tirole, 1994).
In practice, when there are multiple innovations, IP rights are usually divided between
alliance partners as follows: each partner is assigned the rights to its self-developed IP, and a
share of the rights to jointly-developed IP (Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007). However, in some
instances the foreground IP associated with specific innovations is assigned to a specific partner
regardless of which partner invented it. For example, in the alliance between Boston Scientific
Corporation (BSC) and NitroMed Inc. (NMI) dated November 20, 2001, ownership of all Device
Inventions is assigned to BSC, while NMI is granted ownership of all Nitric Oxide Releasing
Compound Inventions, regardless of the identity of the inventor.
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The hypotheses developed here examine why IP rights are assigned in this special way in
some R&D alliance contracts. I suggest that the decision to precisely specify foreground IP
rights is influenced by the relative ability of each partner to utilize the IP today and in the future.
The relative bargaining position of each partner is expected to play a role in this decision as well.
4.5.3.1.1. Relative ability to utilize IP. Firms form R&D alliances in order to gain access
to the research capabilities of other firms (Tripsas et al., 1995), particularly their expertise in
specific areas of science and technology. The evolution of a firm’s research capabilities has been
characterized as a path-dependent process that is constrained by a firm’s initial resource
endowment (Helfat, 1994; Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell, and Klepper, 2000). In addition,
research capabilities tend to develop in a ‘local’ fashion (Nelson and Winter, 1982), building
closely upon a firm’s prior stock of knowledge in a particular area of science or technology.
Firms also invest a significant amount of time, and human and financial capital, developing
research capabilities. Thus, it is difficult to duplicate another firm’s research capabilities due to
path-dependence and time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). As a result, a
firm that is already familiar with a particular area of science or technology should be able to
build upon technology that capitalizes on its capabilities in that area better than a firm that has
not made comparable investments.
In some R&D alliances, the scientific and technological skills of each partner overlap,
while in other cases each partner specializes in a very distinct area. In the latter case, each
partner should be best suited to exploit the IP developed during the alliance that is closest to its
area of expertise because it has already made significant investments in developing the requisite
capabilities to do so. Taking the future into account, each partner should also be better suited to
build upon the IP closest to its area of expertise due to path-dependence and time compression
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diseconomies. As discussed above, these factors limit a firm’s ability to build such capabilities in
a timely and cost-effective fashion.
The future utilization of IP is an important consideration in many alliances, as firms
frequently plan to extend alliances in order to develop next generation products. Assigning
control over the IP most related to each firm’s respective core areas of technology, especially
when the partners specialize in different areas, strategically creates an incentive for both partners
to optimally invest in the alliance today in anticipation of an on-going relationship (Leiponen,
2008). Thus, I expect that foreground IP rights over specific innovations will be assigned to each
partner rather than generically assigned when the partners in an R&D alliance each specialize in
distinct areas of science or technology. I state the hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 6: Foreground IP associated with specific innovations is more likely
to be assigned to a specific partner, regardless of which partner invented it, when
the partners specialize in divergent areas of science or technology.
4.5.3.1.2. Bargaining power.34 Bargaining power may also play a role in determining
how IP rights are assigned. In general, bargaining ability refers to a party’s ability to win
accommodations from another party (Dwyer and Walker, 1981), and to influence the outcome of
a negotiation (Schelling, 1956). In an R&D alliance, each partner’s bargaining ability is likely to
be determined by its initial bargaining power, which is a function of several financial and nonfinancial factors. One indicator of the supplier’s bargaining power, and thus its ability to
negotiate favorable contract terms, is its financial health. A cash-constrained supplier is likely to
be desperate for external funding. As a result, its ability to bargain over the favorable assignment
of foreground IP rights is diminished because its financial constraints put it in a weaker

34

Similar to Study 1, I adopt the terminology of a sourcing agreement for the following hypotheses. The larger
partner typically plays the role of a buyer, while the smaller partner fills the supplier role.
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bargaining position relative to the buyer. Conversely, when the supplier is not cash-constrained,
it is in a better position to negotiate a favorable assignment of the foreground IP rights.
It is important to note that in regard to the assignment of foreground IP rights, the
supplier typically would prefer to gain control over the IP developed during the alliance that is
most related to its core area of science or technology. In the literature, patents have been
suggested to be a signal of a firm’s quality (Spence, 1973). Particularly for an entrepreneurial
firm, patents serve as an indicator of the value of the firm’s capabilities, which has been shown
to impact its ability to obtain external funding (Long, 2002). Anecdotal evidence also suggests
that managers in entrepreneurial firms view their patent portfolios as a measure of performance
(Lemley, 2000). Thus, gaining control over core IP is critical to entrepreneurial firms that are
suppliers of technology in R&D alliances, as a growing asset stock signals stronger performance
(DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999). For these reasons, I expect that an R&D alliance contract is more
likely to assign ownership of specific IP to a specific partner when the supplier’s bargaining
ability is enhanced by its financial health. I offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: Foreground IP associated with specific innovations is more likely
to be assigned to a specific partner, regardless of which partner invented it, when
the supplier’s financial health is strong.
The relative bargaining position of the partners is also likely to be a function of the
buyer’s initial bargaining power. Large firms, as ‘buyers’ of technology, often simultaneously
participate in multiple R&D alliances with multiple partners. The rationale for engaging in
several alliances is that it allows buyers to ‘partially manage the technological uncertainty that
they face in their competitive environment’ (Alvarez and Barney, 2001: 139), making them less
dependent on the outcome of any single alliance, especially when those alliances involve
multiple suppliers engaged in the development of the same technology. As a result, if one
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supplier’s efforts fail, the buyer has other suppliers to fall back on. Thus, buyers engaged in
multiple alliances at the outset of a new alliance are likely to possess more bargaining power,
enhancing their bargaining position relative to any single supplier. In turn, this should strengthen
the buyer’s ability to negotiate favorable contract terms or at least prevent the supplier from
obtaining its favorable assignment of the foreground IP rights. As such, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 8: Foreground IP associated with specific innovations is less likely to
be assigned to a specific partner, regardless of which partner invented it, when
the buyer is simultaneously engaged in multiple R&D alliances.
Aghion and Tirole (1994) propose that differences in bargaining power may distort the
allocation of IP rights rather than directly influence their assignment. In essence, they suggest
that the logic of incentive alignment may be trumped by bargaining power considerations. Thus,
because the relative bargaining position of each partner differs from alliance to alliance, it is
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important to examine whether this factor moderates the relationship predicted in Hypothesis 6.
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Figure 4-14. Expected plot to support interaction effect of bargaining power on the assignment of
IP rights
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When the buyer’s bargaining power is strong, it is in a position to extract concessions
from the supplier regardless of what is optimal according to the logic of incentive alignment.
While resting on a slightly different mechanism, the proposed outcome is similar to the one
predicted by Aghion and Tirole (1994), which suggests that the relationship in Hypothesis 6
should weaken when the buyer has a strong relative bargaining position. In addition, the
relationship predicted in Hypothesis 6 should hold when the supplier’s bargaining position is
relatively strong. Figure 4-14 depicts an extreme example of what is expected. The buyer’s
bargaining position is strongest on the left side of the x-axis, while the supplier’s position is
strongest on the right. The y-axis denotes the predicted probability of assigning specific IP to a
specific partner, regardless of which partner was the inventor. The top dashed line represents the
case when the partners operate in highly divergent areas of science and technology, while the
bottom dashed line represents the case when the partners operate in very similar areas.
In line with Aghion and Tirole (1994), Figure 4-14 shows that when the supplier’s
bargaining position is strong, IP is assigned based on the logic of incentive alignment. However,
when the buyer’s bargaining position is strong, the predicted positive relationship is completely
negatively moderated. As depicted, the buyer’s strength puts it in a position to dictate the
contract terms, reducing the probability that specific rights will be assigned to a specific partner
when the partners’ areas of expertise are divergent. It is important to note that the buyer’s strong
relative bargaining position may be a result of the supplier’s financial constraints or the power it
derives from participating in multiple alliances. Thus, the argument outlined here suggests:
Hypothesis 9a: The positive relationship predicted in Hypothesis 6 should be
weakened when the supplier is financially constrained.
Hypothesis 9b: The positive relationship predicted in Hypothesis 6 should be
weakened when the buyer is simultaneously engaged in multiple alliances.
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4.5.3.2. Assignment of Severe Termination Rights in R&D Alliances. The right to
terminate an alliance is an important strategic consideration in many theories of financial
contracting (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). According to Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Hart
and Moore (1998), the right of a financier to terminate an entrepreneur’s project at an
intermediate stage (i.e., before unobservable cash flows arrive) serves as a mechanism to reduce
the entrepreneur’s incentive to consume private benefits (i.e., act opportunistically). Thus, given
the ‘project substitution’ or ‘project cross-subsidization’ problem, which entails the possibility of
the supplier obtaining private benefits by shirking on the focal alliance, it is not surprising that
many R&D alliance contracts contain termination provisions.
Termination provisions can take many forms and can often be invoked by either alliance
partner. For example, provisions that allow either partner to terminate the alliance for breach of
contract or bankruptcy are nearly ubiquitous in R&D alliance contracts. The provisions most
relevant to the ‘project substitution’ and ‘project cross-subsidization’ problems, however, are
severe termination rights that allow the buyer to unilaterally terminate an alliance at will (i.e.,
unconditionally, without cause) after a certain date is reached or at any time, or if the buyer
determines that continuation of the alliance would be ‘unwise’. Such severe termination rights
are employed more selectively than those that allow either party to terminate for breach of
contract or bankruptcy. The hypotheses developed next explore the factors that impact the
assignment of these rights to buyers in R&D alliances. The lack of verifiability and the relative
bargaining power of the partners are two important considerations that factor into this decision.
4.5.3.2.1. Lack of verifiability. R&D alliance contracts often require suppliers to
undertake observable but difficult-to-verify actions. For example, a contract may explicitly state
that the supplier should exert the same degree of effort on the alliance activities as it would on an

203
internal project. While the supplier’s alliance-related effort might be easy to observe, it is
difficult to verify that such effort is comparable to what the supplier would dedicate to one of its
own projects. As a result, the supplier may be tempted to reallocate personnel or resources that
are supposed to be devoted to the alliance to internal projects or other alliances in order to
capture private benefits. This is an example of the ‘project substitution’ and ‘project crosssubsidization’ problems highlighted above. The supplier’s desire to capture private benefits puts
the partners’ goals and objectives for the alliance at odds, creating a potential incentive problem.
Assigning severe termination rights to the buyer is expected to restore the supplier’s incentive
and prevent it from diverting resources to other projects or alliances.
A factor that is likely to influence whether there are other projects or alliances for the
supplier to divert resources to, thus creating a potential verifiability problem, is the range of
applications for the supplier’s technology. The technology contributed to the alliance by the
supplier may be applicable in a wide range of fields. Technology that can be adapted for use in
multiple applications rather than in a single domain is often referred to as general purpose
technology (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Bresnahan and Gambardella, 1998). Firms that
possess general purpose technology are likely to be highly sought-after alliance partners.
When the supplier’s technology is widely applicable, it has an incentive to pursue private
rents, either by forming multiple alliances or by focusing key resources on internal projects to
develop and commercialize the technology itself. In such cases, the supplier may provide the
buyer with signs that it is progressing on the alliance objectives, but it is difficult for the buyer to
verify that the supplier is exerting its full effort. Granting severe termination rights to the buyer
serves to restore the supplier’s incentive not to shirk on the alliance. If the supplier is deemed to
be diverting effort, the buyer can unilaterally and unconditionally invoke its option to end the
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alliance at an intermediate stage, before any common benefits are recognized. The potential loss
of such benefits should deter the supplier from seeking private benefits. Thus, I predict:
Hypothesis 10: The buyer is more likely to obtain severe termination rights when
the supplier’s technology can be used in a wide range of applications.
4.5.3.2.2. Bargaining power. Bargaining power is also expected to influence the
allocation of severe termination rights to the buyer in R&D alliance contracts. As noted
above, the supplier’s financial health is one factor that determines its bargaining position,
which impacts its ability to influence the outcome of contract negotiations. The supplier
would prefer that severe termination rights are not granted to the buyer. If the supplier is
cash-constrained, its bargaining position is weakened, reducing its ability to negotiate for
terms that it finds favorable. Conversely, if the supplier’s financial health is strong, it is
likely to be in a better position to negotiate, improving its chances of preventing the
buyer from obtaining severe termination rights. In essence, a solvent supplier can
legitimately threaten to break off negotiations unless its terms are accepted, whereas a
supplier desperate for funding does not possess such leverage. Consequently:
Hypothesis 11: The buyer is less likely to obtain severe termination rights when
the supplier’s financial health is strong.
A similar argument can be made for buyers that are simultaneously engaged in multiple
alliances. As noted above, when a buyer is participating in multiple alliances, it is less dependent
on the outcome of any single alliance. In addition, if multiple suppliers are working on similar
projects, the buyer can simply turn to one of the other suppliers if one fails. Consequently, the
buyer can legitimately threaten to walk away from negotiations unless the supplier concedes to
its terms. Conversely, the fewer alliances the buyer is engaged in, the more dependent it is on the
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outcome of specific alliances. As a result, the buyer’s bargaining position is not likely to be as
strong, reducing its ability to pressure the supplier into accepting its terms. Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 12: The buyer is more likely to obtain severe termination rights when
the buyer is simultaneously engaged in multiple R&D alliances.
Another factor that is likely to impact the supplier’s bargaining power is whether it is
responsible for manufacturing any components of or the entire product resulting from the
alliance. If it is, the supplier is likely to have a significant amount of leverage over the buyer.
This argument draws on the idea of resource-based bargaining power in inter-firm relationships
(Yan and Gray, 1994). Coff (1999) develops this line of reasoning in regards to the nature of the
bargaining relationship between employers and employees. He suggests that employees with
difficult to imitate, critical resources hold enormous bargaining power over their employers.
Applied to an R&D alliance, the supplier’s bargaining position should be strengthened when it is
conducting downstream value-chain activities that are critical to realizing the alliance objectives,
enhancing its ability to obtain concessions from the buyer. I can state the hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 13: The buyer is less likely to obtain severe termination rights when
the supplier is responsible for any manufacturing related to the final product.
While the arguments presented in Hypotheses 11-13 propose that bargaining power
directly influences whether the buyer is able to obtain severe termination rights, it is possible that
bargaining power moderates the relationship proposed in Hypothesis 10. Again, drawing on
Aghion and Tirole (1994), the assignment of rights predicted by the logic of incentive-alignment
should be distorted when the supplier’s bargaining position is weak. However, because the
desired outcome this time is favored by the buyer, the moderating impact of bargaining power
should negate the predicted relationship as shown in Figure 4-15. The buyer’s bargaining
position is strongest on the left side of the x-axis, while the supplier’s position is strongest on the
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right in Figure 4-15. The y-axis now denotes the predicted probability of the buyer obtaining
severe termination rights. The top dashed line represents the case where the supplier’s
technology is useful in a wide range of applications, while the bottom dashed line represents the
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case where the supplier’s technology is specialized.
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Figure 4-15. Expected plot to support interaction effect of bargaining power on the assignment of
severe termination rights
Consistent with Aghion and Tirole (1994), Figure 4-15 shows that when the supplier’s
bargaining position is strong, the assignment of severe termination rights is based on the logic of
incentive alignment. However, when the buyer’s bargaining position is strong, the predicted
relationship is weakened. As depicted, the buyer’s strength puts it in a position to dictate the
contract terms, increasing the probability that it will be able to obtain severe termination rights
when the supplier’s technology is relatively specialized. It is important to note that the buyer’s
strong relative bargaining position may be a result of the supplier’s financial constraints or the
power it derives from participating in multiple alliances. In addition, the buyer’s bargaining
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position may be determined by whether the supplier has any manufacturing responsibilities.
Thus, the arguments outlined here suggest the following:
Hypothesis 14a: The positive relationship predicted in Hypothesis 10 should be
weakened when the supplier is financially constrained.
Hypothesis 14b: The positive relationship predicted in Hypothesis 10 should be
weakened when the buyer is simultaneously engaged in multiple alliances.
Hypothesis 14c: The positive relationship predicted in Hypothesis 10 should be
weakened when the supplier is not responsible for any manufacturing related to
the final product.
4.5.4. Measures
The measures developed here rely on the data set described in Section 4.3.4.
4.5.4.1. Dependent Variables. To test the hypothesized relationships, I developed two
dependent variables, specific IP assignment and severe termination.
An analysis of the contracts in the sample revealed that in most alliances each partner
will have sole ownership of all independently-developed IP and co-ownership of jointlydeveloped IP. Hypotheses 6-9, however, examine why IP associated with specific innovations is
assigned to a specific partner. Thus, the dummy variable specific IP assignment was created to
capture when the contract stipulates that foreground IP associated with a specific technology will
be assigned to a specific partner regardless of the identity of the partner responsible for inventing
it. For each contract containing such terms, specific IP assignment is set to one, zero otherwise.
Hypotheses 10-14 examine why buyers are able to obtain severe termination rights in
R&D alliance contracts. The dummy variable severe termination was created to indicate whether
such rights are granted to the buyer. This variable is assigned a value of one when any of the
following severe termination rights appear in an alliance contract: the right to unilaterally
terminate without cause at any time during the alliance, the right to unilaterally terminate without
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cause after a specific time period or alliance stage, or the right to unilaterally terminate if the
buyer determines that continuation of the alliance would be ‘unwise’.
4.5.4.2. Independent Variables. To test Hypothesis 6, a measure of the partners’ relative
ability to exploit IP is needed. Using patent data, I developed the measure knowledge diversity to
determine the degree of overlap in the partners’ knowledge bases. The original measure was
developed by Jaffe (1986) and has been used recently by Sampson (2004), Oxley and Sampson
(2004), and Sampson (2007). Each firm’s knowledge portfolio was captured by measuring the
distribution across 3-digit patent classes of the patents applied for in the five years prior to the
formation of the alliance. This distribution is described by a multidimensional vector, Fi = (Fi1
… Fis), where Fis represents the number of patents assigned to partner firm i in patent class s.
Diversity of partner firm knowledge is then:

√(

)(

)

where i ≠ j.
The measure knowledge diversity varies from zero to one. A value of one indicates the
greatest possible diversity between the partners’ portfolios. When this is the case, each partner is
bringing very specific capabilities to the alliance, making it unlikely that each partner has the
knowledge about, let alone ability to exploit, IP in fields that are far from its core areas. Thus, it
is in situations such as these where it is expected that specific IP will be assigned to each partner
in order to take advantage of their respective expertise, as proposed in Hypothesis 6.
For Hypothesis 10, a measure is needed that indicates whether the supplier has alternative
opportunities outside of the focal alliance, which potentially creates a situation where there is a
lack of verifiability. I used the measure generality of the supplier’s technology to assess this
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threat. Generality refers to how applicable the supplier’s technology is to other technological
domains. Using patent data, I determined the average number of 3-digit technological classes
assigned to all of the supplier’s patents that were filed for in the 5 years prior to the alliance. A
patent may be assigned to multiple classes if the patent examiner deems that the innovative input
of the patent relates to a wide variety of domains (Gittelman, 2008). Patents classified into a
greater number of technological classes are interpreted as having a greater scope of applicability.
Thus, the more applicable the technology is, the more likely the supplier is to have opportunities
to form other alliances with other partners.
Several hypotheses propose that bargaining power is likely to have an impact on the
assignment of both IP and severe termination rights in R&D alliance contracts. Following the
convention of previous studies (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Higgins, 2007; Adegbesan and
Higgins, 2011), supplier’s stockholders’ equity (in millions of dollars) is used to measure the
supplier’s financial health. A lower value of stockholders’ equity, especially a negative value,
indicates that a supplier is in need of external funding, which should decrease its bargaining
power. I obtained this data from Compustat and IPO prospectuses for each supplier in the sample
in the year prior to which the alliance contract was signed.
The variable buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio was developed in order to assess the buyer’s
ex ante bargaining power. As proposed in Hypotheses 8 and 12, buyers with larger alliance
portfolios are likely to wield more leverage over suppliers than buyers engaged in fewer
alliances. A count of the R&D alliances each buyer was participating in at the time the new
alliance was formed was collected from Windhover’s Strategic Transactions database.
The dummy variable any manufacturing by the supplier is used to capture a non-financial
measure of the supplier’s ex ante bargaining power. This variable is assigned a value of one if
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the supplier will be responsible for manufacturing any components of the final product, or the
entire final product, resulting from the alliance, zero otherwise. According to Hypothesis 13, the
supplier’s bargaining position is likely to be enhanced when it possesses some manufacturing
responsibility. Information was gathered directly from each contract to develop this measure.
4.5.4.3. Controls. I included several control variables in the econometric analyses to
eliminate the possibility that alternative factors may drive the hypothesized relationships. Using
information directly from the contract associated with each alliance, a dummy variable is used to
capture whether the buyer has committed to contribute any capital to the supplier. Alliance
payment is set to one when the contract indicates that the buyer will make any type of payment
(i.e., upfront, milestone, R&D) to the supplier, zero otherwise. This measure tracks if the buyer
contributing any capital to the supplier influences the assignment of rights.
A dummy variable is used to capture if the buyer takes an equity stake in the supplier as
part of the alliance. Using information from each contract, equity is set to one if the buyer takes
any type of equity holding (common or preferred stock), zero otherwise. This variable controls
for the possibility that ownership may affect the nature of the bargaining between firms.
I also control for cases where the same partners were involved in a previous alliance. It
may simply be the case that firms that have worked together in the past utilize the same contract
template for their subsequent alliances. Alternatively, Adegbesan and Higgins (2011) suggest
that prior ties may affect the nature of bargaining. Thus, I control for this factor by including a
dummy variable, same partner, which is set equal to one if there are any earlier alliances
recorded in the Strategic Transactions database that bring together the same partners in the five
years prior to the current alliance, zero otherwise.
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The supplier’s R&D intensity is also included as a control in the tests of Hypotheses 6-9
to account for the level of investment that the supplier has made in its technology. A supplier that
has made significant R&D investments is likely to desire to retain control over the IP that it has
developed. I measure the supplier’s R&D intensity in this study by dividing the supplier’s R&D
expenditures by the supplier’s total operating expenses (both in the year prior to the alliance). I
use operating expenses rather than revenue or income because the suppliers in the sample are
generally entrepreneurial firms that may have not generated any sales or profits in the year prior
to the alliance. Thus, the ratio calculated here using operating expenses more accurately indicates
how much of the firm’s available resources are being dedicated to developing new technology. I
collected the information used to calculate this measure from Compustat and IPO prospectuses.
I also included the buyer’s total assets (in billions of dollars), collected from Compustat,
as a control variable. This measure takes into account whether the allocation of rights is simply a
function of the buyer’s size, which may influence the nature of the bargaining relationship
between the partners.
A final control included in the tests of Hypotheses 6-9 is the dummy variable each firm
manufacturing, which is set to one when both partners will be responsible for manufacturing
some elements of the final product, zero otherwise. The rationale behind this measure is that
each firm will need control over the IP rights associated with the technologies that it will be
manufacturing. The actual contracts in the sample were used to determine the manufacturing
responsibilities of each partner in each alliance.
A final control included in the tests of Hypotheses 10-14 is the dummy variable
employment provisions, which is set to one when the contract either explicitly names technical
individuals from the supplier’s organization that will be assigned to the project or, at a minimum,
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designates how many man-hours per quarter the supplier should dedicate to the alliance. Such
provisions are inexpensive and easy to include in a contract up front. However, while the actions
requested by such provisions may be observable, they are often difficult to verify. Thus,
Robinson and Stuart (2007) suggest that pairing severe termination rights with provisions that
are difficult to verify removes the need to verify them, especially if it is costly to do so.
Lastly, I control for the fact that some firms have more than one contract in the sample.
These contracts may not be independent of each other. Firms may use a similar contract structure
in all of their alliances (regardless of whether it is with a previous or new partner), reflecting an
organizational norm rather than the actual need to include specific provisions in the contract. To
control for the possible lack of independence, I cluster observations by firm for the purposes of
calculating standard errors (Huber, 1967). In the limited number of cases where a contract can be
assigned to more than one firm (i.e., because both partners have multiple contracts in the
sample), the contract is assigned to the firm with more contracts in the sample for the purposes of
correcting the standard errors. As most of the firms in the sample are only involved in one
contract, fixed effects are not used.
4.5.5. Methods
Probit analysis is the appropriate technique to use to test the hypotheses given the
dichotomous nature of the dependent variables in this study. Under the probit model, the
probability of assigning IP rights associated with specific innovations to specific partners and the
probability of severe termination rights being assigned to the buyer are modeled in two separate
equations as functions of alliance-, supplier-, buyer-, and partner-specific variables. Specifically,
using the binary probit approach, I estimate the following general equations for the probability of
the assignment of each right of interest:
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(3) Pr(Specific IP assigned to specific partner)= + *Alliance payment
+*Equity*Same partner +*Supplier’s R&D intensity +*Buyer’s
total assets +*Each firm manufacturing +*Knowledge diversity
+*Supplier’s stockholders’ equity + *Buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio+
*Knowledge diversity*Supplier’s stockholders’ equity + *Knowledge
diversity*Buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio +
(4) Pr(Severe termination rights to buyer)= + *Alliance payment
+*Equity*Same partner +*Buyer’s total assets +*Employment
provisions +*Applicability of supplier’s technology +*Supplier’s
stockholders’ equity +*Buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio +*Any
manufacturing by supplier +*Applicability of supplier’s
technology*Supplier’s stockholders’ equity + *Applicability of supplier’s
technology*Buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio + *Applicability of supplier’s
technology*Any manufacturing by supplier + 
As in Study 1, the magnitude of the conditional ‘main’ effects estimated from equations
(3) and (4) is not simply the value of the coefficient associated with the respective variables.
Rather, in a non-linear model, the magnitude of the effects varies depending on the variable of
interest’s starting value, the magnitude of the change in that variable, and the values of the other
variables in the model (Long and Freese, 2006: 171).
The interaction terms in equations (3) and (4) correspond to Hypotheses 9a-b and
Hypotheses 14a-c, respectively. These interactions allow me to examine if the logic of incentive
alignment is distorted by bargaining power. Again, the coefficients and standard errors of
interaction terms in non-linear models, such as the binary probit models employed in this study,
cannot be interpreted in the same way as they are in linear models. The sign of the interaction
term coefficient need not correspond to the direction of the hypothesized conditional effect that
motivated the inclusion of the interaction term in the first place (Huang and Shields, 2000; Ai
and Norton, 2003). The standard error of the coefficient associated with the interaction term also
does not convey direct information about the statistical significance of the interaction effect.
As in Study 1, I followed the simulation-based approach developed by King et al. (2000),
which was recently introduced in the strategic management literature by Zelner (2009), in order
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to overcome the difficulty of interpreting the results from a probit analysis with multiple
interaction terms. This simulation technique makes it possible to graphically evaluate the change
in the predicted probabilities associated with an empirically relevant change in the value of the
independent variable of interest with all other variables held constant at relevant values. In
addition, this technique makes it possible to present the effects of the interaction terms in
equations (3) and (4) graphically, allowing for the examination of both the direction and
magnitude of these effects. The approach also allows for an examination of the statistical
significance of the interaction terms by specifying an additional test option in Stata.
4.5.6. Results
Table 4-12 provides summary and correlation statistics for the dependent, independent
and control variables used in the analyses. Preliminary analysis of the table provides some
insight regarding the determinants of the assignment of specific IP and severe termination rights.
The summary statistics indicate that there is moderate heterogeneity in the independent and
control variables. The correlation statistics also indicate specific IP to specific partners (i.e., the
dependent variable in equation (3)) is positively and significantly correlated with knowledge
diversity. This result tentatively suggests that the assignment of such rights is driven by this
factor.
There are a moderate number of statistically significant correlations between and among
the control and independent variables in Table 4-12, which suggests that there may be
multicollinearity problems, especially when the interaction terms are formed. High levels of
multicollinearity can lead to problems estimating regression coefficients (Marquardt, 1980),
which can be minimized by mean-centering variables (Neter et al., 1996). I mean-centered
knowledge diversity and the bargaining power measures before creating the interaction terms in

Table 4-12. Descriptive statistics and correlations a
Variable
Mean
1. Specific IP to specific partner
0.26
2. Severe termination
0.41
3. Alliance payment
0.67
4. Equity
0.38
5. Same partner
0.12
6. Supplier's R&D intensity
0.57
7. Buyer's total assets
22.84
8. Each partner manufacturing
0.27
9. Employment provisions
0.15
10. Knowledge diversity
0.60
11. Applicability of supplier's technology
2.02
12. Supplier's stockholders' equity
38.61
13. Buyer's R&D alliance portfolio
0.77
14. Any manufacturing by supplier
3.85

S.d.
0.44
0.50
0.48
0.49
0.33
0.24
83.61
0.45
0.36
0.29
0.64
63.32
0.42
4.35

Min
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.05
1.00
-41.49
0.00
0.00

Max
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.93
673.32
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
227.06
17.00
1.00

1

2

0.07
0.02
0.18
0.21†
0.07
-0.05
0.26*
0.14
0.25*
-0.07
0.17
0.00
0.18

0.13
0.11
0.12
0.09
-0.06
0.04
0.09
0.07
0.02
-0.03
0.08
-0.09

3

0.55***
0.03
0.12
-0.12
0.07
0.12
0.24†
0.03
-0.19
0.12
0.08

4

0.19
0.19
-0.12
0.22†
0.19
0.41***
-0.10
-0.29*
-0.09
0.17

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

-0.11
-0.01
0.02
0.03
-0.27*
0.22†
0.37**
0.26*
0.09

-0.23†
0.19
0.19
0.31*
0.26*
-0.01
0.02
-0.10

-0.03
-0.06
-0.06
-0.09
-0.02
0.17
0.12

0.03
0.22†
0.06
-0.14
0.11
0.33**

-0.08
0.03
0.10
0.28*
0.04

-0.20
-0.32**
-0.10
0.06

0.23†
0.15
0.12

0.41***
-0.08

0.18

a

N = 66
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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equation (3), as suggested by Aiken and West (1991). Applicability of supplier’s technology and
the measures of bargaining power were also mean-centered before creating the interaction terms
in equation (4). I then calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs). All individual VIFs and the
average VIF for each fully-specified model are well below the recommended threshold of 2.5,
which suggests that there is little multicollinearity (Belsley et al., 1980; Kleinbaum et al., 1988).
Table 4-13: Summary of results for study 2
Hypotheses (Predicted sign)
Conditional ‘main’ hypotheses
Assignment of specific IP rights to specific partner
H6: Partners’ knowledge diversity (+)
H7: Supplier’s shareholders’ equity (+)
H8: No. of buyer’s other alliances (-)
Assignment of severe termination rights
H10: Applicability of supplier’s technology (+)
H11: Supplier’s shareholders’ equity (-)
H12: No. of buyer’s other alliances (+)
H13: Supplier’s manufacturing responsibility (-)
Interactions
Assignment of specific IP rights to specific partner
H9a: Partners’ knowledge diversity x
Supplier’s shareholders’ equity (+)
H9b: Partners’ knowledge diversity x
No. of buyer’s other alliances (-)
Assignment of severe termination rights
H14a: Applicability of supplier’s technology x
Supplier’s shareholders’ equity (-)
H14b: Applicability of supplier’s technology x
No. of buyer’s other alliances (+)
H14c: Applicability of supplier’s technology x
Supplier’s manufacturing responsibility (-)
Significant control variables
Assignment of specific IP rights to specific partner
Alliance payment
Equity
Same partner
Note: Statistically significant results in bold

Sign of result

H6: + (p<0.01; Model 3)
H7: + (p<0.01; Model 3)
H8: not supported
H10: not supported
H11: not supported
H12: not supported
H13: not supported

H9a: not supported
H9b: not supported

H14a: not supported
H14b: not supported
H14c: not supported

+ (p<0.10; Model 3)
+ (p<0.05; Model 3)
+ (p<0.01; Model 3)

Table 4-13 is presented here to provide the reader with a brief summary of the results for
this study. A more complete discussion of the results follows. Table 4-13 shows that a limited
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number of the conditional ‘main’ hypotheses are supported, specifically Hypotheses 6 and 7.
None of the hypotheses that propose interactions are supported, however. The table also shows
that some support was found for the influence of the control variables alliance payment, equity,
and same partner on the assignment of specific IP rights to a specific partner. Further discussion
of these findings is warranted given the limited supported for the hypotheses in this study.
Table 4-14 presents the binary probit estimations for when the dependent variable is the
probability of assigning specific IP to a specific partner regardless of which partner invented it.
Model 1 includes only the control variables. Model 2 adds knowledge diversity to account for the
incentive-alignment explanation for the assignment of such rights, while Model 3 adds the
measures of bargaining power. Finally, Model 4 includes the interactions between knowledge
diversity and the measures of bargaining power (i.e., the supplier’s stockholders’ equity and the
number of alliances that the buyers is simultaneously involved in).
Table 4-14. Results of binary probit analysis for assignment of specific IP rights to specific partners a
Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 3:
Independent Variables
controls only
incentive alignment
bargaining power
Constant
-0.969*
(0.470)
-1.792*
(0.655)
-2.921*** (0.901)
Knowledge diversity (KD)
1.969*
(0.866)
3.147**
(1.209)
Supplier's shareholders' equity (SSE)
0.011**
(0.004)
No. of Buyer's other R&D alliances (BOA)
-0.067
(0.056)
KD x SSE
KD x BOA
Alliance payment
-0.952*
(0.419)
-1.175*
(0.463)
-1.050†
(0.612)
Equity
1.208**
(0.388)
1.030*
(0.463)
1.204*
(0.557)
Same Partner
1.248*
(0.575)
1.754**
(0.683)
1.897**
(0.690)
Supplier's R&D intensity
0.038
(0.773)
-0.440
(0.929)
-0.665
(0.951)
Buyer's total assets
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
Each firm manufacturing
0.669
(0.442)
0.511
(0.498)
0.644
(0.554)
Log pseudolikelihood
-31.402
-28.933
-25.962
Wald 2
29.58***
20.42**
35.07***
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
5.17*
11.89*
Wald Test (vs. previous model)
5.17*
8.68*

Model 4:
full model
-1.151
(0.737)
2.903**
(1.119)
0.010*
(0.005)
-0.080
(0.056)
-0.004
(0.016)
-0.226
(0.159)
-1.050
(0.674)
1.294*
(0.612)
1.897**
(0.613)
-0.494
(1.019)
0.001
(0.001)
0.784
(0.539)
-25.188
38.59***
14.32*
2.20

a

N = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

As noted in Table 4-14, the Wald chi-square statistic for all models is statistically
significant at the p<0.01 level or better, indicating that each model is an improvement over a
model that only includes a constant. Normally a likelihood-ratio test would be used to determine
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if Models 2-4 are an improvement over Model 1. However, when standard errors are calculated
by clustering, as is this case here, individual observations are no longer independent and the
‘likelihood’ measure calculated does not reflect this. Thus, it is recommended that the standard
likelihood-ratio test should not be used after estimation with clustering (Sribney, 1997 [updated
2005]). Instead, the Wald test, which is one way of testing whether the parameters associated
with a group of explanatory variables are zero, is preferred. If the Wald test is significant for a
particular group of explanatory variables, it is safe to conclude that the parameters associated
with the variables are not zero. As a result, the variables should be included in the model.
However, if the Wald test is not significant, the explanatory variables should be omitted from the
model (Agresti, 1990).
While the Wald test indicates that Model 4 is a significant improvement over Model 1, a
separate Wald test that compares Model 4 to Model 3 shows that it is not an improvement over
Model 3. This result indicates that the interaction terms should be omitted from the model. In
addition, the coefficients of the interaction terms are not statistically significant in Model 4.
However, because the model is non-linear, the magnitude and statistical significance of the
interaction terms cannot be directly interpreted by examining the coefficients and standard errors
associated with each term. To confirm that the interactions are not significant, I again employed
the procedure introduced by Zelner (2009). Not surprisingly, the test indicates that none of the
interactions are significant, corroborating the findings from the Wald test that the parameters
associated with the interaction terms are equal to zero. Thus, the analyses conducted in this study
do not provide any support for Hypotheses 9a-b.
Based on this result, I focus on Model 3 to investigate the other hypotheses developed in
this study. Before doing so, it is important to briefly examine the control variables. In Model 3,
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the sign of the coefficient for alliance payment is negative and significant at the p<0.10 level,
which indicates that this control influences the assignment of specific IP rights to specific
partners in an R&D alliance contract to some extent. This result is not surprising given that the
nature of the bargaining relationship between the partners is likely to be impacted when the
buyer commits to contribute funding to the supplier. The promise of an infusion of capital from
the buyer is likely to enhance the buyer’s ability to negotiate for favorable contract terms.
The sign of the coefficient for equity is positive and significant at the p<0.05 level. One
explanation for this result is that the buyer is willing to relinquish control of specific IP to the
supplier because it knows that it will be able to capture some portion of the returns from the IP
through its equity stake in the supplier. The sign of the coefficient for same partner is positive
and significant at the p<0.01 level, which indicates that firms that have partnered in the past are
more likely to assign specific IP to specific partners. This may reflect that the partners are using
the same contract template that they have in the past, or it may indicate something about the
nature of the bargaining relationship between them (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). However,
without the previous contracts between the partners, it is difficult to determine which explanation
is driving this result. None of the other control variables are statistically significant.
Turning to the main hypotheses, Hypothesis 6 suggests that when the partners specialize
in divergent areas of science or technology, specific IP is more likely to be assigned to specific
partners. Support is found for this hypothesis, as the coefficient for knowledge diversity is
statistically significant in the predicted direction at the p<0.01 level in Model 3. Hypothesis 7
proposes that when the supplier’s financial health is strong, specific IP is more likely to be
assigned to specific partners. Support is also found for this hypothesis, as the coefficient for
supplier’s stockholders’ equity is positive and statistically significant at the p<0.01 level in
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Model 3. Hypothesis 8 suggests that when the buyer is engaged in multiple R&D alliances,
specific IP is less likely to be assigned to specific partners. No support is found for this
hypothesis, as the coefficient for buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio is not statistically significant.
As noted, coefficients in non-linear models are not directly indicative of the magnitude of
the effect size. In such cases, the effect depends on the coefficient of the variable, the change in
its value, and the values selected for all of the other variables in the model (Long and Freese,
2006: 171). Researchers have been encouraged to report the marginal effects of key variables of
interest for several sets of theoretically interesting or empirically relevant values of the other
variables in the model (Hoetker, 2007: 335). While this approach is more informative than
reporting odds ratios or the coefficients alone, Zelner (2009) notes that the utility of a marginal
effect to answer questions of substantive interest is limited because a marginal effect is a
derivative. In some cases, particularly when the distribution of the variable of interest is
characterized by large differences between observed values, focusing on marginal effects may
give misleading estimates of probability changes (Peterson, 1985; Caudill and Jackson, 1989;
Kennedy, 2003: 266-267). As a result, it may be more informative to report the difference in the
predicted probabilities associated with a meaningful change in the variable of interest. The
simulation approach developed by King et al. (2000) can be used to do this.
Table 4-15 examines the economic significance of changes in knowledge diversity and
supplier’s stockholders’ equity on the likelihood of assigning specific IP rights to specific
partners in an R&D alliance. In this table, I hold all continuous variables at their respective
means and all dummy variables at their respective modes. Then to obtain the difference in the
probability of assigning specific IP to specific partners associated with a change in knowledge
diversity, I vary its value from one standard deviation below the mean (0.30) to one standard
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deviation above the mean (0.90). Similarly, to obtain the estimated difference in the probability
of assigning specific IP to specific partners associated with a change in supplier’s stockholders’
equity, I vary its value from -$40 million to $200 million. This range was selected to examine
extreme cases; one where the supplier is in desperate need of funding (-$40 million) and one
where the supplier’s financial health is particularly strong ($200 million).
Table 4-15. Estimated change in probabilities associated with changes in knowledge diversity
and supplier’s stockholders’ equity
Variable
Knowledge diversity
Supplier’s stockholders’ equity

Low
0.33%
0.25%

High
10.32%
33.75%

Difference
9.99%
33.40%

The estimated differences in the probability of assigning specific IP rights to specific
partners shown in Table 4-15 are both statistically significant at the p<0.01 level based on the
confidence intervals associated with their respective standard errors. In regards to knowledge
diversity, the results indicate that there is roughly a 10% higher probability of assigning specific
IP rights to specific partners when the partners’ knowledge portfolios are highly divergent as
opposed to when they greatly overlap. In addition, the table shows that specific IP rights are
33.4% more likely to be assigned to specific partners when the supplier’s financial health is
strong versus when the supplier is extremely cash-constrained.
Table 4-16 presents the binary probit estimations for when the dependent variable is the
probability of assigning severe termination rights to the buyer. Model 1 includes only the control
variables. Model 2 adds applicability of supplier’s technology to account for the explanation
based on a lack of verifiability, while Model 3 adds the measures of bargaining power. Finally,
Model 4 includes the interactions between applicability of supplier’s technology and the
measures of bargaining power. As noted in Table 4-16, the Wald chi-square statistic never
reaches a conventional level of statistical significance for any of the models. In addition, the
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control and independent variables are not statistically significant in any model. These results
suggest that there is no support for any of the hypotheses proposed in this study regarding the
assignment of severe termination rights.
Table 4-16. Results of binary probit analysis for assignment of severe termination rights to the buyer a
Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 3:
Independent Variables
controls only
incentive alignment
bargaining power
Constant
-0.357
(0.252)
-0.533
(0.605)
-0.723
(0.901)
Applicability of supplier's technology (AST)
0.090
(0.276)
0.049
(1.209)
Supplier's shareholders' equity (SSE)
0.003
(0.004)
Buyer's other R&D alliances (BOA)
-0.040
(0.612)
Any manufacturing by supplier (AMS)
0.333
(0.056)
AST x SSE
AST x BOA
AST x AMS
Alliance payment
0.332
(0.380)
0.318
(0.386)
0.344
(0.557)
Equity
0.118
(0.373)
0.135
(0.369)
0.232
(0.690)
Same Partner
-0.500
(0.480)
-0.523
(0.521)
-0.581
(0.951)
Buyer's total assets
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
Employment provisions
-0.481
(0.395)
-0.487
(0.399)
-0.418
(0.554)
Log pseudolikelihood
-42.941
-42.879
-42.169
Wald 2
4.34
4.33
6.58
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
0.11
1.52
Wald Test (vs. previous model)
0.11
1.49

Model 4:
full model
-0.387
(0.291)
0.064
(0.330)
0.003
(0.004)
-0.037
(0.041)
0.273
(0.512)
0.000
(0.006)
-0.025
(0.072)
-0.245
(0.736)
0.340
(0.400)
0.236
(0.368)
-0.563
(0.589)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.488
(0.451)
-42.041
7.82
2.84
0.44

a

N = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

4.5.6.1. Robustness Tests. Logistic regression techniques were employed in place of
probit as a robustness test. As expected, the results were substantially identical. This is not
surprising given that the cumulative normal and logistic distributions are very similar, except at
the tails. Considerable differences between the results of logit and probit are expected only when
the sample size is large. In such a case, the number of observations in the tails of the distributions
likely increases, highlighting the differing widths of the distributions at the tails (Maddala, 1983:
23). The sample size is relatively small in this study (N = 66), suggesting that it is unlikely that
there is much of a difference between the number of observations in the tails of the distributions.
An additional robustness test was conducted that examined the sensitivity of the
probability of assigning severe termination rights to the buyer to the aggregation level for the
technological classifications for the measure applicability of supplier’s technology. In addition to
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determining the average number of 3-digit technological classes assigned to all of the supplier’s
patents that were filed for in the 5 years prior to the alliance, I also calculated the average
number of 6-digit classes assigned to each of the supplier’s patents. The results did not change in
any of the models; none of the models reach a conventional level of statistical significance.
4.5.7. Discussion
In this study, I set out to examine the factors that influence the assignment of two
important control rights in R&D alliance contracts, namely IP rights and severe termination
rights. I suggested that in order to align the partners’ incentives, the ability to exploit IP today
and in the future should be taken into consideration when deciding whether to assign specific IP
to a specific partner, regardless of which partner was responsible for its invention. I also
proposed that the applicability of the supplier’s technology, which creates a potential verifiability
challenge, influences the assignment of severe termination rights to the buyer. Two hypotheses,
rooted in PRT and agency theory, were then investigated.
I also suggested that bargaining power plays a role in the assignment of both rights. Most
of the previous research on the role of bargaining power investigates its direct impact (e.g.,
Lerner et al., 2003; Higgins, 2007; Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). According to Aghion and
Tirole (1994), however, the efficient allocation of control rights is distorted by bargaining power,
suggesting that it may play a moderating role. With the exception of Lerner and Merges (1998),
this possibility has not been explored. Thus, this study also endeavored to investigate if and how
bargaining power impacts the assignment of key rights in R&D alliance contracts. Hypotheses
were developed proposing both a direct and a moderating effect of bargaining power.
The results reported in the previous section provide support for the hypothesis that the
partners’ ability to exploit IP impacts the decision to assign specific IP rights to specific partners.
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The results also indicate that the supplier’s bargaining power has a direct influence on this
decision. No support was uncovered, however, for a moderating role for bargaining power. In
addition, the results do not provide support for the hypotheses that examine the assignment of
severe termination rights to the buyer. It is important to further investigate and interpret these
results (and non-results), as there are theoretical and practical implications.
While the results indicate that the partners’ ability to exploit IP (as measured by their
knowledge diversity) impacts the assignment of specific IP rights to specific partners, Table 4-15
shows that the predicted probability of this occurring is rather low even when the partners’
knowledge portfolios are highly diverse (10.32%). In addition, the difference in the probability
associated with a change from a low level of diversity to a high level of diversity is rather small
(~10%). Thus, even though this result is statistically significant, from a practical standpoint, it
does not appear as if considerations about the partners’ ability to exploit IP are factored into
decisions about the assignment of these rights to a large extent.
In contrast, the predicted probability of IP rights being assigned to specific partners when
the supplier possesses the bargaining power (as measured by supplier’s stockholders’ equity) is
higher (33.75%). The difference in the probability of this event occurring associated with a
change from a low to a high level of supplier bargaining power is also greater (33.40%). Thus,
the statistical and economic significance of the results appear to suggest that bargaining power
considerations play a stronger role in the assignment of specific IP rights to specific partners than
knowledge exploitation considerations.
It is important to note, however, that the probability of assigning specific IP to specific
partners never exceeds 50% in Table 4-15. These probabilities are dependent on the values that
all of the other variables in the model are set to, in addition to the range over which the variable
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of interest is changed. As noted in the previous section, I set the continuous variables to their
mean and the dummy variables to their mode in order to obtain the probabilities displayed in
Table 4-15 from the simulation. For example, the probabilities associated with a change in
knowledge diversity rely on the mean value for supplier’s stockholders’ equity (~$39 million).
Based on an examination of the distribution of supplier’ stockholders’ equity in the sample, the
mean value is much closer to the cash-constrained end of the spectrum rather than the
financially-strong end. Thus, different results are obtained if the same change from a low to high
value of knowledge diversity is made for other values of supplier’s stockholders’ equity.

Probability of assigning specific IP to specific
partners
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Figure 4-16. Predicted probability of assigning specific IP to specific partners over the entire
range of supplier’s stockholders’ equity at three levels of knowledge diversity
Figure 4-16 shows this difference over the entire distribution of supplier’s stockholders’
equity in the sample. The thick dashed line corresponds to the probabilities associated with a low
and high level of knowledge diversity at the mean value of supplier’s stockholders’ equity. As
the bargaining power of the supplier improves (i.e., stockholders’ equity increases from its mean
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value) in Figure 4-16, the probability of assigning specific IP rights to specific partners increases
regardless of whether the partners’ knowledge diversity is high, low or average. Importantly, the
probability of this event occurring exceeds 50% in the high knowledge diversity condition. The
fanning out of the lines in the figure, however, appears to indicate that incentive-alignment
considerations are factored in to some extent when the supplier possesses a high degree of
bargaining power.
Conversely, as the supplier’s bargaining power further weakens (i.e., stockholders’ equity
declines from its mean value), the probability of assigning specific IP rights to specific partners
decreases regardless of the level of knowledge diversity. Specifically, when the supplier is
extremely cash-constrained, bargaining power appears to completely trump incentive-alignment
considerations. Note that the three lines indicating the different levels of knowledge diversity
converge to a probability of approximately 0% in this case. Overall, the results presented in
Figure 4-16 suggest that bargaining power plays the predominant role in the decision to assign
specific IP to specific partners. In addition, it appears that incentive-alignment considerations do
factor into this decision, primarily when the supplier’s financial health is extremely strong.
From a theoretical standpoint, Figure 4-16 provides some support for Aghion and
Tirole’s (1994) suggestion that bargaining power distorts the relationship predicted by PRT,
especially when the supplier is in a weak bargaining position. However, this distortion takes the
form of a direct effect rather than a moderation effect. As shown in Figure 4-14, for a ‘true’
interaction, the probability of assigning specific IP to specific partners should remain at
approximately 0% at low levels of knowledge diversity even when the supplier’s bargaining
position is enhanced. This is not the case in Figure 4-16, as the probability increases for all levels
of knowledge diversity when the supplier’s bargaining power is strong. In addition, the model
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that examined the proposed interactions between knowledge diversity and the various measures
of bargaining power was not a statistical improvement over the model that contained only main
effects, and none of the interaction terms were statistically significant. These results lend further
support to the notion that the distortion proposed by Aghion and Tirole (1994) manifests through
the direct effect of bargaining power.
From a practical standpoint, the results highlight the potential sub-optimization of
innovation problem discussed by Leiponen (2008). When IP rights are assigned based on
bargaining power considerations rather than the logic of incentive-alignment, the alliance may
suffer from underinvestment (both in terms of funding and effort). As a result, Leiponen (2008)
found that the misallocation of rights leads to a significant reduction in the probability of
innovation in the context of knowledge-based service industries. While a direct measure of the
innovative outcome of the R&D alliances in the sample was not collected for this study, this is a
future avenue to explore. Another extension of this study that would shed some light on whether
the partners recognize that the ex ante assignment of rights is sub-optimal would be to examine if
there are renegotiations and amendments to the contract that re-align incentives by changing the
way that IP rights are assigned.
A second practical implication of the findings from this study is that suppliers that are on
financially stable ground are better positioned to negotiate with large buyers over key rights.
This concurs with the practitioner perspectives presented by Lerner and Merges (1998) for
biopharmaceutical alliances.35 The bargaining ability of financially strong suppliers may purely
be a function of a lack of cash constraints, but it also may be due to the development of strong
alliance and contract capabilities (Dyer et al., 2001; Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Financially
35

This result is also important in light of the fact that none of the resource-based measures of bargaining power
impact the assignment of IP rights. Thus, in line with the Lerner and Merges’ (1998) anecdotes, the results of this
study reinforce the notion that managers focus on financial constraints when negotiating R&D alliance contracts.

228
strong suppliers are expected to have participated in more successful R&D alliances, providing
the experience necessary to build such capabilities over time. Conversely, cash-constrained
suppliers are more likely to be younger and lack previous R&D alliance experience. In addition,
even if cash-constrained suppliers have participated in previous R&D alliances, their focus may
be more on the technical aspects rather than legal or managerial concerns. Future research should
examine this possibility.
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, the non-results for the hypotheses that explore the
assignment of severe termination rights suggest that other explanations should be considered.
Based on discussions with practitioners, an institutional theory explanation may be viable. Since
the Supreme Court recognized the government’s right to terminate for convenience in 1875
(United States v. Corliss Steam Engine Company, 1876), courts and administrative boards have
placed few limits on this right. Harkening back to the incentive-alignment explanation, it is
recognized in the law that unilateral termination for convenience provides the terminating party
with the power to demand contract performance while reserving the right to end the relationship
if the contract proves undesirable at some later point in time. In support, the District Court of
New Jersey said that the parties to a contract enjoy ‘considerable discretion in deciding when and
to what extent a contract may be terminated’ (Linan-Faye Construction Company, Inc. v.
Housing Authority of the City of Camden, 1994). The question, however, is whether and under
what conditions can a party opposing termination for convenience attack the enforceability of the
provision. Different courts may apply different standards, and these standards may change over
time. Thus, depending on the jurisdiction, it may be more or less costly to incorporate severe
termination rights in an R&D alliance contract when the cost of possible future litigation is taken
into consideration. As a result, the inclusion of severe termination rights may be a function of
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their enforceability in the jurisdiction that the contract is governed by. This is a valuable avenue
to explore in future research.
Overall, the results from this study provide insight into the assignment of key rights in
R&D alliance contracts, specifically IP rights. The findings particularly lend support to the
notion that ex ante bargaining power is a strong determinant of the assignment of IP rights. The
results do suggest, however, that incentive-alignment considerations play a role to some extent
when the supplier is financially strong. Finally, the non-results for the hypotheses that examined
the assignment of severe termination rights suggest that alternative explanations should be
explored that draw on perspectives other than PRT and agency theory.
4.6. Conclusion
In the first study of this essay, I examine the hazards that plague R&D alliances and the
contractual safeguards designed to contend with them. I also examine whether managers and
lawyers are as farsighted as TCE suggests by investigating if and how previous alliance
experience impacts the design of R&D alliance contracts. In the second study of this essay, I
examine the assignment of two important decision and control rights in R&D alliance contracts,
namely foreground IP rights and severe termination rights (i.e., those that can be invoked
unilaterally and unconditionally). In this concluding section, I summarize the arguments and
findings from each study, highlight the contributions to the existing literature, and suggest
managerial implications. Finally, I identify the limitations of the studies in this essay and suggest
future research directions.
4.6.1. Summary of Argument and Findings
Drawing on TCE, I argue in Study 1 that specific contractual provisions can be drafted to
address the context-specific hazards that arise in R&D alliances. As the level of these hazards
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rise, the likelihood of including such provisions in the contract similarly rises. In an alliance,
contractual provisions essentially substitute for the hierarchical governance mechanisms that
provide the structure and rules through which hazards are dealt with in a vertically integrated
firm or an equity joint venture. However, because R&D alliances require creativity and
innovation, such provisions should only be included in the contract if the hazards are severe in
order to avoid adding unnecessary constraints. Haggling over irrelevant terms is also likely to
lead to protracted contract negotiations (Weber et al., 2009) and the potential breakdown of trust
between the partners before the alliance even begins.
TCE assumes that the managers and lawyers that draft alliance contracts are relatively
farsighted in their ability to perceive when hazards are present at the outset of negotiations or
likely to arise as the alliance unfolds. In addition, TCE expects managers and lawyers to learn
relatively quickly from their experience and incorporate what they learn into subsequent
contracting situations, allowing them to develop what Williamson (1996) calls ‘responsive
institutions’. Based on recent case study evidence (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Lumineau et
al., 2011), however, I suggest that this learning process is not necessarily as fast as presumed by
TCE. Rather, ‘contract design capabilities’ (Agyres and Mayer, 2007) accumulate slowly over
time. In addition, such capabilities have a ‘shelf-life’, wherein they atrophy if they are not used.
Thus, I argue that the relationship between the degree that hazards are present and the likelihood
of including provisions to contend with them predicted by TCE will be impacted by the previous
alliance experience possessed by each partner. Furthermore, I propose that the impact of
experience is likely to depend on the types of alliances that a firm has engaged in. Specifically,
the challenges and hazards encountered in marketing and supply alliances are likely to be
different than those faced by firms in R&D alliances. As a result, managers and lawyers that
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have not drafted an R&D alliance contract may be less aware of the pertinent hazards than their
counterparts with a wealth of such experience.
Study 2 draws on the incentive-alignment logic of PRT to examine the assignment of
decision and control rights in R&D alliance contracts. I deviate from previous research by
investigating the allocation of two of these key rights, namely foreground IP rights and severe
termination rights, rather than examining how a larger bundle of rights is divided between
alliance partners. The rationale for taking this approach is grounded in recent research that shows
firms are concerned about gaining control over specific rights that are highly relevant to their
goals and objectives as opposed to simply ‘winning’ the most rights (e.g., Ariño and Ring, 2010;
Kloyer, 2011). In addition, recent research also proposes that different rights/bundles of rights
are functionally differentiated, suggesting that the underlying factors that determine their
assignment are likely to be different (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). Thus, I propose in Study 2
that the assignment of foreground IP should take into consideration each partner’s ability to
utilize the IP today and in the future in order to create the proper incentives for each partner to
optimally contribute to the alliance. I also propose that severe termination rights should be
assigned to the buyer in order to eliminate the supplier’s incentive to shirk on the alliance when a
lack of verifiability of the supplier’s actions creates the potential for ‘project substitution’ or
‘project cross-subsidization’. In addition, I examine if and how ex ante bargaining power
influences the assignment of rights by testing both direct and moderating effects of several
factors that determine each partner’s bargaining position.
Using a sample of 66 R&D alliances in the medical device industry, I find moderate
support for the hypothesis that previous alliance experience moderates the relationship predicted
by TCE regarding the inclusion of contractual safeguards to contend with transaction hazards.
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Study 1 indicates that R&D alliance contracts are more likely to include a facilities access
provision if the supplier’s knowledge is highly tacit when buyers have more previous alliance
experience. The results do not support a similar outcome when the supplier’s previous alliance
experience is considered. Taken together, these findings are not surprising given that technical
knowledge often flows in only one direction in R&D alliances: from the supplier to the buyer
(Alvarez and Barney, 2001). Thus, while the inclusion of a facilities access provision is salient to
the buyer, the supplier may find its inclusion less desirable, as such access may hasten the
buyer’s ability to appropriate the supplier’s proprietary knowledge and abandon the alliance.
Furthermore, the results indicate that it is not simply the total number of previous
alliances (or R&D alliances) that a firm has engaged in that helps it to ‘learn how to contract’
(Mayer and Argyres, 2004), but the fraction of its total experience dedicated to R&D alliances.
Again, this finding applies to the buyers in the sample investigated in Study 1, which are
typically larger firms. Such firms are more likely to have in-house counsel or a business
development team that possesses experience designing R&D alliance contracts than smaller,
entrepreneurial firms that are more focused on their survival. This finding also provides some
support for the notion that the type and intensity of the experience matters, as the hazards
encountered in marketing and supply alliances are not likely to be as relevant in R&D alliances.
Study 1 also tentatively indicates that R&D alliance contracts are more likely to include
non-solicitation provisions if there is a risk of misappropriation when suppliers have more
previous alliance experience. Again, this finding is not entirely surprising given that protecting
knowledge from misappropriation is a more salient issue for small suppliers engaged in R&D
alliances than large buyers. The results only provide tentative support, however, because even
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though the change in the probability of including a non-solicitation provision as supplier’s gain
experience has economic significance, the interaction terms lack statistical significance.
Finally, Study 1 tentatively shows that R&D alliance contracts are less likely to include a
non-solicitation provision if there is a risk of misappropriation when the buyer has more previous
alliance experience. This finding runs counter to both the baseline prediction of TCE and the
proposed interaction hypothesis. It is possible, however, that buyers may prefer not to include a
non-solicitation provision when the supplier’s knowledge is tacit, especially in the event that the
alliance expires or is terminated without meeting its objectives. In such a case, the buyer retains
its option to recruit and hire the supplier’s employees that possess the tacit knowledge, thereby
salvaging the alliance. Again, even though the magnitude of this result has economic
significance, the lack of statistical significance suggests that it should be cautiously interpreted.
Alternatively, this result may simply reflect the buyer’s leverage over the supplier.
The results reported in Study 2 support the hypothesis that the partners’ relative ability to
exploit IP impacts the decision to assign specific IP rights to specific partners. The results also
show that ex ante bargaining power directly influences this decision, rather than moderating the
incentive-alignment based hypothesis. Deeper investigation of the results indicates that the
impact of bargaining power overwhelms the influence of the partners’ ability to exploit IP when
the supplier is cash-constrained at the outset of the alliance. However, when the supplier’s
financial health is strong, knowledge exploitation considerations play a larger role in the
assignment of IP rights.
Unfortunately, Study 2 does not show any support for the hypotheses regarding the
assignment of severe termination rights in R&D alliances. This lack of results was discussed at
some length at the end of the study.
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4.6.2. Contributions
The idiosyncratic nature of R&D creates the potential for opportunism when firms
collaborate to conduct an R&D project. Although previous research has focused on examining
the choice between different collaborative governance forms (i.e., alliances vs. joint ventures) in
the face of opportunism, the literature has paid limited attention until recently to the contracts
developed to provide ex post support when the partners decide to form an alliance. Thus, Study 1
sought to fill this gap and advance research on contract design by studying provisions that are
included in R&D alliance contracts to provide such support. Drawing on TCE, I argue and show
that the inclusion of facilities access and non-solicitation provisions in an R&D alliance contract
is determined by the communication and safeguarding needs presented by an alliance. The
findings tentatively suggest that contractual provisions provide an alternative to hierarchical
governance for dealing with the ex post concerns that arise during alliance implementation.
While the findings from Study 1 suggest that contract design decisions adhere to the logic
of TCE, the economic rationality of managers and lawyers appears to have its limits, especially
in light of the results for the moderating influence of previous alliance experience. Theoretically,
Study 1 shows some support for the notion that managers and lawyers may not be consciously
applying TCE. In addition, the results suggest that they are not as far sighted and able to design
‘responsive’ contracts as TCE assumes. Rather, managers and lawyers with little or no
experience may initially struggle with contract design, as suggested by Lumineau et al. (2011).
In line with Mayer and Argyres’ (2004) findings, they appear to learn somewhat slowly over
time and incorporate elements from previous contracts that produced a positive outcome. Thus,
Study 1 demonstrates to some extent that decisions that conform to the logic of TCE may only
come about after managers and lawyers have experienced a particular hazard and solved it
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firsthand. They may not immediately understand why the solution that was implemented worked,
however, until they have experienced several situations with the same hazard requiring the same
solution.
Whereas previous research that has examined ‘learning how to contract’ has relied on
case studies of single contracts or a series of contracts between the same partners, Study 1 is
unique in that it utilized a sample that consisted of contracts from multiple companies. In
addition, information was collected about the alliance history of each individual firm in the
sample. Thus, I was able to investigate whether the previous findings regarding the relatively
slow and incremental nature of ‘learning how to contract’ are idiosyncratic to the firms studied
or generalizable to firms in other contexts/industries. The results of this study lend some support
to the latter.
In addition to providing insight into the limitations of economic rationality, the results
from Study 1 contribute to the inter-organizational learning and alliance capabilities streams of
the literature. Study 1’s focus on previous alliance experience speaks to the notion of ‘learning
about alliance management’ found in the inter-organizational learning literature. Studies in this
literature suggest that firms that have extensive alliance experience learn to manage alliances
more effectively over time (Barkema et al., 1997; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Tsang, 2002). As
part of this experience, firms are expected to develop ‘contract design capabilities’ (Argyres and
Mayer, 2007) as they participate in more alliances.
Both streams of the literature emphasize that the benefits derived from previous
experience may be short-lived and depreciate rapidly unless what has been learned is deliberately
captured (Mayer and Agryres, 2004; Sampson, 2005). In the absence of explicit processes,
knowledge may go undocumented, making it unavailable to managers and lawyers in subsequent
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contracting situations. Although a direct measure of the presence of a ‘learning’ process was not
captured, Study 1 does provide a degree of confirmation for the notion that firms that participate
in more alliances learn more about alliance management, suggesting that they capture more of
what has been learned. Specifically, when a firm’s portfolio of alliances is composed of a higher
ratio of R&D alliances over a five-year period, it appears as if what has been learned is exercised
enough to prevent the firm’s contract design capabilities from atrophying.
In Study 2, I sought to examine the assignment of control/decision rights considered to be
important in the context of an R&D alliance. PRT suggests that control/decision rights should be
assigned in an economically rational manner in order to create the proper incentive for each
partner to invest in the alliance at an optimal level. However, in regards to the assignment of
foreground IP rights, the results suggest that the logic of incentive alignment is overwhelmed by
bargaining power concerns unless the supplier’s financial health is strong. This finding
demonstrates that the economic rationality of managers and lawyers has its limits. In addition,
the results suggest that bargaining power has a strong direct, rather than moderating, impact on
the assignment of foreground IP rights. The importance of this finding is that it shed lights on the
mechanism through which the distorting influence of bargaining power, originally proposed by
Aghion and Tirole (1994), operates. With the exception of Lerner and Merges (1998), previous
research has not tested whether this distortion manifests itself directly or as a moderator.
Study 2 also examines Adegbesan and Higgins’ (2011) suggestion that the assignment of
different rights that play different functions is influenced by different factors. The findings from
Study 2 tentatively suggest that this is the case. I was able to test this proposal because I
examined the assignment of individual rights that play different roles, in contrast to many of the
existing studies that investigate how many rights a particular partner wins. Whereas the
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assignment of foreground IP rights, which divide the returns from the alliance between the
partners, is influenced by both incentive alignment and bargaining power concerns, the
assignment of severe termination rights, which safeguard against private rent seeking behavior, is
not. Because of the lack of statistically significant results, I speculated that the assignment of
severe termination rights may be influenced by other factors including the legal standards in
different jurisdictions.
4.6.3. Implications for Practice
While the studies conducted in this essay are based primarily on economic theories,
managerial concerns also motivated the research questions examined. Thus, the results of these
studies hold managerial implications in addition to the theoretical contributions discussed. For
managers of firms that participate in many R&D alliances, these studies demonstrate that it is
important to capture the lessons from previous alliances in order to design more effective
contracts in the future. Cultivating contract design capabilities requires conscious effort, which
may be especially challenging for smaller, entrepreneurial firms. Given their focus on technical
issues and simply surviving, smaller firms may be hesitant to dedicate scarce resources to the
establishment of a full-blown alliance function. However, in light of historically high failure
rates for alliances (Bamford et al., 2004), and the erosion of trust when contract negotiations
focus on irrelevant issues (Weber et al., 2009), establishing even rudimentary processes to
capture lessons from previous experience may pay off in future contracting situations.
An interesting, yet speculative suggestion based on the results of Study 1 to entrepreneurs
looking to found a new technology-based company would be to include a business development
and/or legal affairs expert on the founding team, particularly one that has experience formulating
deal structures and negotiating collaborations in a similar industry context. Having such an

238
expert on the founding team should help to overcome the capabilities gap that many new firms
face in regards to alliance management. Among the suppliers in the sample investigated in Study
1, less than a third listed a business development position on its top management team in its S-1
filing. It is not entirely clear from the descriptions provided, however, but it appears that only a
handful of the individuals filling these positions possessed any previous business development
experience at the time the firm was founded. In addition, fewer than a dozen suppliers in the
sample list someone in a legal affairs or in-house counsel role on its S-1 filing. Thus, despite
having a business development manager or general counsel, many smaller, entrepreneurial firms
are likely to lack the capabilities required to manage the alliance life cycle.
In the absence of a founding team member with such experience, start-up firms may
consider retaining outside counsel that is familiar with the industry context that the firm operates
in. This may be a stop-gap measure during the period in which the firm is building its
technological capabilities, but most likely it is not a long-term solution if top management
anticipates engaging in numerous collaborative endeavors. In the long run, having personnel
dedicated to negotiating deals and drafting contracts is more likely to lead to the creation of the
requisite capabilities. Fostering systems and practices to capture the lessons from experience
should also help develop such capabilities at the firm level. In the event of employee turnover,
knowledge that is not codified is likely to leave the firm with the individual that possesses it.
However, if it is codified, the knowledge is more likely to remain with the firm even if key
employees leave.
A final interesting, yet conjectural suggestion based on Study 1 for managers and lawyers
in smaller firms is to learn as much as possible about contract design and alliance management
from their large firm counterparts during the contract development and implementation stages of
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the alliance lifecycle. Alvarez and Barney (2001) note that in the classic race situation, smaller
firms often lack the capabilities to learn organizational practices from their larger partners.
However, knowing that this is the case in advance may allow the smaller partner’s managers and
lawyers to better prepare for learning opportunities, especially if the firm has personnel dedicated
to playing this role and rudimentary learning processes in place.
Turning to Study 2, the results highlight the potential sub-optimization of innovation
problem that is likely to occur when bargaining power considerations overpower the logic of
incentive-alignment. If the assignment of IP is determined by the relative bargaining positions of
the partners, the alliance may suffer from underinvestment (both in terms of funding and effort),
reducing the probability of innovation (and profits). Leiponen (2008) suggests that contracts
could be proactively and strategically written in a manner that creates incentives for each partner
to invest at the optimal level. Kloyer (2011) demonstrates the importance of properly assigning
IP rights in order to control the threat of moral hazard, and thus restore each partner’s incentive
to exert optimal effort. One implication for practice is that assigning IP to the partner best suited
to exploit it today and in the future may heighten the assigned partner’s motivation to continue to
invest in the IP, which is likely to improve innovative and financial performance in the long run.
A second managerial implication related to the finding that bargaining power concerns
often overwhelm the ideal assignment of IP is that managers and lawyers need to be aware of the
balance of power between the alliance partners. As noted, Lerner and Merges (1998) provide
anecdotal evidence that pharmaceutical firm business development experts use the imbalance of
power to capture more key rights in R&D alliance contracts. This practice may lead to
contentious ex ante haggling and costly ex post renegotiations, which in turn likely harms the
alliance outcome. Thus, managers and lawyers are encouraged to proactively take the balance of
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power into consideration when negotiating over foreground IP rights. A frank and honest
discussion between the partners about their respective bargaining positions may help to prevent
strong arm tactics over such rights. Rather, the partners can focus on establishing a framework
that will encourage each firm to exert its optimal amount of effort, while promoting cooperation
and collaboration between the firms.
4.6.4. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
First, caution must be exercised when generalizing the results from the studies in this
essay to other contexts. The arguments about the inclusion of specific contractual provisions and
the assignment of key control rights are examined here in the context of R&D alliances. The
pooling of resources and capabilities in this context gives rise to specific hazards, which factor
prominently in the choice of the contractual safeguards employed and how rights are assigned.
Alliances involving marketing or supply activities are likely to involve different hazards,
implying that the relationships examined for R&D alliances may not be relevant in other
contexts. Thus, similar analyses for alliances involving other value chain activities are required
to determine what the key hazards are in those contexts and what provisions are appropriate to
contend with them.
The empirical results may also be sensitive to the industry analyzed. Many of the
previous studies of contract design and the allocation of control rights have examined
biopharmaceuticals. Despite sharing many characteristics, the medical device industry differs
from this setting in several ways. Whereas R&D is driven by basic science in biotechnology,
R&D in the medical device industry relies more on advances in relatively established areas of
technology. In addition, there is a difference in the volume of R&D alliances in each setting.
While recent trends are driving the development of convergence devices that are pushing the
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limits of traditional device manufacturers, there have been fewer R&D alliances in the medical
device industry than in biopharmaceuticals over a comparable period of time. Thus, with the
exception of very large medical device firms, most entrepreneurial firms possess a relatively
small amount of previous alliance experience. Considering that the hypotheses regarding the
impact of contracting capabilities rely on measures of previous alliance experience, very
different results may be found in the biopharmaceutical setting compared to the results
uncovered in Study 1.
A final empirical limitation to consider is the size of the sample of contracts used to test
the hypotheses developed in each study. A direct consequence of fewer alliances taking place in
the medical device industry is that fewer alliance contracts are available. Windhover’s Strategic
Transactions database is the most complete source of information on alliances in the medical
device industry, so I have some degree of confidence that the contracts employed in the studies
in this essay represent a fairly thorough collection of the contracts that were filed with the SEC
per the materially relevant transaction standard. Nonetheless, the limited number of contracts
available hinders the power of the analysis. Particularly in cases when the sample size is small, a
Type II error is more probable than a Type I error (Wuensch, 1994). This problem is further
exacerbated when there are several independent variables, as demonstrated by Monte Carlo
simulations conducted by Hart and Clark (1999) that explore the behavior of Maximum
Likelihood estimates in probit models across differing sample size and with varying numbers of
independent variables.
Beyond extensions of the studies conducted in this essay to other industry settings and
value chain contexts, an important direction for future research would be to examine the
relationship between innovation, performance and the assignment of IP rights. Despite evidence
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that contracts are frequently renegotiated due to changes in bargaining power (Lerner et al.,
2003), we still know very little about whether eventually correcting contracts that initially assign
IP rights ‘incorrectly’ results in better innovative outcomes and more successful alliances.
Another fruitful avenue to pursue, which was mentioned in the discussion at the end of
Study 2, would be to examine alternative explanations for the lack of results regarding the
assignment of severe termination rights to the buyer when verifiability problems exist. Despite
previous research in the biopharmaceuticals setting that shows that this relationship is valid (e.g.,
Robinson and Stuart, 2007; Lerner and Malmendier, 2010), it is worth exploring other rationales.
Also, while the lack of results may be due to a Type II error, the institutional arrangements may
differ between the industry settings, suggesting that industry norms rather than incentive
alignment impacts the assignment of severe termination rights in the medical device industry.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, contract clauses may substitute for more hierarchical
mechanisms in alliances. Recent research, however, has investigated the use of committees to
contend with the same hazards that were identified in Study 1 (Reuer and Devarakonda, 2012).
Thus, it would be interesting to examine whether contractual clauses and alliance committees are
used simultaneously or if they are actually substitutes. Speculatively, contractual clauses may be
more appropriate in situations where the response to a hazard can be specified in detail before the
alliance begins. In contrast, committees may be better suited to dealing with hazards that arise
after the alliance begins when the response cannot be specified or the hazard foreseen during
contract negotiations.
Finally, it would be valuable to capture an actual measure of previous contracting
experience in place of the counts of previous alliances used to proxy for contract design
capabilities. It is nearly impossible to collect fine-grained information about the experience
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possessed by the actual managers and lawyer who negotiated a contract, such as how many
contracts they have drafted and for what types of alliances. However, 10-K reports and IPO
prospectuses provide information about the general experience possessed by members of the top
management team, and whether any members hold the title of business development director or
have any previous business development experience. Ideally, it would be valuable to determine if
a firm has an alliance function but this information is not frequently disclosed publicly.
4.6.5. Concluding Remarks
The studies in this essay provide evidence that contracts are consistently designed that do
not conform to the predictions of economic rationality. TCE predicts that firms that fail to learn
from their previous mistakes and continue to design inadequate contracts will perform poorly,
and eventually be forced to exit the market (Williamson, 1985). However, because it is
empirically difficult to control for all of the factors that could potentially impact firm
performance, we do not have much evidence that indicates that poorly designed contracts lead to
unsuccessful alliances or poor firm performance (Weber et al., 2009).
What we do witness is that contracts are frequently renegotiated (Reuer and Ariño, 2002;
Lerner et al., 2003). From a managerial standpoint, haggling over irrelevant terms can be
frustrating, resulting in the breakdown of trust between partners, which may contribute to the
failure of an alliance. Getting caught up in constantly renegotiating terms in an R&D alliance is
especially likely to prevent the partners from focusing on creativity and innovation, activities
required for success. Thus, the studies in this essay suggest that if managers can be made aware
of why certain provisions are appropriate or worth negotiating about in specific situations, they
are more likely to be better equipped to use their knowledge to positively influence the contracts
that they design, leading to better alliance and firm performance.
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CHAPTER 5
COMPREHENSIVE CONCLUSION
5.1. Introduction
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to draw together the findings from the three
essays in this dissertation. Despite the different levels of analysis covered in each essay, there are
several connections that can be made that provide valuable insights for both theory and practice.
In addition, some interesting research questions and opportunities arise from a consideration of
how these essays relate to each other.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. I begin by recapping the common
themes that unify the essays in this dissertation. This is followed by a discussion of how the key
findings from each essay are linked. I then touch upon key implications for both theory and
practice based on these linkages. Finally, I present potential extensions and offer some new
directions that could be explored based on the connections between the findings.
5.2. Common Themes: Technological Creativity and the Shifting Boundaries of R&D
One common theme that unifies the three essays in this dissertation is the pursuit of
technological creativity. As noted in the introduction, Mokyr (1990) suggests that technological
creativity is one of the most potent forces in history and a key driver of economic progress. He
goes on to state that technological creativity has provided society with a ‘free lunch’ in that the
returns from innovation are greater than the increase in effort and the cost necessary to bring
about the output. Despite the importance of technological creativity to the advancement of
society and the improvement of living standards, the process of innovation has been less than
systematic throughout much of human history. The widespread adoption of the ‘method of
invention’ in the late-19th century played an important role in systematizing this process
(Whitehead, 1985[1926]), advancing the pursuit of new scientific knowledge from the realm of
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ad hoc testing to an endeavor based on the use of rigorous and repeatable procedures to test
hypotheses.
The second theme drawing the essays in this dissertation together is the shifting
boundaries of R&D. For much of the 19th century, R&D was conducted outside of the boundaries
of the firm. However, in the first half of the 20th century, firms increasingly brought R&D in
house with the establishment of corporate labs, as control over the process of innovation
promised to be a pathway to and a source of competitive advantage. The boundaries of R&D
remained fairly stable in the U.S. for a relatively long period of time, only to become fluid again
in the last few decades of the 20th century. This period has witnessed the relatively rapid
adoption of collaborative forms of R&D that bring together entities from both the public and
private sector to develop and commercialize new technology. Chesbrough (2003) has
characterized this current shift as a transition from a closed to an open innovation paradigm. As
the boundaries continue to blur, some researchers have called into question our conceptions of
firms, suggesting that these new collaborative arrangements are in essence networks that allow
for the efficient and reliable exchange of scientific and technological knowledge (Powell, 1990).
Collectively, the broad themes that connect the three essays in this dissertation bring up
several interesting and important questions. For example, why did the pursuit of technological
creativity shift from an activity mainly conducted outside of the boundaries of the firm to one
performed in-house in the first half of the 20th century? In addition, what factors caused the
boundaries to blur in the last few decades of the 20th century, leading to the collaborative pursuit
of technological creativity? Also, how do firms decide whether to conduct R&D internally or
rely on an external R&D source? Finally, what types of formal arrangements are established to
manage relationships with external sources of R&D in order to promote technological creativity?

246
These questions and several others were examined in the three essays in this dissertation. The
following section briefly summarizes how the main findings from each essay are linked.
5.3. Connections between Key Findings from Each Essay
The first two essays in this dissertation examined the fluidity of the boundaries of R&D
from an historical perspective and at the level of a single project. An important finding in these
essays is that formal and informal institutions have had a major impact on the transition to and
the acceptance and use of collaborative forms of innovation. Specifically, as discussed in the first
essay, institutions act as shift parameters. In essence, institutions impact the costs of engaging in
transactions. The range of organizational options available may be wider or narrower depending
on whether institutions decrease or increase such costs.
A second key finding that cuts across essays is that the adoption of new organizational
forms often has little to do with economic rationality. Rather, firms engage in mimetic
isomorphism to gain legitimacy among peers, adopting practices because they are fashionable. In
addition, institutions often exhibit a great deal of inertia, especially if powerful actors are deeply
invested in maintaining the status quo. As a result, the institutional setting may be stable over a
long period of time, greatly limiting experimentation with different organizational forms. In
order to overcome such inertia, a triggering event or change in leadership is often required to
help entrenched actors envision new alternatives and to break down informal beliefs. New formal
institutions are often also required to reinforce a shift in informal norms. Such feedback and feed
forward loops help to explain how institutional change is initiated.
A key observation is that the institutional changes discussed in the first essay helped to
shape the environmental factors introduced in the second essay that have contributed to the shift
from the closed to the open innovation paradigm. It is important to note that many of these
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factors are interrelated. For example, the rise of the venture capital market in the U.S. is a result
of a change in the interpretation of a law that governs how retirement funds can be invested (i.e.,
the Department of Labor’s 1979 ruling regarding the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974). In turn, the availability of venture capital made it possible for highly mobile knowledge
workers to launch entrepreneurial ventures. Concurrently, the government enacted laws that
encouraged collaborative research (e.g., the Federal Technology Transfer Act, the National
Collaborative Research Act), resulting in the emergence of a robust market for technology that
connected entrepreneurial and established firms, facilitated by advances in information and
communication technology.
While the boundaries of R&D have become more fluid, firms have far from abandoned
the internal pursuit of technological creativity in the face of these institutional and environmental
changes. Rather, the current era exhibits an extraordinary amount of diversity in regards to how
firms pursue technological creativity. Even within the same industry, different firms have
adopted different approaches to innovation. An example discussed in the second essay is that of
Lucent and Cisco. In the late-20th/early-21st century, Lucent (formerly Bell Labs) had a fairly
insular position regarding R&D, whereas Cisco performed little internal R&D, preferring instead
to scan for promising new technologies developed by start-ups and to make toe-hold investments
in such firms (Chesbrough, 2003: xviii). Thus, a framework was developed in the second essay
to help explain some of the intra-industry variation in the approach to innovation.
An important take-away from the second essay is that not all situations call for
collaborative R&D. Rather, managers evaluating whether an external partner is required should
take firm-, transaction-, and project-level characteristics into consideration in conjunction with
the environmental factors that are present in the industry their firm operates in. Of particular

248
importance is recognition of being caught in the Not-Invented-Here (NIH) mindset identified by
Katz and Allen (1982). Firms that exhibit the NIH mindset are likely to disregard the transactionand project-level characteristics that suggest an external partner may be required. Cognizance of
this problem may help managers to overcome this mindset and consider the full array of options
for organizing innovation in light of all of the factors at each level of the framework presented in
the second essay.
Whereas the first two essays primarily examine the boundaries of R&D and questions
regarding whether firms should enter into collaborative R&D arrangements, the third essay
focuses on the formal governance of such arrangements after the decision to form an R&D
alliance has been made. As the main findings from the two studies conducted in the third essay
were discussed in extensive detail in the final section of the previous chapter, I instead focus here
on presenting the key connections between these studies and the first two essays.
The institutional setting in which inter-firm transactions are embedded again plays an
important role in the studies conducted in the third essay. Formal institutions provide the legal
framework that sets the parameters for managing collaborative endeavors. For example, R&D
alliance contracts frequently include clauses that divide the returns from the alliance between the
partners through the assignment of IP rights. In the U.S., the IP system (which is a formal
institution) secures such rights against infringement and theft, helping the partners to realize the
value of the innovation(s) resulting from the alliance. In the absence of such a formal institution,
an alternative contractual solution would need to be devised in order to provide the same
protection. Informal norms and practices appear to play a role in the use (or non-use) of other
contract terms, as evidenced by the results obtained in the second study of the third essay
regarding severe termination rights. Anecdotally, practitioners suggest that industry norms and
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concerns about reputation play an important role in determining whether or not the granting of
such rights is commonplace.

Essay 1:
An Institutional Theory
Investigation of U.S.
Technology
Development Trends
since the Mid-19th
Century
Essay 2:
The R&D Outsourcing
Decision:
Environmental and
Strategic
Considerations

Level 1:
Informal
Institutions

Level 2:
Formal
Institutions

Level 3:
Governance

Essay 3: An Empirical
Examination of the
Design of R&D
Alliance Contracts in
the Medical Device
Industry

Level 4:
Resource
Allocation
Figure 5-1. The three essays in relation to the model of the economics of institutions
Figure 5-1, reproduced from the opening chapter, provides an ideal way to visualize the
connections between the essays that were just discussed. The placement of the first two essays in
the figure shows that the essays are connected by their common interest in how institutions
impact decisions about the boundaries of R&D. The first essay provides an explanation based on
institutional theory for the major shifts in the boundaries of R&D over the last century and a half
at the level of the economy as a whole. An important conclusion from the first essay is that the
current era does not represent a simple reversion to the boundaries of R&D observed in the late19th/early-20th century. Rather, in the dual-path era, firms engage in internal R&D while also
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taking advantage of the robust market for technology through licensing and collaborative
organizational forms.
The focus of the second essay shifts from the level of the economy as a whole to that of
an individual project in order to explain discrete R&D sourcing decisions. Again, the impact of
institutions, acting through the major environmental factors discussed, is a key element of the
model developed in the second essay. In addition, the model takes into account the influence of
several firm-level considerations along with the transaction- and project-level characteristics
traditionally examined. The final essay in this dissertation further shifts the level of analysis
down in order to examine the formal governance mechanisms that firms employ, in the form of
contracts, once they have selected an external R&D source. While this essay is shown to be
directly linked to Level 3 in the figure, it is again connected to the first two essays by the
constraints that institutions place on managers and lawyers regarding contract structure.
5.4. Implications for Theory and Practice
Rather than recapping the implications for theory and practice presented in each of the
essays in this dissertation, I discuss implications based on the connections between the essays in
this section. In regards to theory, an important implication that cuts across the three essays is that
the ability of TCE to explain phenomena related to the boundaries of R&D is limited. The essays
in this dissertation demonstrate the limits of TCE alone to provide an explanation for the
historical evolution of the boundaries of R&D, the variance in project-level decisions made by
firms facing similar transaction characteristics, and the inclusion of specific clauses in R&D
alliance contracts. To overcome this limitation, all three essays rely on the integration of TCE
with other theoretical perspectives. While strategy research has always been multidisciplinary,
the major disciplines (e.g., economics, sociology, and psychology) have largely been called upon

251
in isolation (Agarwal & Hoetker, 2007). However, recent research has taken steps to combine
insights from the resource-based view and TCE in order to explain differences in sourcing and
governance mode decisions (e.g., Argyres, 1996; Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Sampson, 2004b;
Mayer and Salomon, 2006).
The framework developed in the second essay of this dissertation follows in this tradition
through its inclusion of technological and relational capabilities, which are suggested to play a
role in initiating the decision to seek an external R&D source. The third essay also calls on the
capabilities literature, specifically in the first study which examines the moderating impact of
contracting capabilities on the relationships drawn from TCE regarding the inclusion of specific
clauses. The adoption of this approach in both essays echoes Williamson’s (1998: 48) suggestion
that strategy scholars should be examining how firm A should organize a transaction of
characteristics X in light of its strengths and weaknesses (i.e., capabilities and rigidities). The
second and third essays tentatively demonstrate that factoring in a firm’s pre-existing resources
can help to improve the predictive power of TCE when examining R&D boundary decisions and
the structure of R&D alliance contracts.
In regards to the first essay, TCE is actually embedded in Level 3 of the model of the
economics of institutions (Williamson, 1998: 29). The institutional factors operating at Level 2
act as shift parameters which directly shape the transaction environment at Level 3. These rules
of the game impact the play of the game (i.e., governance decisions). Scholars in the New
Institutional Economics tradition have long seen the value of integrating TCE with other
perspectives in order to better explain historical trends. In fact, institutional theory itself actually
encompasses ideas from several disciplines including economics and sociology. Thus, the first
essay demonstrates that combining insights from multiple streams of institutional theory leads to
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a more complete understanding of historical trends. By augmenting TCE with economic and
cognitive views of institutions, the first essay is able to go beyond suggesting why a particular
firm selects a specific technology development mode to explaining the adoption of technology
development practices at the economy-wide level.
From a practical standpoint, the connections between the findings from the first and third
essays suggest that familiarity with the informal norms and practices that are prevalent in an
industry may help to alleviate some of the haggling that takes place in contract negotiations. At
the end of the day, the development and commercialization of new products is the desired
outcome of an R&D alliance. Partners may lose trust in each other and the project may be
delayed if negotiations become contentious. Although the relationship is complex, speed-tomarket is a key determinant of the success of new product development along several dimensions
of performance (Stanko, Molina-Castillo, and Munuera-Aleman, 2012). Thus, familiarity with
industry norms should help the lead negotiators for each partner to identify terms that are likely
to hold up the contract design process. In turn, acknowledging that some terms are vital to each
partner at the outset can help negotiators to focus on drafting a contract that promotes
cooperation in order to avoid costly delays and the erosion of trust.
A related implication for practice is that learning about industry norms is often slow and
costly owing to time-compression diseconomies. As a result, an entrepreneurial firm entering
into an alliance for the first time may lack familiarity with such norms until it has participated in
several alliances. To overcome this deficiency, the founding team might consider hiring industry
veterans, especially those with alliance experience, to fill the business development and in-house
counsel roles. While establishing a full-blown alliance management function may be out of the
question for many smaller firms, the founding team might also consider how it can use
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technology to capture what the firm has learned about industry norms and practices so that
negotiators have a ‘playbook’ that can be used as a guide in subsequent alliances. The
improvements in information and communications technology discussed in the second essay
have not only contributed to the shift from closed to open innovation, but also to the
advancement of knowledge management within firms.
5.5 Future Research Opportunities
In this final section, I present several interesting questions and future research
opportunities that arise from the connections drawn between the essays in this dissertation. First,
the current period is characterized as the dual-path era in the first essay. The implication of this
characterization is that firms are not relying solely on in-house R&D or external sources of
R&D. Rather, at the aggregate level, firms are observed to utilize both modes. However, as noted
in the second essay, some firms are observed to rely on one mode or the other to a greater extent.
This brings up an interesting question that connects the first essay to the studies conducted in the
third essay: are the contracting practices of firms that frequently outsource R&D and engage in
R&D alliances different from those of firms that rarely do so? An examination of this question
would help to delve deeper into the origins and evolution of contracting capabilities.
A second related research opportunity arises from the connection between the second and
third essays. Both essays highlight the importance of relational/contracting capabilities. While
the second essay does suggest that the knowledge held by managers from different levels of the
firm should be combined in order to make sound sourcing decisions, neither essay delves very
deeply into a discussion of which functional backgrounds are better suited to take the lead in
regards to making decisions about specific contractual issues. The inability to address this in the
third essay is partially due to the firm-level proxy used for previous contracting experience.
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To overcome this limitation, case studies could be conducted to investigate Argyres and
Mayer’s (2007) dual-alignment principle, which suggests that different employees, due to their
functional backgrounds, possess different knowledge with respect to various types of contract
terms. Such studies would help to further our understanding of when different employees get
involved in contract negotiations and what terms they are brought in to take the lead on. This
research would also help to unpack the contract design capabilities construct. Contract design
capabilities were treated as if they reside at the firm-level in the third essay. Delving deeper into
the role played by different employees would shed light on if and how the knowledge held by
individuals is aggregated to form a firm-level capability.
In addition to managers and lawyers, engineers and other technical employees are
expected to play a role in sourcing decisions and contract design. The second and third essays
did not discuss this possibility explicitly, presenting another avenue to explore related to the
concept of contract design capabilities. While such employees are likely to have a hand in
shaping technical specifications and project milestones and timelines, future research could
examine if there are other aspects of R&D alliance contracts where their knowledge is of value.
Another research opportunity is to investigate the role that technology plays in the
evolution of the boundaries of R&D. In the first essay, institutions were shown to play a major
role in shaping the transaction environment, leading to the boundary shifts observed. The impact
of new technology, however, was not discussed in much detail. Several interesting questions
arise if technology is taken into account: What is the relationship between technology and
institutions? Do institutions shape technology or vice versa? Is technology simply a facilitator or
does it have a direct impact on the evolution of the boundaries of R&D? An investigation of
these questions could draw on the rich literature that discusses technological determinism.
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The impact of technology on sourcing decisions and contract design was also not
examined in much detail in the second or third essays. TCE’s discriminating-alignment
hypothesis (Williamson, 1991: 277) assumes that the key to success is matching the
characteristics of a particular transaction to the ideal governance mode. Contractual
arrangements may still fail, however, even if the most appropriate governance form is selected.
Could such failures be attributed to the characteristics of the technology under development?
How important is it to develop an ‘ideal’ contract when a transaction involves cutting-edge
science? The focus on contractual issues and discriminating alignment may actually be obscuring
the role that technology itself plays in the ultimate outcome of a transaction. Thus, a final
research opportunity to explore is if and how the nature of the technology under development
impacts the predictions of the discriminating-alignment hypothesis.
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